Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

which still retained a popular constitution after the encroachments of centuries.1

Corporations

volution to

George III.

After the Revolution, corporations were free from the intrusion of prerogative; but the policy of mufrom the Re- nicipal freedom was as little respected as in former times. A corporation had come to be regarded as a close governing body with peculiar privileges. The old model was followed; and the charters of George III. favored the municipal rights of burgesses no more than the charters of Elizabeth or James I. Even where they did not expressly limit the local authority to a small body of persons, custom and usurpation restricted it either to the town council or to that body and its own nominees, the freemen. And while this close form of municipal government was maintained, towns were growing in wealth and population, whose inhabitants had no voice in the management of their own affairs. Two millions of people were denied the constitutional privilege of self-govern

ment.

Abuses of close corporations.

Self-elected and irresponsible corporations were suffered to enjoy a long dominion. Composed of local and often hereditary cliques and family connections, they were absolute masters over their own townsmen. Generally of one political party, they excluded men of different opinions, whether in politics or religion, and used all the influence of their office for maintaining the ascendency of their own party. Elected for life, it was not difficult to consolidate their interest; and they acted without any sense of responsibility. Their proceedings were generally secret: nay, secrecy was sometimes enjoined by an oath.1

Despite their narrow constitution, there were some corpo

1 Case of Quo Warranto, 1683; St. Tr., viii. 1039; Hume's Hist., vi. 201; remodelling the corporations, 1687; Hallam's Const. Hist., ii. 238. 2 Report of Commissioners, p. 17.

■ Ibid., p. 36.

4 lbid., 36.

[ocr errors]

rations which performed their functions worthily. Maintaining a mediæval dignity and splendor, their rule was graced by public virtue, courtesy, and refinement. Nobles shared their councils and festivities: the first men of the country were associated with townsmen; and while ruling without responsibility, they retained the willing allegiance of the people, by traditions of public service, by acts of munificence and charity, and by the respect due to their eminent station. But the greater number of corporations were of a lower type. Neglecting their proper functions, the superintendence of the police, the management of the jails, the paving and lighting of the streets, and the supply of water, they thought only of the personal interests attached to office. They grasped all patronage, lay and ecclesiastical, for their relatives, friends, and political partisans; and wasted the corporate funds in greasy feasts and vulgar revelry. Many were absolutely insolvent. Charities were despoiled, and public trusts neglected and misapplied; jobbery and corruption in every form were fostered.2 Townsmen viewed with distrust the proceedings of councils, over whom they had no control, whose constitution was oligarchical, and whose political sentiments were often obnoxious to the majority. In some towns the middle classes found themselves ruled by a close council alone: in others by the council and a rabble of freemen, its creatures, drawn mainly from the lower classes and having no title to represent the general interests of the community. And important municipal powers were therefore intrusted, under Local Acts, to independent commissioners, in whom the inhabitants had confidence. Even the administration of justice was tainted by suspicions of political partiality. Borough magistrates were at once. incompetent and exclusively of one party; and juries were composed of freemen, of the same close connection. This

1 Rep. of Comm., p. 46. 2 Ibid., 31, 46, 47, 48.

VOL. II.

30

8 lbid., 43.
4 Ibid., 26-29, 39.

favored class also enjoyed trading privileges, which provoked jealousy and fettered commerce.1

Monopoly

rights.

But the worst abuse of these corrupt bodies was that which too long secured their impunity. They of electoral were the strongholds of parliamentary interest and corruption. The electoral privileges which they had usurped, or had acquired by charter, were convenient instruments in the hands of both the political parties, who were contending for power. In many of the corporate towns the representation was as much at the disposal of particular families, as that of nomination boroughs in others it was purchased by opulent partisans, whom both parties. welcomed to their ranks. In others, again, where freemen enjoyed the franchise, it was secured by bribery, in which the corporations too often became the most active agents,— not scrupling even to apply their trust funds to the corruption of electors.2 The freemen were generally needy and corrupt, and inferior, as well in numbers as in respectability, to the other inhabitants: but they often had an exclusive right to the franchise; and whenever a general election was anticipated, large additions were made to their numbers.* The freedom of a city was valued according to the length of the candidate's purse. Corporations were safe so long as society was content to tolerate the notorious abuses of parliamentary representation. The municipal and parliamentary organizations were inseparable: both were the instruments by which the crown, the aristocracy, and political parties had dispossessed the people of their constitutional rights; and they stood and fell together.

