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terial to add the word "Surety" to a maker's signature.72 Where, however, a note is indorsed, "A. B., Cashier," the holder may write the name of the bank "for the Bank," above the indorsement.73

74

And it has been held that an acceptor will not be discharged by writing his address below the signature. But where he adds the address to the maker's signature, and such address is necessary to render the note negotiable, it will be a material alteration, and discharge the maker.75

So, if a note signed, "A. B., Treasurer of St. Paul's Parish," is changed to "Treasurer for," etc., with the addition of the words "duly authorized," it will be a material alteration, and discharge the indorser. So, it has been held to be material to add to the maker's name as payee and signature as indorser the words, "President A. B. Association," and to discharge a co-maker. So, it is material to add to the maker's signature the words "and Co." 78 On the other hand, it has been held to be immaterial to cut off from a signature the word "President" or "Secretary," 99 79 or the words "as Trustees of the First Univ. Soc." 80

77

Erasure of Maker.

§ 1748. In like manner, the consent of all is necessary to the erasure of any one maker. 81 And it is a material alteration, if an instrument of guaranty is executed by several parties, and the party 72 Laub v. Paine, 46 Iowa, 550. So, the erasure of such word. Rogers v. Tapp, 14 Cent. Law J. 38.

73 Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 13 N. Y. 309; Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63.

74 Marston v. Petit, 1 Camp. 82, note; or the indorser's address, Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. St. 214.

75 Commercial & Farmers' Bank v. Patterson, 2 Cranch, C. C. 346, Fed. Cas. No. 3,056.

76 Sheridan v. Carpenter, 61 Me. 83.

77 First Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178.

78 And such addition will discharge an indorser, although there was no such firm, but the maker was a member of another firm. Haskell v. Champion, 30 Mo. 136.

79 Thackaray v. Hanson, 1 Colo. 365.

80 Burlingame v. Brewster, 79 Ill. 515;

Hayes v. Matthews, 63 Ind. 412.

81 Barrington v. Bank, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 405. And the payee's consent will not bind other makers. Morrison v. Garth, 78 Mo. 434.

guarantied strikes out the names of each on payment by him of his proportion. The cutting off of the name of a joint maker renders the note void,83 although the note is joint and several in its terms.** This has been questioned, however, in the latter case, unless the erasure is shown to be with the intention of discharging the other maker.85 And the maker of a joint note will not be discharged by the erasure of the name of an infant joint maker, after the contract had been repudiated and rescinded by him.86

88

The erasure of a surety's name in the body of a note, and the substitution of another surety, has been held not to be a material alteration.87 But, in general, the cutting off of the name of a surety is a material alteration, or the cutting off of one and adding of another co-maker. And one surety will be discharged by the cutting off of a co-surety or co-maker and substitution of another without his consent.90 But the erasure of a surety has been held not to discharge the principal debtor."1

89

Alteration of Payee's Name.

§ 1749. It is a material alteration to change the name of the payee or of a special indorsee.93 And such alteration, fraudulently

82 Bank of Hindostan v. Smith, 36 Law, J. C. P. 241.

83 Piercy's Heirs v. Piercy, 5 W. Va. 199; Gillett v. Sweat, 6 Ill. 475. Although it would still be the subject of larceny. People v. Call, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 120.

84 Mason v. Bradley, 11 Mees. & W. 590.

85 Chit. Bills, 210; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 Adol. & E. 675. And even with such intention, after part payment. Eldred v. Peterson, 80 Iowa, 264, 45 N. W. 755.

86 Young v. Currier, 63 N. H. 419.

87 Jones v. Insurance Co., 1 Metc. (Ky.) 58.

$8 Mason v. Bradley, 11 Mees. & W. 590; McCramer v. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244; Broughton v. West, 8 Ga. 248.

