one left unlocked excused the negligence of the bank in not locking the other door of the vault, so as to relieve it from liability. In Marietta Trust & Bkg. Co. v. Faw (1924) Ga. App., 121 S. E. 244, where a customer of a bank deposited a Liberty bond for safe keeping under circumstances such as to make the deposit a special one and the bank a gratuitous bailee, and the bond was converted by the vice president to cover a defalcation, it was held that while slight diligence in the protection and preservation of a special deposit in the degree of care imposed by law upon a gratuitous bailee, yet where, as in this case, such bailee is a bank, already reduced to financial stringency by the defalcations of its vice president, who, at the time the special deposit was made, had long been and still was in charge of the bank's business and assets, and who had, for years before such special deposit was made, successfully concealed from the president and directors all knowledge of his fraud and of the bank's real condition, by substituting forgeries for the money stolen by him from the bank, and who, after receiving such special deposit for the bank, stole it, converted it into cash, and placed that cash in the bank, substituting it for one or more of his prior forgeries, the bank cannot, while retaining the proceeds of such conversion of the special deposit, escape liability to the depositor on the theory that all the wrongful acts shown were the unauthorized individual acts of the vice president and that the bank itself had exercised due care in the preservation of the special deposit for the benefit of the depositor, although, if the bank had received no benefit or profit from the transaction, the result might be different. In the latter connection the court in its syllabus said: "Even if the bank had received no benefit from the transaction, still the length of time the vice president's defalcations had existed,-‘seven or eight years, possibly longer,' according to his own testimony-without 31 A.L.R.-45. knowledge or suspicion of the same on the part of the president or directors of the bank, and without their becoming acquainted with the bank's real financial condition, would leave it a question for determination by the jury as to whether or not the directors had exercised due care in retaining such a person in the office of vice president and in charge of the bank's business and assets. Civil Code 1910, §§ 3470, 4530, 5735. A director of a bank has duties to perform more essential than that of allowing his name to be printed on the bank's stationery; and negligent ignorance is sometimes equivalent to knowledge. Penal Code 1910, § 204." And it was further held that the bank could not be heard to plead, under the facts of the case, that its vice president exceeded his authority in receiving the special deposit for the bank, even if it conclusively appeared that he did so exceed his authority, since the bank must either repudiate or ratify the transaction as a whole, and its retention by it of the net proceeds amounted to a ratification of the transaction as a whole. In Kansas it has been held that the "Bank Depositors' Guaranty Fund Law" does not protect special deposits in the nature of bailments, and consequently that one who had deposited Liberty bonds with a bank for safekeeping could not, upon the conversion thereof by the bank, proceed against the guaranty fund, even though the bank officials had attempted to protect the depositor by executing a contract to the effect that the bonds were to be regarded as a general deposit of cash. Bloomheart v. Foster (1923) 114 Kan. 786, 221 Pac. 279. And in Spry v. Hirning (1923) S. D. 191 N. W. 833, where Liberty bonds were deposited in the depositor's bank for the purpose of being transmitted to another bank selected by the depository bank for safe-keeping, but instead were converted to its own use, upon its failure and an attempt by the depositor to obtain a preference from the bank guaranty fund, under the Depositors' Guaranty War saving stamps. Act, on the theory that there had been a special deposit and not merely a bailment, it was held that since the certificate of deposit did not require the return of the identical bonds deposited, but provided merely for their return, "or the equivalent," the transaction amounted to nothing more than a bailment, which was not protected by the guaranty fund. And in Tyler County State Bank v. Rhodes (1923) Tex. Civ. App. —, 256 S. W. 947, it was held that a special deposit of Liberty bonds in a bank for safe-keeping did not come within the class of deposits protected by the guaranty fund under the Texas Bank Deposit Guaranty Law. - And in Tyler County State Bank v. Johnson (1924) Tex. Civ. App. -, 257 S. W. 932, it was held that one who deposited Liberty bonds with a bank for safe-keeping, to be returned on demand, was not a "depositor" within the meaning of the Texas Bank Deposit Guaranty Law, since, as no title passed to the bank, the relation became that of bailor and bailee, and therefore that the bank's conversion of the bonds on its insolvency did not entitle the depositor to proceed against And this even the guaranty fund. though the conversion was on the advice of the commissioner of insurance and banking, such fact not being sufficient to make the owner a "depositor," since the commissioner was without authority