state and performs the services for his patrons in another, has arisen in several cases, as in Kansas City v. Seaman (1916) 99 Kan. 143, L.R.A. 1917B, 341, 160 Pac. 1139, and Smith v. Jackson (1899) 103 Tenn. 673, 47 L.R.A. 416, 54 S. W. 981. In the former case the conclusion was reached that one was engaged in interstate commerce who solicited laundry work for a laundry company situated without the state; while in the Tennessee case, the court held that an agent of a laundry company in another state, who collected garments and sent them out of the state to be laundered and thereafter redelivered them to their owners, was not engaged in interstate commerce, SO as to be protected against the privilege tax imposed on his occupation by statute. The court said that the term "commerce," found in the interstate clause of the Federal Constitution, could not be held to embrace a transaction such as was presented in this case; that it implied, when used by business men, trade or traffic, as in the exchange of specific articles or commodities for other articles or commodities, or else of these for money or its representative; that in a case like that before it, nothing, in the true commercial sense, was sold or exchanged; and that there was simply a personal contract based on a valuable consideration having no element of a commercial transaction falling within the protection of this clause of the Constitution. Several other cases may be referred to because of their value for purposes of illustration or of analogy, although the facts do not bring them within the scope of the annotation. In Muir v. Samuels (1901) 110 Ky. 605, 62 S. W. 481, it was held that a laundry was not a "manufacturing establishment" within the meaning of a statute giving to employees a prior lien on the property of any mine, railroad, rolling mill, foundry, "or other manufacturing establishments," when the property passed into the hands of a receiver or assignee for the benefit of creditors. And a laundry company was held in Com. v. Keystone Laundry Co. (1902) 203 Pa. 289, 52 Atl. 326, not to be a "manufacturing" concern within the meaning of a statute relating to taxation (the statutory provision not being set out). It was said: "The appellant was incorporated for the purpose of 'cleansing, bleaching, starching, and smoothing textile fabrics by the use of machinery and mechanical appliances, and the application of skilled manual operation.' Its principal business is, as properly stated by the court below, 'washing and ironing.' In carrying on this business, it needs soap and dyes, and, even if it does manufacture these two articles for its own use, instead of buying them, such manufacture of them does not make the 'washing and ironing' concern a 'manufacturing plant and business,' as defined by statute, lexicon, or judicial utterance." Attention is called also to Re White Star Laundry Co. (1902) 117 Fed. 570, in which it was held that the business of a laundry was not within the provision of the bankruptcy statute giving jurisdiction over corporations "engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuit." The court said that the terms "manufacture" and "manufacturing" have well-recognized interpretations which were clearly inapplicable to the business under consideration. And the court took the view that the terms "trading" and "mercantile," as construed by the weight of authority, could not be applied to the business in question. The question as to what amounts to trade or commerce is one which, of course, has arisen in various other cases, to one or two of which attention is called, in view of the fact that the issue in the reported case (STATE v. MCCLELLAN, ante, 527) was as to the meaning of these terms. Thus, in Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators' Union (1922) 151 Minn. 220, 27 A.L.R. 631, 186 N. W. 781, where the question was whether the business of conducting a motion picture theater was a trade within the meaning of the statute relating to agreements or combinations in restraint of trade, the court said that it seemed clear that the only logical conclusion was that the word "trade" was used in its broadest sense, and included business of any kind in which a person engaged for profit. But the Federal Supreme Court has taken the position that a baseball exhibition, although for money, would not be called "trade or commerce" in the commonly accepted use of those words, observing that personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. Federal Baseball Club v. National League (1922) 259 U. S. 200, 66 L. ed. 898, 26 A.L.R. 357, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465. It was held in this case that the organized business of giving exhibitions of baseball between clubs in different states was not interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Anti-trust Acts. The decision affirms (1921) 269 Fed. 681, 50 App. D. C. 165, in which the court, after referring to various definitions of the terms "trade" and "commerce," said that through these definitions runs the idea that trade and commerce require the transfer of something, whether it be persons, commodities, or intelligence, from one place or person to another. R. E. H. 1. A warranty of fitness is implied in leasing machinery for performance of specified work for which it was designed. [See note on this question beginning on page 540.] Evidence to explain lease. 