89 Davis v. Coleman, 29 N. C. 424; Smith v. Weld, 2 Pa. St. 54.

90 Hall's Adm'x v. McHenry, 19 Iowa, 521.

91 Huntington v. Finch, 3 Ohio St. 445.

92 Stoddard v. Penniman, 108 Mass. 366; Davis v. Bauer, 41 Ohio St. 257; Erickson v. Bank, 44 Neb. 622, 62 N. W. 1078; Horn v. Bank, 32 Kan. 518, 4 Pac. 1022; Robinson v. Berryman, 22 Mo. App. 509; Bell v. Mahin, 69 Iowa, And see § 718, supra.

93 Grimes v. Piersol, 25 Ind. 246, 30 Ind. 129.

made, is a forgery. And it is a material alteration, although made without fraud and in a noticeable manner." 95 So, if a note is payable to A., and indorsed by A. and B., the addition of B.'s name as payee will discharge both indorsers. And it is a material alteration to add to the payee's name in the body of a note the word "Collector," 1997 or "Junior."

100

" 98

But if the payee's name is misspelled by accident, an alteration correcting the mistake, and making the name what it was intended, will not be material." So, the addition of the words "and Co." to the payee's name has been held not to be material, if done in good faith; or a change in the drawee's name from "A., B. & Co." to "A. and B.," after an acceptance by them as "A and B."; or a change in the payee's name to that of another firm, representing the same payees, by consent of the maker and payee, but after execution by the surety.10

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101

Negotiable Words Added.

§ 1750. Where the words "or order" have been omitted by mistake, and the bill was intended to be negotiable, it has been held not to be a material alteration to insert them afterwards;

103

or to

408, 29 N. W. 331. So, by substituting husband's name for wife's. Sneed v. Milling Co., 18 C. C. A. 213, 71 Fed. 493; Id., 20 C. C. A. 230, 73 Fed. 925. 94 Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230.

95 German Bank v. Dunn, 62 Mo. 79.

96 Aldrich v. Smith, 37 Mich. 468.

97 York v. Janes, 43 N. J. Law, 332; or "guardian," Jackson v. Cooper (Ky.) 39 S. W. 39.

98 Broughton v. Fuller, 9 Vt. 373.

99 E. g. "Franklin Derby" changed to "Francis E. Derby," Derby v. Thrall, 44 Vt. 413; or "Benj. R. Cole" to "Benj. Cole," Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227; or by adding his full surname, Mouchet v. Cason, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 307.

100 Elliott v. Blair, 47 Ill. 342.

101 Byles, Bills, 325; Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 247; Chit. Bills, 211; Farquhar v. Southey, Moody & M. 14, 2 Car. & P. 497; Hamelin v. Bruck, 9 Q. B. 306. 102 Arnold v. Jones, 2 R. I. 345.

103 Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 248; Chit. Bills, 212; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 407; Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. 246; Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 435, 12 East, 475; Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East, 512; Robinson v. Touray, 1 Maule & S. 217; Byron v. Thompson, 11 Adol. & E. 31; Cariss v. Tattersall, 2 Man. & G. 890; Granite Ry. Co. v. Bacon, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 239.

. 104

107

change a bill made payable to "A. or bearer" to "A. or order"; or to add the words "or bearer" to a note, which is not negotiable, and is not made so by such addition.105 But, in general, the addition of the words "or order" has been held to be material,106 even though a space was left, which was not intended as a blank to be so used.1o So, the addition of the words "or bearer" is material,108 or the change of "order" to "bearer." 109 And if a clerk opens a sealed letter, and alters a check contained in it by erasing the word "order" and substituting "bearer," it will be a forgery.110 But it is not a forgery to cancel the crossing of a check, under the provisions of the English statute.111 And it does not, under the bills of exchange act, affect the indorsee's right to recovery, although "order" is stricken out by the acceptor, and "in favor of the payee only" substituted.112

Alteration of Promise.

§ 1751. It is a material alteration to convert a joint note into a joint and several note; 113 or to change "I" to "we"; or to add

114

104 Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 247; Atwood v. Griffin, 2 Car. & P. 368; or to change "order" to "bearer," Croswell v. Lebree, 81 Me. 44, 16 Atl. 331.