The Municipal

The Reform Act wrested from the corporations their exclusive electoral privileges, and restored them Corporations to the people. This tardy act of retribution was followed by the appointment of a commission of a Ibid., 33.

Bill, 1835.

2 Ibid., 45.

1 Rep. of Comm., p. 40.
Ibid., 34, 35. (See table of freemen created.)

inquiry, which roughly exposed the manifold abuses of irresponsible power, wherever it had been suffered to prevail. And in 1835, Parliament was called upon to overthrow these municipal oligarchies. The measure was fitly introduced by Lord John Russell, who had been foremost in the cause of parliamentary reform. It proposed to vest the municipal franchise in rated inhabitants, who had paid poor-rates within the borough for three years. By them the governing body, consisting of a mayor and common council, were to be elected. The ancient order of aldermen was to be no longer maintained. The pecuniary rights of existing freemen were preserved, during their lives; but their municipal franchise was superseded; and as no new freemen were to be created, the class would be eventually extinguished. Exclusive rights of trading were to be discontinued. To the councils, constituted so as to secure public confidence, more extended powers were intrusted, for the police and local government of the town, and the administration of justice; while provision was made for the publicity of their proceedings, the proper administration of their funds, and the publication and audit of their accounts.

No effective opposition could be offered to the general principles of this measure. The propriety of re- Amended by storing the rights of self-government to the the Lords. people, and sweeping away the corruptions of ages, was generally admitted; but strenuous efforts were made to give further protection to existing right, and to mod fy the popular character of the measure. These efforts, ineffectual in the Commons, were successful in the Lords. Counsel were heard, and witnesses examined, on behalf of several of the corporations; but the main principles of the bill were not contested. Important amendments, however, were inserted. The pecuniary rights and parliamentary franchise of freemen received more ample protection. With a view to qualify the democratic constitution of the councils, a 1 June 5th, 1835. - Hans. Deb., 3d Ser., xxviii. 541.

property qualification was required for town councillors; and aldermen were introduced into the council, to be elected for life; the first aldermen being chosen from the existing body of aldermen.1 These amendments were considered by ministers and the Commons, in a spirit of concession and compromise. The more zealous advocates of popular rights urged their unconditional rejection, even at the sacrifice of the bill; but more temperate counsels prevailed, and the amendments were accepted with modifications. A qualification for councillors was agreed to, but in a less invidious form aldermen were to be elected for six years, instead of for life; and the exclusive eligibility of existing aldermen was not insisted on. And thus was passed a popular measure, second in importance to the Reform Act alone. The municipal bodies which it created, if less popular than under the original scheme, were yet founded upon a wide basis of representation, which has since been further extended. Local self-government was effectually restored. Elected rulers have since generally secured the confidence of their constituents: municipal office has become an object of honorable ambition to public-spirited townsmen; and local administration, if not free from abuses, has been exercised under responsibility and popular control. And further, the enjoyment of municipal franchises has encouraged and kept alive a spirit of political freedom in the inhabitants of

towns.

One ancient institution alone was omitted from this general Corporation measure of reform, the corporation of the City of London. of London. It was a municipal principality, — of great antiquity, of wide jurisdiction, of ample property and revenues, and of composite organization.

1 Hans. Deb., 3d Ser., xxx. 426, 480, 579, &c.

2 Ibid., 1132, 1194, 1335.

8 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76.

4 Municipal Corporations Act, 1859, 22 Vict. c. 35.

Distinguished for

See Reports of Lords' Committees on Rates and Municipal Franchise, 1859, and Elective Franchise, 1860.

« AnteriorContinuar »