-effect of words "if enny thing hapens."

It is equally clear that where, as here, the words, "if enny thing hapens," condition the gift, they strongly support the idea of a testamentary intent; indeed, they exactly state what is expressed in or must be implied from every will. True, if the particular contingency stated in a paper, as the condition upon which it shall become effective, has never in fact occurred, it will not be admitted to probate. Morrow's Appeal, 116 Pa. 440, 2 Am. St. Rep. 616, 9 Atl. 660; Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 66 Atl. 92, 8 Ann. Cas. 1146. In the present case, however, it is clear the contingency, "if enny thing hapens," was still existing when testator died suddenly on the same day he wrote and mailed the letter; hence, the facts not being disputed, the question of testamentary intent was one of law for the court. Davis's Estate, 275 Pa. 126, 118 Atl. 645.

As is often the case in holographic wills of an informal character, much of that which is written is not dispositive; and the difficulty, in ascertaining the writer's intent, arises largely from the fact that he had little, if any, knowledge of either law, punctuation, or grammar. In the present case this is apparent from the paper itself; and in this light the language now quoted must be construed: "I think we are gone to have one of the hardest [winters]. Plenty of snow & Verry cold Verry cold! I dont want to see it this way but it will come

well I cant say if I will come over yet. I will wright in my next letter it may be to ruff we will see in the next letter if I come I have some very valuable papers I want you to keep fore me so if enny thing hapens all . [the real and personal property specified] goes to George Darl & Irvin Kepp this letter lock it up it may help you out."

When resolved into plainer English, it is clear to us that all of the quotation, preceding the words "I have some very valuable papers," re

late to the predicted bad weather, a doubt as to whether decedent will be able to go to Glencoe because of it, and a possible resolution of it in his next letter; the present one stating, "we will see in the next letter if I come." This being so, the clause relating to the valuable papers begins a new subject of thought, and since the clearly dispositive gifts which follow are made dependent on no other contingency than "if enny thing hapens," and -provision in death did happen letter as testasuddenly on the same day, the paper, so far as respects those gifts, must be treated as testamentary.

mentary.

It is difficult to understand how the decedent, probably expecting an early demise, as appears by the letter itself, and the fact of his sickness and inability to work during the last three days of the first or second week preceding,-could have possibly meant anything else than a testamentary gift when he said, "so if enny thing hapens [the property specified] goes to George Darl & Irvin;" and why, if this was not intended to be effective in and of itself, he should have sent it to two of the distributeees named in it, telling them to "Kepp this letter lock it up it may help you out."

The second question to be determined depends on the proper construction of § 2 of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917 (P. L. 403, 405; Pa. Stat. 1920, § 8308), which is a reenactment of § 6 of the Wills Act of April 8, 1833 (P. L. 249), reading as follows: "Every will shall be in writing, and, unless the person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed by him at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction."

The letter now being considered was all in the handwriting of decedent, including the word "Father," at the end of it; and hence the point to be decided would appear to resolve itself into this: Does the word "Father," when taken in connection

with the contents of the paper, show that it was "signed by him?" When stated thus bluntly-in the very language of the statute the answer seems free from doubt; but since we said in Brennan's Estate, 244 Pa. 574, 581, 91 Atl. 222, that "signing,' in the usual acceptation of the word and in the sense in which, presumably, it is used in the act, is the writing of a name or the affixing of what is meant as a signature," we must go further and determine whether or not the word "Father" was "meant as a signature."

In Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218, 223, it is said: "The purpose of the legislature seems rather to have been to designate the place where the signature should be, to wit, at the end of the will, than to prescribe the manner in which it should be made.

.. It was not, as was supposed in the earlier cases, to furnish, in the handwriting, evidence of identity, and protection against fraud; for the name might be signed by the testator, or by another at his request, in which last case no such proof is deducible from the handwriting. The authentication of the instrument was left to the wit

nesses.

While the place of the signature is rigidly defined, its mode is left unfettered."

In Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 229, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am. St. Rep. 798, 18 Atl. 1022, this subject was fully considered, and we there said: "The purposes of the Act of 1833 were accuracy in the transmission of the testator's wishes, the authentication of the instrument transmitting them, the identification of the testator, and certainty as to his completed testamentary purpose. The first was attained by requiring writing instead of mere memory of witnesses, the second and third by the signature of testator, and the last by placing the signature at the end of the instrument. The first two requirements were derived from the English statute; the third was new (since followed by the Act of 1 Vict. chap. 26), and was the result of ex

perience of the dangers of having mere memoranda or incomplete directions taken for the expression of final intention. Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381, 52 Am. Rep. 478; Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 223. These being the purposes of the act, and the legislature not having concerned itself with what should be deemed a signing, we must look dehors the statute for a definition. As already said, the act is founded on the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II.). Under I that act it has been held that the signing may be by a mark, or by initials only, or by a fictitious or assumed name, or by a name different from that by which the testator is designated in the body of the will. 1 Jarman, Wills, 78; 1 Redf. Wills, chap. 6, § 18, and cases there cited."

ciency.

This has been approved and followed in Plate's Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 33 Am. St. Rep. 805, 23 Atl. 1038, Swire's Estate, 225 Pa. 188, 192, 73 Atl. 1110, and Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 100, 103 Atl. 533, and has never been doubted. If, then, the word "Father" was intended as a completed signature to this particular character of paper, it answers all the pur- -signature by poses of the Wills "Father”-suffiAct. That it was so intended we have no doubt. It was the method employed by decedent in signing all such letters, and was mailed by him as a finished document. In these respects it varies from Brennan's Estate, supra, so much relied on by appellant, where ther," was construed to be not a sigthe writing of "your misserable fanature, but part of an unfinished paper, which decedent retained, and to which his signature was not subsequently attached.

It is, of course, true-and upon this point Plate's Estate and Brennan's Estate, supra, were decided—that while "exactly what constitutes a signing has never been reduced to a judicial formula," if that which is written at the end of the paper is not "a full and complete signature, according to the intention and understanding of the testator," it is

not a compliance with the statute. The same cases decide, however, it will be held to be so, "if the intent to execute is apparent." In the present case, as already pointed out, tes. tator used the word "Father," as a complete signature, and mailed the paper as a finished document. True, a formal will would not be so executed; but this is not a formal will. It

is a letter, signed by him in the way he executed all such letters, and, from this circumstance, his "intent to execute is apparent" beyond all question.

The decree of the court below is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed, the costs in this court to be paid by the estate of Harry O. Kimmel, deceased.

I. Introductory, 682.

II. Signature by mark, 682.

III. Signature by Christian name, 687. IV. Signature by initials, 688.

V. Signature by wrong name, 690. VI. Signature by stamp, 691.

I. Introductory.

In treating the question of the sufficiency of the signature of a testator as affected by the manner of signing, cases involving the place of signing have not been included.

II. Signature by mark.

The rule is well settled by practically an unbroken line of authorities that a statute requiring a will to be signed or subscribed by the testator is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.

United States. Everhart v. Everhart (1888) 34 Fed. 85.

Alabama. Schieffelin v. Schieffelin (1899) 127 Ala. 14, 28 So. 687. Arkansas. Re Cornelius (1854) 14 Ark. 675; Guthrie v. Price (1861) 23 Ark. 396.

California. Re Mullin (1895) 110 Cal. 252, 42 Pac. 645; Re Dombrowski (1912) 163 Cal. 290, 125 Pac. 233; Re Clark (1915) 170 Cal. 418, 149 Pac. 828.

Nebraska. Thompson v. Thompson (1896) 49 Neb. 157, 68 N. W. 372. New Jersey.-See Campbell v. McGuiggan (1896) N. J., 34 Atl. 383.

