fantry at daylight of the 29th at Huey's Mills, 5 miles above Columbia.

At the very same hour Schofield sent Colonel P. S. Post's brigade up the river to ascertain if Hood had really crossed and ordered Stanley with the two divisions of Nathan Kimball and G. D. Wagner and the reserve artillery to Spring Hill to cover that point and hold the road open for the passage of the entire army. At 8 A. M. Stanley was on the march. On reaching Rutherford's Creek, four miles from Columbia, Kimball's division was halted and faced east to cover the crossing against a possible attack. Stanley with Wagner's division. pushed forward and at noon was within two miles of Spring Hill, at which time he was informed that Buford's division of Forrest's cavalry was approaching from the east. The troops were quickly thrown forward and L. P. Bradley's brigade was sent ahead half a mile to occupy a wooded knoll commanding all the approaches from the east. The other two brigades were on the north, and the greater part of the artillery was posted on a rise of ground south of the town. Scarcely had these dispositions been completed when Hood moved to his attack.

Before sunrise Cheatham's corps, with Cleburne's division in advance, began crossing the river, Hood accompanying Cleburne on the direct road to Spring Hill. Cheatham was followed by Stewart's corps and Johnson's

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division of Lee's corps, Lee himself with the remainder of his corps being left in front of Columbia. About 3 P. M. Cleburne approached Spring Hill and unavailingly assaulted Bradley twice, but in a third attack on front and flank Bradley was severely wounded and his brigade driven to the edge of the village where it was rallied and put in position to cover the wagon train, part of which had reached Spring Hill. Cleburne attempted to follow up his advantage but was checked by the fire of eight pieces of artillery. Bradley's loss was about 150 killed and wounded and the Confederate loss a little more. Bradley's reorganized force made so stout a resistance that at sunset Hood abandoned the attack. The result was that the Confederate infantry was checked when within 800 yards of the Franklin road but their cavalry had gained the road both north and south. of the town. Stanley with his one division of about 4,000 men was now in a critical position; his nearest support was Kimball, more than eight miles to the rear, while the other divisions of the army were still at Duck River. Fortunately for Stanley and the whole Union army Hood's plans to gain the road miscarried and Cheatham's corps bivouaced not more than half a mile from the road over which Schofield's army was obliged to pass from Columbia to Franklin. After dark Stewart arrived and formed on Cheatham's right, and by 8 o'clock

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two corps of Hood's army were in position facing the road and not over half a mile from it.

Meanwhile Schofield, who had remained during the day at Columbia, started in the afternoon with Ruger's division of Whitaker's brigade for Spring Hill, when about three miles from the town he came upon the Confederate cavalry holding the road and after a skirmish drove it off. Leaving Whitaker to cover a cross road a mile or two below the town, Schofield continued his march with Ruger to Spring Hill where he arrived about 7 P. M. and two hours later moved on to force a passage at Thompson's Station. On his approach the Confederates withdrew, leaving clear the road to Franklin, and Ruger took possession of the crossroads. Schofield returned to Spring Hill where, meanwhile, Cox had arrived with his division of the 23d corps. Just before midnight Cox was ordered to start for Franklin and to take Ruger with him. By 1 o'clock on the morning of the 30th Cox was on the road and was soon followed by the train of 800 wagons. As the head of the train passed Spring Hill the Confederate cavalry attacked it and destroyed some wagons, but Wood's division which had followed Cox from Duck River drove off the enemy. Kimball's division followed Wood's and at 4 A. M. Wagner followed Kimball, his skirmishers remaining until nearly daylight. The rear guard consisted

of Opdycke's brigade and not a man nor a wagon was left behind.*

He

Schofield threw up a line of intrenchments and a division of the 4th corps under Stanley crossed to the north bank of the river, all those remaining in the works south of it being under command of General Cox. By noon the trains were all in and most of them crossed to the north bank. Not anticipating a general attack Schofield gave orders for the withdrawal of the troops at sunset. was mistaken as to the intention of Hood, however, for the latter, smarting under his disappointment at the failure at Spring Hill, had girded himself for a last supreme effort. rest's cavalry had followed Schofield's rear and when Wagner's division, acting as Schofield's rear guard, had halted and thrown up barricades about 250 yards beyond the main line, Hood rapidly advanced his infantry and ordered a desperate assault to drive the Union forces into the river.t Two of Wagner's brigades were on

For

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133

retreat of the Confederates to the outer line of works, the capture by Opdycke of nearly 400 prisoners and 9 battle flags, and the recovery of the captured batteries. Meanwhile the battle had extended to the right and left involving all of the 23d corps and the left brigade of Kimball's division. The Confederates reached the works in many places but were unable to carry them. On both sides the fight