105 Goodenow v. Curtis, 33 Mich. 505. And see Weaver v. Bromley, 65 Mich. 212, 31 N. W. 839. But see, contra, Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 35 Neb. 174, 52 N. W. 883.

106 Johnson v. Bank, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 310; Pepoon v. Stagg, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 102. And a surety will be discharged by the insertion of "or order" by the maker after delivery to the payee at the payee's request. Haines v. Dennett, 11 N. H. 180.

107 Bruce v. Westcott, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 374.

108 McCauley v. Gordon, G4 Ga. 221; Simmons v. Atkinson, 69 Miss. 862, 12 South. 263.

109 Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 247; Needles v. Shaffer, 60 Iowa, 65, 14 N. W. 129. Schroeder v. Webster, 88 Iowa, 627, 55 N. W. 569; Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45 Wis. 373; McDaniel v. Whitsett, 96 Tenn. 10, 33 S. W. 567; Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22, reversing Flint v. Craig, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 319. 110 Belknap v. Bank, 100 Mass. 376.

111 Simmons v. Taylor, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 463. And the words "not negotiable" may be added at any time to a crossed check. Byles, Bills, 325.

112 De Croix v. Meyer, 25 Q. B. Div. 343.

113 Benj. Chalm. Dig. art. 247; Chit. Bills, 210; 2 Pars. Notes & B. 561; Perring v. Hone, 4 Bing. 28, 2 Car. & P. 401; Samson v. Yager, 4 U. C. Q. B. (0. S.) 3. But see, contra, Miller v. Reed, 27 Pa. St. 244.

114 Draper v. Wood, 112 Mass. 315;

Eckert v. Louis, 84 Ind. 99; Heath v.

115

words for the purpose of binding the separate property of a married woman; or to cut off part of a paper in such manner as to leave an entirely different contract; 116 or to add such words as "without defalcation or set-off"; 117 or "without any relief from valuation or appraisement law." 118 So, where one guaranties "the collection" of a bill, it is a material alteration to strike out those words; add a guaranty of payment,120 or a waiver of demand and notice,121 to a blank indorsement.

119

or to

Condition-Consideration.

§ 1752. It is also a material alteration to add a condition, e. g. that a guaranty shall only attach when a certain contract is performed,122 or "if suit be instituted"; 123 or to change the condition of a collector's bond so as to include an additional township.124 So, it is material if a condition attached to a note is separated from it,125 especially if this is done fraudulently.126 And such alteration amounts to a forgery.127 But it is not material to cut off the words "upon condition," where no condition is specified,128 or to indorse

Blake, 28 S. C. 406, 5 S. E. 842; Humphreys v. Guillow, 13 N. H. 385. But see, contra, Eddy v. Bond, 19 Me. 461.

115 Taddiken v. Cantrell, 69 N. Y. 597; Reeves v. Pierson, 23 Hun (N. Y.) 185; Clapp v. Collins (City Ct. N. Y.) 7 N. Y. Supp. 98.

116 Scofield v. Ford, 56 Iowa, 370, 9 N. W. 309.

117 Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. 707. So, the words "or discount" added after the words "without defalcation." Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. Law, 227.

118 Holland v. Hatch, 11 Ind. 497. Although the contrary was held in Holland v. Hatch, 15 Ohio St. 464.

119 Newlan v. Harrington, 24 Ill. 206.

120 Iowa Val. State Bank v. Sigstad, 96 Iowa, 491, 65 N. W. 407.

121 Davis v. Eppler, 38 Kan. 629, 16 Pac. 793. And see § 708, supra, as to filling blank indorsements.

122 Hemming v. Trenery, 9 Adol. & El. 926.

123 Tate v. Fletcher, 77 Ind. 102.

124 Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 680.

125 Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 460; Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Stephens v. Davis, 85 Tenn. 271, 2 S. W. 3$2.

126 Gerrish v. Glines, 56 N. H. 9. 127 State v. Stratton, 27 Iowa, 420. 128 Palmer v. Largent, 5 Neb. 223.

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