recital of a deed is notice of the contents of such deed, since it puts the party upon his inquiry, and he must be supposed to pursue it till he find the recited deed, unless something is shown to have occurred short of that to satisfy the mind of the party; and naturally calculated to divert him from further inquiry. Taylor TS. Stibbert, 2 Vesey Jr. 437; Hiern vs. Mill, 13 Vesey 114; Hall vs. Smith, 14 Vesey 426; Jackson vs. Meeley, 10 Johns. R. 374. But it was urged that the registry must go further, and show the precise state of the security. Accordingly:

3. In Pettibone vs. Griswold, 4 Conn. R. 158, it was decided, that, where the condition of a mortgage deed was, that the mortgagor should pay all notes, which the mortgagee might indorse or give for the mortgagor, and all receipts which the mortgagee might hold against him, the deed was void as against the other creditors of the mortgagor. This was put, or attempted to be put, upon the same ground assumed by the New York courts in Frost vs. Beekman, that those interested in the registry were not bound. to look beyond it, and must be able to determine from that, the precise state of the title. The learned judge here did not seem to have adverted to the difference between the two cases. When the registry, on its face, seems to be perfect, but is not so, it necessarily misleads the party, who will naturally rely upon it. On the other hand, where the notice upon the registry is general, as by reference to other deeds, or instruments, whether to define the estate conveyed, or the extent of the condition of a mortgage, it has no such tendency to mislead, any more than such a recital in the deed itself would have that effect upon one seeing the deed. And if such a recital in the deed is valid notice of its contents as between the parties, there is no reason, why the registry of the deed should not be as good notice to creditors and purchasers, as the production of the deed itself, or full notice of its contents, which it has never been doubted made the deed as good, as to other parties, having such notice, as it was between the grantor and grantee. And it is no more requisite that those interested in knowing the state of land titles should be able to determine it from an inspection of the registry than that they should be able to do it

without looking beyond the deeds, provided these had been shown them. And it would scarcely be contended that any deed, in such form as to be valid between the parties, would not be equally valid, as to creditors and purchasers, unless it was fraudulent, in fact, or calculated to mislead others, nothing of which is relied upon in Griswold vs. Pettibone, supra. The truth is that this case was early understood to have been put upon ground not maintainable, and has consequently been abandoned in that state, as their reports show, in numerous cases. All that is now required, in that state, 18, that the contracts secured by a mortgage should be described with such convenient certainty as the case admits of. Stoughton vs. Pasco, 5 Conn. R. 442; Hart vs. Chalker, 14 Conn. 79; Merrills vs. Swift, 18 Id. 257; Sanford vs. Wheeler, 13 Id. 165; Lewis vs. De Forest, 20 Id. 427; Mix vs. Cowles, Id. 420. See also, to the same purport, Skilman vs. Teeple, Saxton's R. 232; 1 Hilliard on Mort. 285-297.

4. And in some of the states it has been held, that the mortgage will be valid as against future incumbrances, where the debt is either so described in the condition of the deed, that its identity can be traced, or such information given that those interested may be able, upon proper inquiry, to trace it out. Garber vs. Henry, 6 Watts 57; Gardner vs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 414; Commercial Bank vs. Cunningham, 24 Pick. R. 274. And all that is at present required, in the way of describing the debt secured, or intended to be secured, by a mortgage, is that it should be capable of clear identification, either by matter upon the record, or else by that, in connection with facts proved aliunde, and which may be regarded as pointed at by the registry.

5. Under this rule great looseness and indefiniteness of description has been admitted, both as to present and future indebtedness intended to be secured, where it is clearly made to appear that it was the bona fide purpose of the parties to secure the debt in question, and that there was no fraudulent purpose as to others. As in the case of The Commercial Bank vs. Cunningham, 24 Pick. R. 270, where a copartnership executed a mortgage to secure a promissory note, and took from the creditor an instrument,

not recorded, which set forth that such note was held as collateral security for the payment or discharge of certain other notes and liabilities of the mortgagor, and that the note and mortgage were to be held as long as the mortgagors should be under any liability of any sort to the creditor: It was held that the mortgage was not fraudulent as against other creditors or bona fide purchasers; and that new notes given to the creditor, whether in renewal of the new notes, or not, were covered by the mortgage, notwithstanding the members of the firm had changed and the new notes were made or indorsed in the name of the new firm. And notes, secured by mortgage, given for a round sum, where nothing was due that was intended to be secured, but the object was merely to indemnify the mortgagee against future liabilities expected to be incurred, and where this was evidenced by a writing between the parties, not recorded, have been held valid securities, as against all debts and securities accruing after the mortgagee had assumed responsibilities. Gardner vs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 407; James vs. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 417, 429.