2. In a suit upon a written lease of a machine for performance of a stated contract, evidence is admissible to show the details of the work to be performed and the lessor's knowledge of it. - of implied warranty. 3. Any warranty of fitness of a machine for a special purpose implied from a leasing for that purpose may be proved by parol, although the lease is in writing and contains no warranty. APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department, affirming a judgment of a Trial Term for Westchester County in favor of defendant on his counterclaim in an action brought to recover rental alleged to be due for certain machinery leased by plaintiff to defendant under written agreements of lease. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion Messrs. Kenneth E. Stockton and Edward R. Whittingham, with Messrs. Stockton & Stockton, for appellant. The court below erred in admitting evidence of oral negotiations prior to the execution of the written contract to prove an "implied warranty" of fitness for a particular purpose. Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288; of the court. Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. 961; Cody v. Dickinson, 159 App. Div. 234, 144 N. Y. Supp. 159; Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co. 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. Supp. 538; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163; Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108, 28 L. ed. 86, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 537; Smith v. Coe, 170 N. Y. 162, 63 (237 N. Y. 30, 142 N. E. 342.) N. E. 57; Heath Dry Gas Co. v. Hurd, 193 N. Y. 255, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 160, 86 N. E. 18. There was no implied warranty of fitness for any general purpose. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 73; Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, 19 L. ed. 987; Bartlett v. Hoppock, 34 N. Y. 118, 88 Am. Dec. 428; Dounce v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163; Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398, 15 Am. Rep. 438; Edwards v. New York & H. R. Co. 98 N. Y. 245, 50 Am. Rep. 659; Timlin v. Standard Oil Co. 126 N. Y. 514, 22 Am. St. Rep. 845, 27 N. E. 786; Hirsch v. Radt, 228 N. Y. 104, 126 N. E. 653; Builders' Brick & Supply Co. v. Walsh Transp. Co. 106 Misc. 460, 174 N. Y. Supp. 690, affirmed in 189 App. Div. 898, 178 N. Y. Supp. 881; Robertson v. Amazon Tug & Lighterage Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 598, 51 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 68, 46 L. T. N. S. 146, 30 Week. Rep. 308, 4 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 496-C. A.; Garrettson v. Rinehart & D. Co. 75 W. Va. 700, 84 S. E. 929. Messrs. Franklin Nevius and William K. Hartpence, with Messrs. Kellogg & Rose, for respondent: It was not error to permit oral testimony of the conversation between the president of the plaintiff company and the defendant at the time that the contract was entered into, for the purpose of establishing an implied warranty that the machinery was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was leased. Putnam v. Interior Metal Mfg. Co. 225 N. Y. 37, 121 N. E. 463; Moriarty v. Porter, 22 Misc. 536, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1107; Carleton v. Lombard, A. & Co. 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422; Bierman v. City Mills Co. 151 N. Y. 482, 37 L.R.A. 799, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635, 45 N. E. 856; Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co. 