statute.126 But, where a loan has been made by means of the lender's check, the statute will run against an action for the loan, not from the date of the check, but from the date of obtaining the money on it.127 In many states a distinction is still made between notes or other instruments under seal and unsealed notes, as to time for bringing action.128 In Connecticut, contracts under seal and nonnegotiable notes may be sued upon at any time within seventeen years, or within four years after the end of any personal disability of the holder.129 In Arkansas, action on a sealed note must be brought within ten years, the limitation as to others being five years.' In Georgia the statute runs for twenty years upon a sealed note.131 But a note does not become a sealed instrument, as to the statute of limitations, by reason of a collateral warrant under seal to confess judgment given at the same time.132 130 Limitation of Attested Notes. 1599. In several of the New England states a longer period is allowed for bringing an action on notes signed by an attesting witness. 133 In Maine it has been held that the lapse of the statutory 126 See § 646, supra. But see Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Tp., 39 Pa. St. 92. 127 Garden v. Bruce, L. R. 3 C. P. 300. Or from the time when the payee learned that there were no funds to meet it. Bethell v. Bethell, 34 Ch. Div. 561. 128 So, Garner v. Toney, 107 Ala. 352, 18 South. 161. 129 CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1370). But not so a guaranty indorsed on a nonnegotiable note. Carpenter v. Thompson, 66 Conn. 457, 34 Atl. 105. 180 Dyer v. Gill, 32 Ark. 410; Foster v. Jett, 20 C. C. A. 670, 74 Fed. 678. But see § 71, supra. 131 Bonner v. Metcalf, 58 Ga. 236. But the note must not only have a seal, but recite that it is sealed, Chambers v. Kingsberry, 68 Ga. 828; Gover v. Chamberlain, 83 Va. 286, 5 S. E. 174; while in MISSISSIPPI the recital in the note is enough, although no seal is put on for several days, McCarley v. Board, 58 Miss. 483. 132 Walrod v. Manson, 23 Wis. 393. 133 VERMONT, 14 years; MAINE and MASSACHUSETTS, 20 years. But this did not extend to an unwitnessed indorsement. Seavey v. Coffin, 64 Me. 224. And see § 68, supra. twenty years in such case is a conclusive bar, and not a mere presumption.134 And, under the present statute, an action may be brought for money had and received on an attested note during the whole time in which an action would lie on the note itself.135 The Massachusetts statute has been held to cover an attested order for the payment of money,136 but not a nonnegotiable note.137 An action may be brought in Massachusetts by the indorsee of an attested note in the name of the payee after the lapse of six years, and within the statutory twenty years.138 And the assignee of an insolvent payee has the benefit of the enlarged limitation.1 The Maine statute has been held not to apply to notes payable in work; 140 or to a note for $200, and such other sums as may arise as additional premium"; 141 or to an attested promise to pay a note; 142 or to a note in which the promise to pay is conditional.143 So, a memorandum as to payment of interest, attested by a witness at the foot of a note and to the left of the maker's signature, will not make it an attested note.1** And although the maker signs a note with the printed word "Witness" upon it in presence of an attorney, who intends to sign it as a witness, but does not sign it until afterwards, and then signs it without the 139 134 Pulsifer v. Pulsifer, 66 Me. 442. But the presumption might formerly be rebutted by a new promise or acknowledgment. Howe v. Saunders, 38 Me. 350. 135 Merrill v. Merrill, 63 Me. 78. In KENTUCKY, a note, being an express promise, was a specialty, but not so an indorsement or a bill of exchange. Clark v. Schwing, 1 Dana, 333. 136 Almy v. Winslow, 126 Mass. 342. 137 Sibley v. Phelps, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 172; Moore v. Edwards, 167 Mass. 74, 44 N. E. 1070. 138 Rockwood v. Brown, 1 Gray (Mass.) 261. And although the indorsement was more than six years after the maturity of the note. Stanley v. Kempton, 30 Me. 118. But see, contra, in MASSACHUSETTS, Frye v. Barker, 4 Pick. 382. And a holder by delivery without indorsement from the payee is not within the statute. Houghton v. Maun, 13 Metc. 128. 159 Pitts v. Holmes, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 92. 140 Dennett v. Goodwin, 32 Me. 44. 141 Lime Rock Ins. Co. v. Hewett, 60 Me. 407. 