Hood formed his lines on either side of the Columbia pike, Cleburne's and Brown's divisions of Cheatham's corps on the east and west sides of the road respectively in two lines of battle. When within 400 yards of Wagner's line at 3:30 P. M. of November 30, the charge was ordered and the Confederates rushed forward with an impetus scarcely exceeded in any battle. Wagner was enveloped on both sides and fiercely attacked in front; the Confederates rushed over the barricades and the Union troops gave way in the greatest disorder, pursued by the exulting Confederates. A gap of 1,000 feet was at once made in the Union lines and toward this point Hood's battalions were rapidly converging. General D. S. Stanley, commanding the 4th corps, had sent the Confederate advance from the north side of the river and instantly started for his line. reached it just as the breach was made and the confused mass of fugitives and Confederates bore to the rear. Opdycke's brigade immediately coming to the rescue. Deploying as they advanced, his troops rushed upon the Confederates, who by this time had carried the centre of the 23d corps' line for the length of a brigade, had gone over the works, captured two batteries and many prisoners and reached an inner line of intrenchments 68 yards in the rear of the main line. When Opdycke's troops met the Confederates a desperate hand to hand encounter took place resulting in the

He

ing was most gallant, Opdycke leading his men to the charge. On this terrible afternoon at Franklin, Hood's army suffered all it was able to endure. The Confederates engaged numbered about 22,000 and Hood admitted a loss of about 4,500,* but Thomas reports the total loss at 6,252, of whom 1,750 were buried on the field, 3,800 were disabled and placed in hospitals, and 702 captured. It is probable also that about 2,000 were

*Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 330.

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slightly wounded. The Union army, including cavalry, numbered about 23,000, of whom 189 were killed, 1,033 wounded and 1,104 missing, Wagner's unfortunate division losing 1,241 of this number.*

On the night of November 30 Schofield withdrew to Nashville and on the morning of December 1 Thomas' army was united. A part of A. J. Smith's veteran division arrived at Nashville during the battle of Franklin, but not in time to be sent to Schofield. The rest of his division and General Steedman's division from Chattanooga arrived on December 1.

*Official Records, vol. xlv.; Jacob D. Cox, The Battle of Franklin (1864), and The March to the Sea- Franklin and Nashville, chap. v.; Battles and Leaders, vol. iv., p. 429 et seq.; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. x., pp. 16-21; Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army; Van Horne, Life of Thomas; Wyeth, Life of Forrest; Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, vol. ii.; Stephen D. Lee, Johnson's Division in the Battle of Franklin, in Mississippi Historical Society Publications, vol. vii., pp. 75-83 (1903); Levi T. Scofield, The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville, Tenn. (Battle of Franklin, Tenn., 1864). For the losses see Livermore, Numbers and Losses, p. 131. "The whole plan, which had originated in the brain of President Davis, to compensate for the enemy's offensive movement in Georgia by penetrating Tennessee was outrageously foolish, from the simple consideration that the two invasions were necessarily unequal; for that into the enemy's country could not seriously affect his super-abundant resources, while that into the southern interior went right into the heart of the Confederacy; and having once passed the frontiers, on which the South had necessarily thrown all its resources in men, was destined to realize General Grant's assertion, that the Confederacy was merely a shell."- Pollard, Last Year of the War, p. 130. See also Confederate Military History, vol. v., pp. 343-345; vol. vii., pp. 217-219; vol. viii., pp. 154-161; vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 154-155.

The day after the battle of Franklin, Hood advanced and established his lines in front of Nashville. Not until Hood appeared before Columbia with the entire army that had confronted the three armies under Sherman, reinforced with Forrest's cavalry, and it was realized that Schofield was fighting a gallant, almost desperate, game to hold Hood back while Thomas was working energetically to organize his own forces, did the authorities at Washington and City Point realize that Thomas had been left with wholly inadequate resources. In reply to a telegram from Grant directing him not to let Forrest escape, General Thomas on November 24 stated that the Confederate army so greatly outnumbered his own that he was compelled to act on the defensive. All of his own cavalry had been dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's cavalry which had gone with Sherman's army. Moreover, 15,000 of his veterans had been discharged by expiration of service and only 12,000 perfectly raw troops had been sent him. This created a feeling of panic at Washington, or it was feared that Hood might avoid Thomas, cross the Cumberland and carry out Davis' plan to have him push on to the Ohio. This fear redoubled when the necessity appeared for Schofield to retire. from Franklin. It was not then so clearly seen as it was afterwards that his stubborn fight against Hood had saved the situation which Sherman created.