so to advise the bank. The court also held that the depositor of the bonds was not entitled to offset the assessment made against her on her stock in the bank against the liability or obligation to her on the part of the bank for the conversion by it of her Liberty bonds. In the reported case (MILLER v. BANK OF HOLLY SPRINGS, ante, 698) the court passed upon the question of the liability of a bank for the loss of United States war saving stamps which had been deposited with it for safe-keeping. In this case, in holding the bank liable for the stolen stamps, the court regarded the bank as a holder under a special contract of bailment based upon a "sufficient consideration," which contract was violated by its having kept the stamps in the vault, which was burglarized, while its safe, where it kept its own money, was not. And in West v. First State Bank (1924) Minn., 197 N. W. 850, it was held that one who had deposited war saving stamps with a bank for safe-keeping as a gratuitous bailee established a prima facie case by showing the bailment and the bank's failure to return the stamps, and that the court would not set aside a verdict in plaintiff's favor where the defense was loss by burglary, but the defendant's evidence was so contradictory and inconclusive as to leave clear room for an honest difference of opinion. The court added, however, that if the evidence had led irresistibly to the conclusion that the stamps had been taken by the burglars, the bank would have been exonerated. And Harland v. Pe Ell State Bank (1922) 122 Wash. 289, 210 Pac. 681, which is set out under the heading "Liberty bonds," supra, also involved the question of the liability of a bank for the loss of war saving stamps held by it for safe-keeping. See the case as therein treated. G. J. C. (154 Minn. 252, 191 N. W. 589.) C. R. VERRY V. GEORGE B. BARNES. LEWIS E. JONES et al., Claimants. F. R. BARNES, Appt., V. C.'R. VERRY, Respt. VIOLETTE M. VERRY, Admrx., etc., of Thomas R. Verry, Respt., V. JAMES FITZGERALD, Sheriff, Appt. Minnesota Supreme Court — January 12, 1923. (154 Minn. 252, 191 N. W. 589.) Attachment of property in possession of sheriff. 1. When the sheriff has levied on the property of a judgment debtor and advertised it for sale, the debtor may not interrupt the execution of the process of the court by attaching the judgment. [See note on this question beginning on page 711.] APPEAL by F. R. Barnes from a judgment of the District Court for Wilkin County (Flaherty, J.) allowing a lien in favor of plaintiff's attorneys in an action on a contract relative to the exchange of certain lands, in which the attorney filed a claim for a lien upon the judgment which appellant claimed to have attached to secure a debt owing himself. Affirmed. APPEAL by plaintiff F. R. Barnes from a judgment of the District Court for Wilkin County (Flaherty, J.) in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover an amount alleged to be due on a judgment against defendant, which had been assigned to plaintiff by a bank. Affirmed. APPEAL by defendant sheriff from a judgment of the District Court for Wilkin County (Flaherty, J.) in favor of plaintiff, subject to an attorneys' lien, in an action brought to recover money collected by defendant on an execution. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the Commissioner's opinion. Messrs. George D. Smith and Wolfe & Schneller for appellants." Messrs. Lewis E. Jones and W. S. Lauder, for respondents: A sheriff is an officer of the court. In seizing property he acts pursuant to the writ of the court for the benefit of the person procuring the writ; to that extent he is the agent of the first attaching creditor, and as such agent cannot do an act against the interest of his principal. Camp v. Williams Bros. 119 Ga. 152, 46 S. E. 66; Headrick v. Brattain, 83 Ind. 188; Winton v. State, 4 Ind. 321; Sibert v. Humphries, 4 Ind. 481; Ross v. Clarke, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 354; Shinn v. Zimmerman, 23 N. J. L. 150, 55 Am. Dec. 260; Dawson v. Holcomb, 1 Ohio, 275, 13 Am. Dec. 618; Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio St. 124, 62 Am. Dec. 214; Jones v. Jones, 1 Bland, Ch. 443, 18 Am. Dec. 327. The lien of the attorney is unassailable and must be sustained. Gill v. Truelsen, 39 Minn. 373, 40 N. W. 254; Lindholm v. Itasca Lumber Co. 64 Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931; Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307, 113 N. W. 701, 12 Ann. Cas. 341; Henry v. Traynor, 42 Minn. 234, 44 N. W. 11; Davis v. Great Northern R. Co. 128 Minn. 354, 151 N. W. 128; Coleman v. Austin, 99 Ga. 629, 27 S. E. 763; People use of Simon v. Pack, 115 Mich. 669, 74 N. W. 185; Fenno v. English, 22 Ark. 170; Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 412, 14 Am. Dec. 172; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Allcorn v. Butler, 9 Tex. 56. Lees, C., filed the following opinion: Three judgments of the district court of Wilkin county are involved in these appeals, which were heard. and submitted at the same time. On December 27, 1919, a judgment was entered in the district court of Wilkin county in favor of C. R. Verry and against George B. Barnes for $2,623.80. An execution was issued and a levy made on land in that county. The land was advertised for sale on February 21, 1920. On that day Barnes's attorney paid