142 Young v. Weston, 39 Me. 492; Bunker v. Ireland, 81 Me. 519, 17 Atl. 706. 143 Chapman v. Wight, 79 Me. 595, 12 Atl. 546. 14 Trustees of Parsonage Fund in Fryeburg v. Osgood, 21 Me. 176. consent or knowledge of the maker, and not in his presence, it will not be an attested note.1 145 Limitation of Collateral Security. § 1600. A collateral lien may be enforced where an action for the debt would be barred.14 146 Thus, a note may be barred, and not the mortgage which secures it.14 The debt represented by the note remains in such case with the mortgage, although the statute has discharged the remedy on the note,118 and although the mortgage was indorsed with a promise "to pay on the same condition as the within as per note of this date." 149 So, an action will lie on a covenant to pay contained in a collateral mortgage, after the note secured by it is barred.150 In New Hampshire the statute puts a note secured by mortgage on the same footing as to the statute of limitations as the mortgage itself, and the note is not barred until the mortgage is barred.15 On the other hand, in Illinois and some other states the mortgage is treated as a mere incident of the note, and is put on the same footing and barred when the note is barred.152 And, if the note is taken out 145 Smith v. Dunham, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 246. 146 Byles, Bills, 345; Spears v. Hartly, 3 Esp. 81. 147 Cerney v. Pawlot, 66 Wis. 262, 28 N. W. 183; Hayes v. Frey, 54 Wis. 503, 11 N. W. 695; Fisher's Ex'rs v. Mossman, 11 Ohio St. 42; Myer v. Beal, 5 Or. 130; Wilkinson v. Flowers, 37 Miss. 579; Cheney v. Stone, 29 Fed. 885, Demuth v. Bank, 85 Md. 315, 37 Atl. 266; Webber v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 70, 19 N. W. 751. 148 Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 535. Although the mortgage could not have become barred by the existing statute. Joy v. Adams, 26 Me. 330. But no action will lie after foreclosure for any deficiency that may remain on the note, Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 159; nor for a personal decree in the foreclosure, Barnt v. Kennicutt, 57 Mich. 268, 23 N. W. 808. 149 Grinnell v. Baxter, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 386. 150 Earnshaw v. Stewart, 64 Md. 513, 2 Atl. 734; Dinniny v. Gavin, 4 App. Div. 298, 39 N. Y. Supp. 485. 151 Alexander v. Whipple, 45 N. H. 502; Gen. Laws, p. 511, § 5; Meredith Bridge Sav. Bank v. Ladd, 40 N. H. 459. But the act only applies as against the mortgage, and will not affect a surety on the note who was not a party to the mortgage subsequently given by the father of the principal maker. 152 Emory v. Keighan, 94 Ill. 543; Medley v. Elliott, 62 Ill. 532; Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 482; McCarthy v. White, 21 Cal. 495; Lent v. Shear, 26 Cal. of the statute by bringing suit upon it, it will save the mortgage also,153 In Kentucky, where a note is secured by a vendor's lien, the lien goes with the note, and is barred by the same delay.15 Limitation against the State-Decedents' Estates. 135 § 1601. The statute of limitations does not, in general, affect the right of the state to bring suit at any time on a bill or note.1 But this immunity does not belong to counties or other municipal corporations, 156 If the payee dies, the statute will run against his personal representatives only from the date of letters granted after the bill had matured." 157 And many statutes give additional time for suit by the executor or administrator of the person originally entitled,' the 158 361; Wood v. Goodfellow, 43 Cal. 185; Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104; City of Fort Scott v. Schulenberg, 22 Kan. 649; Blackwell v. Barnett, 52 Tex. 326. So, in Oregon, Allen v. O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17. If some of the secured notes are barred, and others are not, the mortgage can only be foreclosed as to the latter. Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16. And if a note is barred as to some makers, and not as to others, it can only be foreclosed against the latter. Low v. Allen, 26 Cal. 141. 153 Eborn v. Cannon's Adm'rs, 32 Tex. 231. 154 Yeates v. Weeden, 6 Bush, 438; Tate v. Hawkins, 81 Ky. 577. 1552 Pars. Notes & B. 663; or against the commissioners of the sinking fund, Hill v. Josselyn, 13 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 597; or upon a note made to the clerk for property sold by order of the court, and therefore in the custody of the law, Tyner v. Fenner, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 469. 