New York. Jackson v. Jackson (1868) 39 N. Y. 153; Butler v. Benson (1847) 1 Barb. 526; Van Hanswyck v. Wiese (1865) 44 Barb. 494; Re Bene

ventano (1902) 38 Misc. 272, 77 N. Y. Supp. 651; Hartwell V. McMaster (1880) 4 Redf. 389; Chafee v. Baptist Missionary Convention (1843) 10 Paige, 89, 40 Am. Dec. 225; Simpson's Will (1870) 2 Redf. 29; Re Foley (1907) 55 Misc. 162, 106 N. Y. Supp. 474; Re Klinzner (1911) 71 Misc. 620, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1059; Re McCabe (1911) 75 Misc. 35, 134 N. Y. Supp. 682; Re Corcoran (1911) 145 App. Div. 129, 129 N. Y. Supp. 165; Re Irving (1912) 153 App. Div. 728, 138 N. Y. Supp. 784, affirmed without opinion in (1913) 207 N. Y. 765, 101 N. E. 1106.

Washington.-Points v. Nier (1916) 91 Wash. 20, 157 Pac. 44, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1046; Wilson v. Craig (1915) 86 Wash. 465, 150 Pac. 1179, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 871. England. Wilson V. Beddard (1841) 12 Sim. 28, 59 Eng. Reprint, 1041, 10 L. J. Ch. N. S. 305, 5 Jur. 624; Bryce's Goods (1839) 2 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 325, 163 Eng. Reprint, 427; Field's Goods (1843) 3 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 752, 163 Eng. Reprint, 890.

See also Holtam's Estate (1913) 108 L. T. N. S. 732.

Ireland. Clarke v. Clarke (1868) Ir. R. 2 C. L. 395.

Canada.-Momberg v. Jones (1915) 32 West. L. Rep. 513, 9 West. Week. Rep. 246, 25 D. L. R. 766. See also Lamoureux v. Craig (1913) 49 Can. S. C. 305, reversing (1913) Rap. Jud. Quebec 22 B. R. 252, 19 La. Rev. de Jur. 443, 14 D. L. R. 399, which reversed (1912) Rap. Jud. Quebec 42 C. S. 385, 2 D. L. R. 148.

It is not necessary that any specific mark should be used, provided the

party does make a mark or symbol which is intended to be in lieu of his signature. Beneventano (1902) 38 Misc. 272, 77 N. Y. Supp. 651. An illegible subscription may be regarded as a mark. Hartwell v. McMaster (1889) 4 Redf. (N. Y.) 389. The mark must be made with the intent to execute the will thereby. Plate's Estate (1892) 148 Pa. 55, 33 Am. St. Rep. 805, 23 Atl. 1038, reversing (1891) 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 644, wherein it appeared that the testator started to write his name, and made a stroke which bore no resemblance to the form of mark ordinarily used for such purpose, and which two witnesses professed to recognize as the first part of the initial of his first name, and then he stopped and said, "I can't sign it now." It was held that this was not a sufficient signature by mark.

In Everhart v. Everhart (1888) 34 Fed. 85, it appeared that the testator requested one of the witnesses to write his will, which he did, as dictated by the testator; that when it was written the testator attempted to sign it, but from physical debility was unable to do so, but in the attempt made a small mark or scratch on the paper, and failed to do more; that he said he made and published the paper as his last will and testament. The paper writing showed a small mark or scratch on the left-hand corner, but no name attached to it. There were also two small marks or dots on another part of the paper, very dim, as though made with the point of a pencil, and not at the usual place for signing such a paper, by the party executing it. It was held that this was not a sufficient signature by mark, the court saying: "The place where made, and the character of the small marks and dots, furnish no evidence that they were made as a substitute for the signature of the testator. It is true that a testator may sign his will by making a mark, but he must intend the mark as a substitute for his name; and when there is no name written, or anything indicating who made the mark, and especially when the mark is made at

an unusual place for the signature, it ought to require very satisfactory evidence that the mark was intended by the testator as his signature, or as a substitute for it."