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. Supp. 538; Sturm v. Williams Oven Mfg. Co. 201 App. Div. 113, 193 N. Y. Supp. 852; Cooper v. Payne, 103 App. Div. 118, 93 N. Y. Supp. 69, 186 N. Y. 334, 78 N. E. 1076; Van Pub. Co. v. Westinghouse, C. K. & Co. 72 App. Div. 121, 76 N. Y. Supp. 340; William Anson Wood Mower & Reaper Co. v. Thayer, 50 Hun, 516, 3 N. Y. Supp. 465; The St. S. Angelo Toso, 271 Fed. 245; Herbrand Co. v. Lackawanna Steel Co. 280 Fed. 11; Flynn v. Bedell Co. 242 Mass. 450, 27 A.L.R. 1504, 136 N. E. 252; Heath Dry Gas Co. v. Hurd, 193 N. Y. 255, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 160, 86 N. E. 18; Charter Gas Engine Co. v. Kellam, 79 Where the hirer makes known to the owner the purpose for which the property is hired and relies upon the skill and judgment of the owner, there is an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for which the property is hired. Chamberlain v. Pratt, 33 N. Y. 47; Chase v. Second Ave. R. Co. 97 N. Y. 384, 49 Am. Rep. 531; Henry E. Fox Constr. Co. v. Logan Constr. Co. 170 N. Y. Supp. 50; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471, 18 N. C. C. A. 1058; Putnam v. Interior Metal Mfg. Co. 225 N. Y. 37, 121 N. E. 463; Carleton v. Lombard, A. & Co. 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422; Bierman v. City Mills Co. 151 N. Y. 482, 37 L.R.A. 799, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635, 45 N. E. 856; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y. 61, 25 Am. Rep. 136; Sand v. Garford Motor Truck Co. 204 App. Div. 70, 198 N. Y. Supp. 43, appeal dismissed in 236 N. Y. 327, 140 N. E. 713; Sturm v. Williams Oven Mfg. Co. 201 App. Div. 113, 193 N. Y. Supp. 852; Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co. 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y. Supp. 538; Cooper v. Payne, 103 App. Div. 118, 93 N. Y. Supp. 69, 186 N. Y. 334, 78 N. E. 1076; Bell v. Mills, 78 App. Div. 42, 80 N. Y. Supp. 34; Van Pub. Co. v. Westinghouse, C. K. & Co. 72 App. Div. 121, 76 N. Y. Supp. 340; Landreth v. Wyckoff, 67 App. Div. 145, 73 N. Y. Supp. 388; William Anson Wood Mower & Reaper Co. v. Thayer, 50 Hun, 516, 3 N. Y. Supp. 465; Newman v. Wilson, 78 Hun, 295, 28 N. Y. Supp. 914; Moriarty v. Porter, 22 Misc. 536, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1107; The St. S. Angelo Toso, 271 Fed. 245; Herbrand Co. v. Lackawanna Steel Co. 280 Fed. 11; Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U. S. 630, 30 L. ed. 810, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Flynn v. Bedell Co. 242 Mass. 450, 27 A.L.R. 1504, 136 N. E. 252; McClamrock v. Flint, 101 Ind. 278; Conn v. Hunsberger, 224 Pa. 154, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 372, 132 Am. St. Rep. 770, 73 Atl. 324, 16 Ann. Cas. 504; 15 Am & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. pp. 1231, 1234, 1237. Crane, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement of which the material part is as follows: "Lease. "The Hoisting Engine Sales Co., Inc., lessor, hereby leases to John J. Hart, lessee, the following equipment subject to the following terms: "One 40' boom, all steel Shannon Traveler with an 8x10 D. C. D. D. Lambert hoist with swinger and counterweight drum. "Delivery to be made at Nutley, N. J. "Return delivery to be made to our yard at Long Island City with trucking charges prepaid to above yard or to an equal distance elsewhere if so directed. Lessee agrees to return equipment in as good condition as when received less wear incident to normal service in the hands of a competent operator. "Equipment to be used by the lessee on his contract at Singac, N. J." After the defendant had installed the traveler and hoist, it broke down completely and failed to do the work for which it was hired. The defendant had a subcontract with the Brady Company in the state of New Jersey to excavate a trench and lay about 10 miles of water pipe. The pipes were made of steel, 30 feet long and 72 inches in diameter, and weighed about 4 tons each. With the derrick the defendant intended to operate an orange-peel bucket to do the digging and also intended to use the same machine to put the pipe in the trench. The hoist could not be operated as it was designed to work, and the boom broke when attempting to lift one of the pipes. That the machinery was unfit for the purpose for which it was hired has been determined by the jury and the unanimous affirmance of its verdict by the appellate division concludes us from examining the question. The defendant having returned the traveler and hoist, this action was commenced to recover the rental reserved in the lease. The defendant counterclaimed by setting up a breach of warranty and demanding the damages sustained in consequence thereof. From a judg-. ment recovered by the defendant the plaintiff has appealed, presenting what it claims to have been errors in the admission of evidence to vary the terms of the writing as given above. The position the plaintiff takes is this: The writing contains no express warranty that the traveler and hoist will do the defendant's work; there is no implied warranty, so there was no warranty at all. Therefore, if this be true, it was error to permit the defendant to give in evidence the conversation with the plaintiff's president, preceding the execution of the lease, wherein he was told the nature of the defendant's contract and the kind of machinery required. This, says the plaintiff, added an express oral warranty to the written lease, as no implied warranty arose out of the transaction. When John J. Hart, the defendant, was on the stand, he was asked: Q. What was the general nature of that contract? A. It was laying a pipe line. Q. Well about how long a pipe line, and what kind of pipe? A. It was a steel pipe, 72 inches in height, 30 feet long, and about 10 miles of work. Q. Do you know Mr. Cist, the president of the plaintiff company? A. I do. Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Cist in regard to your contract over in New Jersey? A. I did, in Mr. Cist's office. Q. Now state what you said to Mr. Cist and what Mr. Cist said to you. A. I told Mr. Cist what I wanted. I said: "Have you got a traveling derrick? I want to use an orange peel on it to do the digging." I also wanted to use the same machine to put in pipe. He said: "I have got a rig that you can use; in fact, it is over in Jersey now." I said, "What kind of a machine is it?" and he said, "It is a Lambert engine, 8 by 16, with a swinger on it, and it is a Shannon traveler." I says, "What kind do you call a Shannon travel (237 N. Y. 30, 142 N. E. 342.) er?" and he said, "It is a machine good for 10 tons." This testimony was received over objection and exception. In the first place, we must note that the written lease refers to a purpose for which this traveler and hoist were to be used. "Equipment to be used by the lessee on his contract at Singac, New Jersey." These are the written words. What do they signify without any oral testimony to explain them? First, they signify that the plaintiff knew that the defendant had a contract to do work at Singac, New Jersey. Second, they make clear that the plaintiff also knew that the equipment it was leasing to the defendant was to be used on that work. Third, that from the nature of the equipment the plaintiff knew that the work was to be the hoisting of dirt and materials. Where the writing is sufficiently specific to state all these things, I do not consider it a Evidence-to explain lease. departure from the instrument to show a little more in detail what the defendant's contract was, and that the plaintiff knew all about it. The plaintiff in writing says: "I know that you want my hoisting machine for use on your contract in Singac, New Jersey." Does this not reasonably imply that it also knew the nature of that contract and generally the kind of work it called for? It does not vary the terms of the written instrument to show by parol that the plaintiff knew what it was writing about, when it referred to the defendant's contract. By therefore, from their nature, may attach to a written as well as an unwritten contract of sale." Carleton v. Lombard, A. & Co. 149 N. Y. 137, 146, 43 N. E. 424. Thus, there is an implied warranty in manufactured goods sold by the maker that they are free from any latent defect growing out of process of manufacture (Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163; Carleton v. Lombard, A. & Co. supra); also, in the sale of seeds by the grower there is an implied warranty that they are free from any latent defect arising from improper cultivation (White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118, 27 Am. Rep. 13). In the sale by a retail dealer of articles of food for immediate use there is an implied warranty that they are fit for human consumption. Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, L.R.A. 1918F, 1172, 118 N. E. 853; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471, 18 N. C. C. A. 1058. That the sale of any of these things was in writing, expressing no warranty, would not prevent the warranty by implication from attaching. analogy there is an implied warranty in the hiring or bailment of certain kinds of property. In the hiring of a horse there is an implied warranty that he is fit for the purpose for which he was taken (Fowler v. Lock, L. R. 7 C. P. 272); in hiring a carriage that it will not fall apart (Hyman v. Nye & Sons (1880) L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 685, 44 L. T. N. S. 919, 45 J. P. 554). Where wharfingers agreed to permit a shipowner to discharge his vessel at their jetty in the Thames, where vessels must of necessity ground in low water, there was an implied warranty that the bed of the river was not so uneven as to cause damage to the ship. The Moorcock (1888) L. R. 14 P. Div. 64, 58 L. J. Prob. N. S. 73, 60 L. T. N. S. 654, 37 Week. Rep. 439, 6 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 373-C. A. Shipowners agreeing to furnish the necessary cranes, chains, and gearing to a stevedore to discharge a cargo impliedly warrant that the chains are so far sound as to be sufficient for the |