and looking at mind as far as possible women. This interest, moreover, acts apart from its connection with body, it quite independently of the nature of the may be broadly asserted that, irrespect- feelings participated in. It is at the basis ively of any qualitative differences, all of sympathy with pains and pleasures, but manifestations of conscious life are inter- it includes the tendency to enter into esting; and since by their objective signs other modes of feeling which are neither they are the common possession of other pleasurable nor painful, and even into the minds, under the ordinary conditions of unemotional thought. observation, they easily come to be re- Another universal source of interest in garded as forms of the beautiful. Hence the contemplation of others' feelings is the many sayings about the superior and the scope for imagination implied in the exclusive interest of man as an object of necessary indefiniteness of the intuition. contemplation, as, for example, that which Since we know the minds of others only Goethe puts into the mouth of his hero in mediately by the data of external signs, his Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre: "Man our cognitions are never precise like the is the most interesting thing to man, and intuition of something immediately present ought, perhaps, alone to interest him."* to consciousness. Even when the signs The causes of this are almost too obvi- are least equivocal, as in the case of a ous to require naming, though they may friend's words, perfect definiteness cannot not have been fully analyzed. It is not be attained. The feeling of any given necessary, for explaining our knowledge moment can never be expressed with abof each other, to assume any intuitive be- solute completeness by the greatest acculief in the existence of other minds than mulation of language. Some of its aspects our own; the objective sign, pre-eminently and relations still remain undetermined. the word, is the common meeting-point of Now, the vague and undefined is the our own and others' consciousness. A lit-source of a peculiar pleasure. It gives tle attention to the process here evolved liberty to thought winged by some emowill perhaps bring out the peculiar at- tion to follow out airy tracks of its own. traction of other minds just mentioned. The artist knows this when he introduces The first and most conspicuous feature into his picture the path or the brook of the case is, that our impressions of winding away into the wood, or the hazy others' feelings must be interpreted in expanse of distant air and mountain. So, terms of our own. The external move-in the case before us, a part of the subtle ment or sound calls up the idea of a influence exercised by every manifestation feeling we ourselves have experienced. of soul-life is due to this free play of the And here of course lies the main interest. idealizing impulse. This remark does not, Whatever comes into this close myste- however, imply that clearness of expresrious connection with our own sentient sion and utterance diminishes the interest; life, has all the borrowed interest of this on the contrary, it heightens it in, the life itself. But this is not all. There is a large majority of cases. For there is alpositive pleasure in every feeling of re- ways left the region of imagination; and semblance; and this pleasure is heightened unless some distinctness of feeling is exin proportion as the resemblance strikes pressed, the sympathetic participation us in the midst of diversity. All of us which is, after all, the chief element of have experienced the strange shock of dis- the pleasure - becomes impossible. And covering the rough image of a human face further, openness and candour are closely in a beetling crag. Now, the knowledge associated with clear expression, and give of another's mind is emphatically a con- it a value of a still higher kind. The imsciousness of likeness amid wide difference. aginative interest now spoken of is seen The boundary separating another's inner most conspicuously when a new characlife from our own is of the most insuper- ter is brought under our notice. The able character. What the whole distinc- idealizing impulse fashions the unknown tion involves need not be here discussed; depths of feeling and thought according to suffice it that it is most fundamental and its own arbitrary will; and, as we know, all-important throughout the whole range the result is often wide enough from the of our cognitions. It is this waking up to a consciousness like our own, yet so widely sundered from our own, which gives something of their exquisite delight even to the interchanges of feeling of mature men and Buch i., cap. 4. fact. The same tendency shows itself in the ideal future developments we paint for those who are objects of a constant personal interest to us. Our knowledge of each other is never so complete as not to leave ample space for this play of imagination. Still Lest these general considerations should objects, becomes undoubtedly more interseem too vague to account for any of our esting to witness. Quickness of observaactual impressions of beauty in human tion and insight, fine discrimination and character, it may be well to trace their inference exercised upon the outer world, bearing on some of these perceptions. In are deeply engaging as mere modes of doing this I shall speak occasionally of active consciousness, though doubtless the isolated feelings or states of conscious- keen feeling of interest in the pursuit ness, but more frequently of general dis- commonly implied in these qualities is a positions or tendencies. It is implied part of the pleasing impression. here, of course, that, agreeably to what more is the charm of feeling added to that Mr. Bain calls the principle of Relativity, of intellect in social vivacity, easy comprechange of impression or variety is essen-hension of others, and imaginative intertial to these effects of conscious life. pretation of their feelings and wants. In Sameness of impression is equivalent to all these cases of intellectual attractiveabsence of impression; and