to the sheriff $2,718.65, the amount required to satisfy the execution. In 1917, a North Dakota bank obtained a judgment against Verry for $6,099.88. On February 18, 1920, $3,550 was due on the judgment. On that day the bank assigned the judgment to F. R. Barnes, who is a brother of George B. Barnes. F. R. Barnes immediately commenced an action against Verry in the district court of Wilkin county to recover the amount due on the judgment and caused a writ of attachment to be issued and delivered to the sheriff, and on February 20 the sheriff levied on Verry's judgment against George B. Barnes and on the land about to be sold to satisfy it. On the following day the sheriff made return on the execution, certifying that he had collected $2,718.65 thereon, deducted his fees and expenses, and held the remainder of the money by virtue of the attachment levied on the judgment. On February 18, 1920, C. R. Verry assigned his judgment against George B. Barnes to T. R. Verry. The assignment was not filed in the office of the clerk of the district court until February 23, 1920. At the time of the assignment, Verry was actually indebted to the assignee in a sum exceeding $3,000. On February 20, 1920, Lewis E. Jones and W. S. Lauder, as attorneys for C. R. Verry, filed in the office of the clerk of the district court a claim for a lien of $1,010.65 upon their client's judgment against Barnes. On February 26, 1920, T. R. Verry made a demand on the 191 N. W. 589.) (154 Minn. 252, sheriff for the money he had received on the execution against Barnes. The demand was refused on the ground that F. R. Barnes had attached the money. Thereupon T. R. Verry brought an action against the sheriff to recover the money. He died while the action was pending and Violette M. Verry, as administratrix of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Messrs. Jones and Lauder intervened in the action in which C. R. Verry had obtained judgment against Barnes and claimed so much of the money in the sheriff's hands as was required to satisfy their lien. There was a trial by the court without a jury of the several issues thus arising. In F. R. Barnes v. C. R. Verry, the court found that the North Dakota judgment had been assigned to plaintiff on February 18, and that on the same day Verry assigned his judgment against George B. Barnes to T. R. Verry; that, to induce F. R. Barnes to purchase the North Dakota judgment, George B. Barnes gave him his note for $1,250, which was the amount paid for the assignment of the judgment; that in truth George B. Barnes was the purchaser of the judgment, and the assignment to his brother was a mere device to defeat the collection of the Minnesota judgment in the case of Verry v. Barnes; that the note had been paid before the trial, and that at the time of the trial George B. Barnes was the real owner of the North Dakota judgment. In C. R. Verry v. George B. Barnes the court found that the attorneys had a lien upon the judgment for the amount they claimed. In Violette M. Verry v. James Fitzgerald, as sheriff, the court found that plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the money in the sheriff's hands remaining after the lien of the attorneys had been satisfied. These appeals are from the several judgments entered on the findings and were taken after motions for new trials had been made and denied. 1. The court was clearly right in Attorney and of lien for services. giving Verry's attorneys judgment for the amount of their lien. An attorney's lien on a judgment he has secured for his client is superior to client-priority the claim of an execution or attaching creditor of the client, who levies on the judgment before notice of the claim for the lien has been given. It has long been settled that a party to a cause may not run away with the fruits of his attorney's industry and ability without satisfying the attorney's just demands. The attorney has a lien on the cause of action from the time of the service of the summons. It continues until it is satisfied or released. It is not necessary that notice of the lien be given to the opposite party or his attorneys. They, are required to take notice of it. Henry v. Traynor, 42 Minn. 234, 44 N. W. 11; Lindholm v. Itasca Lumber Co. 64 Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931; Desaman v. Butler Bros. 114 Minn. 362, 131 N. W. 463; Kubu v. Kabes, 142 Minn. 433, 172 N. W. 496. It is sought to avoid the application of these principles on the ground that Judge Lauder is a nonresident attorney, not licensed to practise in this state. We deem that fact unimportant. A nonresident attorney may try or assist in the trial or conduct of an action or proceeding pending in a court of this state. Gen. Stat. 1913, § 4947. By usage and comity, the privilege of practising in all the courts of a stateis extended to regularly licensed attorneys of sister states. 6 C. J. 573. But they have no authority to commence actions in the courts of this state (Francis v. Knerr, 149 Minn. 122, 182 N. W. 988), and hence the prevailing practice is to associate a resident attorney as the attorney of record. When this is done, as it was here, there is no reason for denying a lien for the compensation the client should pay. 2. Did F. R. Barnes acquire rights by virtue of the attachment which were superior to those of the Verrys? Verrys? The findings with respect |