A Code provision that a signature "shall always be in the proper handwriting of such person" means that the signature shall be written, as contradistinguished from engraved, lithographed, or printed, but does not require that it shall be written out; and the signature may be made by mark. Sheehan v. Kearney (1903) 82 Miss. 688, 35 L.R.A. 102, 21 So. 41.

A mark alone is sufficient, without the testator's name being written near it. Bailey v. Bailey (1860) 35 Ala. 687; Re Guilfoyle (1892) 96 Cal. 598, 22 L.R.A. 370, 31 Pac. 553; Scott v. Hawk (1899) 107 Iowa, 723, 70 Am. St. Rep. 228, 77 N. W. 467; Thompson v. Thompson (1896) 49 Neb. 157, 68 N. W. 372; Jackson v. Jackson (1868) 39 N. Y. 153; Pool v. Buffum (1871) 3 Or. 438; Bryce's Goods (1839) 2 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 325, 163 Eng. Reprint, 427.

Then, where the name of the testator was written in the body of the will and the will was signed by a mark, it was held to be valid, although the testator's name was not written near the mark, when it sufficiently appeared what name the mark was intended to represent. Re Guilfoyle (1892) 96 Cal. 598, 22 L.R.A. 370, 31 Pac. 553. So, a signature by mark is sufficient, although the testator's name is not written on the will in the presence of witnesses. Upchurch v. Upchurch (1855) 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 102; Garnett v. Foston (1905) 122 Ky. 195, 121 Am. St. Rep. 456, 91 S. W. 668; Robinson v. Jones (1906) 105 Md. 62, 65 Atl. 814.

Under a statute providing that "no will shall be valid unless it is in writing, with the name of the testator subscribed thereto by himself, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and moreover, if not wholly written by the testator, the subscription shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two credible witnesses,

who shall subscribe the will with their names in the presence of the testator," it has been held that the signing by mark was sufficient, although the testator's name had been written on the will before he signed it, and not in the presence of the witnesses, it appearing that the testator acknowledged the will and made his mark in the presence of witnesses. Garnett v. Foston (1905) 122 Ky. 195, 121 Am. St. Rep. 456, 91 S. W. 668.

In the case of Re Me-Hun-Kah (1920) 78 Okla. 214, 189 Pac. 867, the court in upholding the probate of a will said: "Section 8349, Rev. Laws 1910, provides that a person who subscribes testator's name should write his own name as a witness, but also expressly provides that a violation of this requirement does not affect the validity of the will. The attesting witnesses and the interpreter testified that testatrix made her mark in their presence, the interpreter writing her name, and she declared same to be her will and that it disposed of her property as she desired."

The fact that the wrong name is added to the mark does not affect the validity of the will. Bailey v. Bailey (1860) 35 Ala. 687; Rook v. Wilson (1895) 142 Ind. 24, 51 Am. St. Rep. 163, 41 N. E. 311; Long v. Zook (1850) 13 Pa. 400; Reed v. Hendrix (Reed v. Whaley) (1918) 180 Ky. 57, L.R.A.1918E, 423, 201 S. W. 482; Clarke's Goods (1858) 4 Jur. N. S. 243, 1 Swabey & T. 22, 164 Eng. Reprint, 611, 27 L. J. Prob. N. S. 18, 6 Week. Rep. 307; Douce's Goods (1862) 8 Jur. N. S. 723, 2 Swabey & T. 593, 164 Eng. Reprint, 1127, 31 L. J. Prob. N. S. 172, 6 L. T. N. S. 789.

In the case of Clarke's Goods (1858) 4 Jur. N. S. (Eng.) 243, supra, it appeared that the deceased, a widow, died in the month of February, 1857. She left a will which was made in the year 1844. It was executed by a mark, but with her maiden name "Susanna Barrall" written against the mark, instead of "Susanna Clarke," her name by marriage and that by which she was described in