fulness of soul ness, the percipient mind has been engaged always means rich variety. The more im- outwardly, and has thus betrayed its portant cases of this principle will be workings by a series of rapid and various spoken of by-and-by. movements. But the predominance of thought over feeling and action tends to a self-contained, unexpressive, and motionless attitude. If all exhibitions of consciousness are interesting, any rare degrees of it must be especially so. For example, the quick emotional temperament is commonly held Of the special sources of interest in huto be an exceedingly attractive object of man nature, one of the most important is contemplation. As a permanent possi- the pleasurable quality of the mental state bility of rich various sensibility, it tends exhibited. To witness the manifestation to engage the admiring gaze of others, of a pleasurable feeling is pleasing, and whether presented in actual life or in the vice versa. This follows from what has creations of fiction. For this reason, proba- been said concerning the mode of reaching bly, the female character is so much oftener the consciousness of others. The observadeemed beautiful than the male. Over and tion of another's pleasure is itself an idea above the pleasurableness of the mere of the feeling partaking of its pleasurable external expression already alluded to, nature. This first effect is no doubt often very much is due to the full fountains of counteracted by after considerations, as feelings themselves. And this interest when another's joy excites our envy, or does not depend on the quality of the injures our sense of justice; but the fundaemotion as pleasurable or painful, but mental fact remains. We are not speakflows from all varieties of exuberant feel- ing of the moral aspects of this tendency ing. When this nature is least fettered in active sympathy, but purely of its value by conventional rules, the charm is en- as an object of contemplation. The first hanced; from which cause arises much effect, then, of gladsome expression — all of the beauty of youth. Closely allied thoughts of the individual's relations to to emotion proper is the excitement ourselves and others being suspended — is of abundant activity. Mr. Bain has shown universally pleasurable. For this reason that previous to any stimulation from it is made a matter of refined taste to hide without, the system manifests a spontane- as far as possible painful feelings, such as ous vigour; and this impulse has a char- constraint or mortification, and to wear in acteristic consciousness of its own which society an even cheerfulness. The special we commonly express as a sense of fresh beauty of some characters may be traced vigorous life. It may be supposed to form, to a natural predisposition to pleasure. along with the great charm of its physi- Although the acquired habit of repressing cal embodiment, a subordinate pleasure in pain and exhibiting pleasure is pleasing, the gratification we derive from the sight the natural disposition to this preference of health and youth. In the remaining is much more so; for it is more perfect as departments of mind, thoughts, and voli- a form of pleasure through the absence of tions, there is less of this excited form of everything like artificial restraint. The consciousness; and accordingly these as- joyous temperament, prone to forget a pects of human nature are of interest pain, and to expand a pleasure, is singuchiefly for other reasons. The intellectual larly beautiful to contemplate. It forms states, again, being characterized by very another source of attraction in the youthlittle external movement, are of secondary ful nature, but is seen in its highest charm interest as mere exhibitions of conscious when it is found rare and unexpected in life. Thought, when directed to external the habitual smile of a wrinkled old age. "Du bist wie eine Blume." Hence art has chosen for the permanent | charm of pleasurable manifestations. I phases of her heroes and gods deep, quiet know of no expression of this feeling so gladness; and of these representations the delicate and true as Heine's exquisite song Greek Apollo, "whose bright eye lends suggested by the sight of youthful innobrightness, and never yet saw a shadow," cence, which begins with the line: will probably always remain first in the order of beauty. Of course this effect of pure gladsomeness is often modified by accompanying suggestions. Insensibility to pain is displeasing, as will be seen, through its unsympathetic character. Similarly the æsthetic anticipation of pleasurable expression is corrected by a recollection of its connection with physical constitution, health, &c. Rarely if ever is this sentiment the whole feeling of beauty, but a concomitant of other feelings and intuitions.* As a second illustration of these simple emotional effects, admiration may be named. The main element here is the perception of some novel and rare degree of a desirable quality. It has been noticed already Hitherto I have dwelt on gratifications that some degree of freshness and unfadepending on our entering into a feeling miliarity must be a characteristic of every of another through its expression. But impression of beauty. A commonplace there are pleasures derived from the spec- exhibition of the most attractive elements tacle of others' feelings not due to this of character can never be beautiful. But sympathetic action of the mind. Of in certain cases the degree of unexpectedcourse, so far as we conceive the consciousness and rarity may be the chief source of state of another, it must be by means of this same interpretation through our own. But in the class of cases now to be noticed the pleasure does not spring exclusively from this assumption of the feeling expressed, but from certain aspects and relations of the same viewed as objects of thought. And, first of all, the manifestations of human consciousness are, no less than impressions from the material world, the causes of special emotions. The one emotion characteristically awakened by the sight and observation of human beings is tenderness