6. It seems now perfectly well settled that a mortgage to secure future advances, may be in the form of a gross sum expressed on the face of the instrument as present indebtedness. The Bank of Utica vs. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 294. And so may a mortgage be taken in this general form to secure present indebtedness arising out of complicated transactions where it may be difficult to describe the securities, or the debts, except in this general way. Bank of Utico vs. Finch, supra.

7. But this must be a constituent part of the original agreement. And where such debts have been all once paid, it has been held not competent to keep the security on foot, and to apply it to other indebtedness, by virtue of a parol contract to that effect. Bank of Utica vs. Finch, supra; Truscott vs. King, 2 Selden R. 147; Mead vs. York, Id. 449; 4 Kent Comm. 176; Ex parte Hooper, 19 Vesey 477; Meland vs. Gray, 2 Y. & C. 199.

8. The forms of these conditions have been very much varied, but since the general principle is now firmly established, that a general description of the indebtedness in the condition of a mort

gage is sufficient, as against creditors and bona fide future incumbrancers and purchasers, the courts have manifested a laudable disposition not to exclude any security, which was relied upon in good faith, at the time the advances were made and subsequently. Hence mortgages to secure blank indorsements by the mortgagee have been held valid, as against creditors whose securities accrued after the date of such indorsements, but before any payment upon them, or even before the bills are put in circulation. Burdett vs. Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287. And it will be equally valid if given to secure future indorsements. Kramer vs. The Bank, 15 Ohio 253; or even to secure one for signing the bond of an executor, as surety. Hawkins vs. May, 12 Alabama R. 673. And a mortgage to secure the mortgagee "what I may owe him on book," was not only held valid, to secure any existing indebtedness, but it appearing that no such indebtedness existed, at the date of the mortgage, to which it could have been intended to apply, it was held that it should be construed to apply to any future indebtedness on book. McDaniels vs. Colvin, 16 Verm. R. 300. So also a mortgage to secure all debts due and all suretyships of the mortgagor for the mortgagee was held a valid security for all existing liabilities. Vanneter vs. Vanneter, 3 Gratt. 148. And in a late case in Vermont it was decided that a mortgage to secure the mortgagee "all the notes and agreements I now owe or have with him," was a valid security to cover all payments made as surety upon any indorsements made by the mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor, after the date of the mortgage, and before knowledge of any intervening incumbrance, such indorsements being made in pursuance of a contract in the form of a promissory note for $1000, expressed upon its face to be collateral to and as "security for any demand or liability he then had or might thereafter have against or on account" of the mortgagor, such collateral note existing at the date of the mortgage. Seymour vs. Darrow, 31 Vt. R. 122. And the leading case, in this country, upon the subject, Shirras vs. Craig, 7 Cranch 34, was a mortgage expressed to be for the security of thirty thousand pounds sterling, when the real object of the deed was to secure "different sums,

dur at the time from particular mortgagees, advances afterwards to be made, and liabilities to be incurred to an uncertain amount." But the security was nevertheless held valid, as against future incumbrancers and creditors, even as to future advances made before notice of any intervening equity.

9. We have not been able to perceive any valid objection to this relaxation from the former cases, which will not equally go to destroy all registered mortgages wherever the securities are changed. And it cannot be denied that such an indulgence as that last named does open a wide door for the practice of fraud. Very few persons would hesitate to treat a mortgage, as probably paid, upon being shown all the securities described in the condition, and especially where they were overdue at the time. The idea of substituting a new security, for one already overdue, would not commonly occur to business men, unless in the case of banks, or moneyed institutions, with whom such practice is more usual, than to suffer the overdue paper to remain unpaid.

10. But notwithstanding this liability to fraud and imposition, and the notoriety of the fact, that some cases of considerable severity do, from time to time, occur in this way, the law is nevertheless settled, beyond all question, or cavil, that no change of the securities will release the title of the mortgagee, so long as the original indebtedness, or any portion of it, remains uncancelled, unless there is clear and satisfactory evidence, that the substituted securities were intended to supersede the mortgage security. Tripp vs. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 614. And where the personal obligation of the debtor is relinquished, or avoided, the mortgage is nevertheless held as a binding security for the debt. Id.; Buswell vs. Davis, 10 N. H. 424. The same was held also where the bond secured by the mortgage was avoided for a fraudulent alteration. Gillett vs. Powell, Spear's Ch. R. 142. But this last decision may be regarded as questionable perhaps. And where the creditor gives his debtor a general release from the debt, or from all debts and liabilities, this will be prima facie a release of the mortgage. Armitage vs. Wickliffe, 12 B. Mon. 488.

11. But no presumptive payment will be allowed to operate