156 St. Charles Co. v. Powell, 22 Mo. 525. 157 Byles, Bills, 346; Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 253; Chit. Bills, 685; Murray v. East India Co., 5 Barn. & Ald. 204. 159 Six months after death in ALABAMA (Code, § 2632); CALIFORNIA (Code Civ. Proc. § 353). One year after death in ARKANSAS (Sand. & H. Dig. § 4840); COLORADO (Mills' Ann. St. § 2916); CONNECTICUT (Gen. St. § 1388). One year after letters, ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 19); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5148); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. St. § 2753; Bissinger v. Lawson, 57 Miss. 36); NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3693); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. $402); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 164); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 18); SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 123); TEXAS (Rev. St. art. 3368). Unless executor or administrator sooner appointed, and in that case until then, WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4234). Six months after notice of appointment of representative in MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 92). In RHODE ISLAND the statute applies if the plaintiff die within 60 days of the end of effect of such a statute being to suspend the running of the statute of limitations until the letters are granted.159 160 Many statutes provide also for an extension of time in case of the death of the party liable to be sued.10 In Indiana, where the statute allowed eighteen months to bring suit after the maker's death, and the statutory time (Gen. Laws, c. 234, § 8); and in IOWA, if the plaintiff die within one year of the end of that time (Code, § 3454). One year after letters in KENTUCKY (Ky. St. §§ 2526, 2527); but not over four years after limitation. Eighteen months after death in INDIANA (Horner's Rev. St. § 298). Two years after death, if plaintiff's death occur before or within 30 days of the end of the period of limitation, MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 92); MICHIGAN (How. Ann. St. § 8722). Two years after letters in MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 12); VERMONT (V. S. § 1213); five years after death in VIR. GINIA (Code, § 2932); WEST VIRGINIA (Code, c. 104, § 17), if interval of more than five years occurs between death and qualification of representative. Under the Massachusetts law, suit may be brought by the payee's representative within two years after letters, on the maker's estate, although more than two years after his own letters. Converse v. Johnson, 146 Mass. 20, 14 N. E. 925. But the converse is not true. Hill v. Mixter, 5 Allen, 27. 159 Cook v. Reynolds, 58 Miss. 243. 160 Six months: ALABAMA (Code, § 2632); CALIFORNIA (Code Civ. Proc. 353); NEW JERSEY (2 Gen. St. p. 1976, § 16). One year: ILLINOIS (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 83, § 19); MINNESOTA (Gen. St. § 5148); MISSISSIPPI (Ann. Code, § 2753); NEVADA (Gen. St. § 3653); NORTH CAROLINA (Code, § 164); OREGON (Code Civ. Proc. § 18); TENNESSEE (Shannon's Code, § 4451); TEXAS (Rev. St. art. 3369); WISCONSIN (Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 4234); RHODE ISLAND (Gen. Laws, c. 234, § 8), if death within 60 days of limitation. Two years: FLORIDA (Rev. St. § 1284). Until letters issued, in SOUTH CAROLINA (Code Civ. Proc. § 123). In KENTUCKY (Ky. St. § 2528), if there are no representatives, and the suit is against the heirs, two years are allowed; otherwise, the six months during which suit is stayed. Davis' Adm'r v. Auxier (Ky.) 41 S. W. 767. Eighteen months in INDIANA (Horner's Rev. St. § 298); NEW YORK (Code Civ. Proc. § 403). Two years, if defendant die within 30 days of the limitation period: MAINE (Rev. St. c. 81, § 92); MICHIGAN (How. Ann. St. § 8722). Two years after letters: MASSACHUSETTS (Pub. St. c. 197, § 12); VERMONT (V. S. § 1214). In GEORGIA all actions against executors must be brought within ten years after the right accrues (Civ. Code, § 3772), but the time between the death of the debtor and the taking out of administration and the time between two administrations, not exceeding in either case five years, is not included. But this applies only to the party entitled to sue, and only twelve months are allowed for nonadministration on the estate of the party liable. Pendleton v. Andrews, 70 Ga. 306. In CONNECTICUT six months are allowed for presen |