in all its varieties. Though the strongest forms of this feeling are confined to a few objects, other and fainter degrees are bestowed on all our fellowcreatures so far as we observe in them certain qualities of character. Thus the joyous temperament already described is commonly lovable. Many moral excellencies especially sympathy and self-sacrifice, generosity and lasting devotion, excite the same impulse of affection; and this effect lends much of their peculiar charm to the beautiful examples of virtue. Even the spectacle of weakness, and a suggestion of possible suffering, may call up a species of this feeling half pleasurable, yet with an under-current of sadness which we call pity. This case is curious, as being an apparent exception to the superior Mr. Carlyle has brought out this with other beautiful aspects of character in his Life of Sterling. So thoroughly joyful, light, and hoping a nature" was his, that even his religious felings seemed to lack the element of terror. Next to this elasticity of heart, the great charm in Sterling's character was his abundance of nature, his "infinite susceptivity." the gratification. Thus all degrees of vir- Mr. Mill, in his able exposure of Bentham's onesided view of human nature, distinguishes the lov able as a third aspect of actions co-ordinate with the aesthetic and the moral. No doubt where the impulse to love depends on a special and restricted relation of the subject and object, it has no aesthetic character; as in the case of a prompting to reward a generous act to one's own child. But when the mere presentation of an action to our attention is followed by an ideal excitation of the emotion, I regard it as analogous to the other pleasurable ef fects of beholding human character. The common uses of language confirm one in the belief that, to the majority, the sympathetic or amiable side of human nature is beautiful. No doubt in minds of high culture the connotation of the word becomes narrowed, and acquires an esoteric value, so to speak, the more intellectual perceptions of harmony, &c, becoming the prominent associations of the word, and excluding the more vulgar sentiment. To most a strongly-marked individuality | element in the pleasure given us by the is apt to be unnatural; though to some it spectacle of human consistency. It is alis highly impressive and admirable for its ways an intellectual process, and as such rare manifestation of courage and force. enters largely into the perceptions of It might perhaps be thought by some beauty of the more cultivated minds. As that the ludicrous aspects of human na- a sense of correspondence between feelture ought to have a place here, as they ing and expression, it appears in the are the source of a special and pleasurable charm of candour and frank openness. It emotion in the beholder. But though the binds the attraction of the present to ludicrous is undoubtedly a part of the that of the past, and is one main force subject-matter of aesthetics, it is strongly sustaining our continued interest in the opposed to the beautiful and sublime, evolution of the individual. which are more especially the subject of Beyond the tracing of resemblances this paper, and would require a separate among different elements of the same indiand different kind of treatment. How-vidual character, the feeling of harmony ever engaging or diverting a laughable ec- shows itself in the reference of these features centricity or defect may be, it is obvious of character to an ideal devolopment of the that it has little to do with the aggregate individual in conformity to the conditions charm of a character.* For the manifest of his environment. There is a gratificatendency of any excessive amount of tion in tracing the correspondence bequaintness of awkwardness in a character tween the character and the circumstances is to inspire contempt after the first im- of individual men and women. The inpulse of laughter has been gratified. Still, heritance of a family trait, the willing a certain admixture of the ridiculous may adoption of the father's pursuit, the exhiadd to the real interest of a nature. As bition of taste and fitness for the prewill be hereafter seen, a suggestion of scribed situation in life, all afford pleasure some common frailty in a great man will to the observer. As a correspondence to often be a relief, and serve to render his an ideal of happiness for the individual, character more natural. Again, a certain this harmony forms a part of our concepvoluntary gratification of our risible sus- tion of a well-balanced mind, and gives to ceptibilities, whether in act or in speech, prudence what little of an aesthetic charactends to please us through its exhibition ter it can ever possess. It appears as a of good-will and wish to entertain. But, well-ordering of energy and appetite in rewith these exceptions, the ludicrous bor- lation to supreme reason in Plato's conders too closely on the unworthy to en- ception of a just, harmonious, or beautiful ter into our notion of a pleasing and ad- man. mirable character as a whole. A more important case of the pleasure In the following elements of beauty in derived from harmony in character is found character the pleasure results from a more in the perception of naturalness, or conintellectual process, the cognition of har-formity to the laws of human nature genmony among relations. The general prin- erally. This principle, it is obvious, is ciple of harmony as a main factor in supplementary to the last, adding the unithe beautiful is too familiar to require versal type to the individual ideal. It immuch illustration. In all our perceptions of the beauty of human nature, some reference of the feeling observed to other feelings or objective facts holding relations with it, may be found. Single feelings, as already mentioned, are of interest chiefly as criteria of general tendencies. Any given manifestation of feeling is at once classified with similar states, and, when this is done easily, a pleasurable feeling results, which is the rudimentary sense of harmony. This emotion is the chief The attractions of individual character are the only things intended to be discussed here. Considered as a member of a group, such as a novel paints for us, a thoroughly ridiculous type of nature may be the source of a high gratification as a relief and counterpoise to the more earnest characters. † This gratification forms also the foundation to plies generally a facility in entering into the expressed feeling on the part of the observer, as is seen in the saying, "One touch of nature," &c.; but it is an intellectual perception more than a sympathetic emotion. It varies with the observer's knowledge and conception of mankind. This perception takes different forms according to the aspect of character presented. When the individual nature is viewed as a whole, it is judged to be complete or otherwise according to its participation in the various elements of the hu the intellectual enjoyment in reading and studying character. Curiosity and aesire to comprehend may blend in the interest awakened by the sight of a human being, though there are often painful accompaniments which rob the feelings of their æs thetic character. man character generally. The pleasure be recognized as containing possibilities of this perception is opposed to the pain of unknown effects-beneficial and injuwhich unaccountable eccentricity, the un- rious-on ourselves, and those of interest due emphasis of any one trait, often occa- to us. Hence a large part of the gratificasions. The Greek mind was quickly sen- tion derived from witnessing the feelings sitive to these effects. The conception of and actions of others is due to the suggesa due proportion of the various elements tions of security and benefit which they of character which we find in Plato, and bring with them. Nor need the good which underlies the celebrated maxim undèv effects be necessarily material blessings. йyav, illustrates this universal harmony Future possible gratifications of our even more than the other. All ideas of various emotional tastes must also be infitness, measure, or adjustment in in- cluded. In brief, when we contemplate dividual character really point to this any disposition in another, we inquire into double correspondence: first of all, with its bearings on our future and contingent the common requirements of human na- pleasures. Now if there are any of these ture, and secondly, with the special re- mental qualities which suggest pleasurable quirements of the individual life. In effects universally, and not merely to the its ethical form this feeling of harmony individual or the few, they assume ipso becomes the sense of propriety to which facto the character of the beautiful. Such Adam Smith gave such a conspicuous qualities there are undoubtedly, and the place in his system, though the refer- consideration of them brings us to those ence here is less to a fact than to an sides of human character which have both end or ideal. This conformity may be both an æsthetic and an ethical value. to types of very various extent. We are In discussing these it will be convenient gratified when we see a man exhibiting to regard first of all the pleasing charac the characteristic qualities of his nation, ter of actions and feelings derived exclurank, age, occupation, and so on. Thus, sively from considerations of their bearing for example, one charm of simplicity, or on the spectator; then to add the supunconsciousness of self, in a child, is due plementary impressions due to a compreto its naturalness, its suitability to the hensive regard for the effects of the concommon condition of childhood. duct on human beings generally, including the agent himself. This arrangement will enable us to arrive at the ethical aspects of character by a gradual progress from simpler phases. This variety of the beautiful is modified especially by the other requirement of rarity already spoken of; and to combine these pleasing effects in an ideal character - to be true to fact, and yet to construct a new character · is the special difficulty of the novelist's art. One circumstance which enables the two effects to blend so frequently is the existence of a moral ideal, to which it is acknowledged our characters ought to approximate. Owing to this, the presentation of a surpassing nobleness of nature, however uncommon in actual experience, is not felt to be unnatural. Our moral aspirations in this instance supply the type or standard. Thus far we have considered the various aspects of human character as matters of contemplation in what may be called a disinterested way; that is, we have conceived the observer as looking simply at the objective facts and their relations to other objective facts, and feeling nothing but what is involved in the contemplation of these alone. But this is seldom the whole of the sentiment produced by. beholding such manifestations. One chief aspect of the conduct and temper of our our fellows is their bearing on our own interests. Bound together as we are in society, every human being soon comes to First of all, then, the exhibition of certain qualities of mind is generally pleasing through the association of possible pleasurable effects on the spectator. This does not involve a process of sympathy with either the agent or the object of the action, but rests on the conception of uniformity in the feelings and actions of the same individual. One source of this pleasure is the ideal character of the conception the imagination of vague, indeterminate possibilities of happiness through the ideal suggestion. The forms of sentiment and volition which are thus generally gratifying will already have suggested themselves. They include the self-repressing, as contrasted with the self-asserting, qualities. When we witness any act of selfsacrifice to another, it is obvious that a general tendency is at once suggested; and, each spectator being a possible recipient of effects from the actions of the same individual, this idea is a source of pleasure. These dispositions may be either those of self-repression or of direct benevolence. A low estimate of oneself, modesty, with but a slight demand on the consideration and |