Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J. cannot appeal, and the judgment and decree were right and proper, and should be affirmed. Our statute (Rev. Laws, 1080) states: "No mortgage of personal property shall be valid for any purpose against any other person than the parties thereto, unless possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to, and retained by the mortgagee"; and it provides further for the securing and keeping of books "for the recording of all chattel mortgages," and also declares that "all chattel mortgages shall be recorded therein." The chattel mortgage in this case, in so far as it is called in question, never was, and is not now, valid for any purpose, because as a part of its execution and as a condition precedent to its validity it was not recorded as required by statute. (Simpson v. Harris, 21 Nev. 353, 370; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn. Cordage Co., 55 Atl. 231.) The fact that the mortgage was of real estate and of personal property, and was filed for record and recorded as a real estate mortgage, did not satisfy the mandatory requirements of the statute, or the construction thereof in Simpson v. Harris, supra, where it is said that a mortgage not "recorded in strict compliance with the statute is absolutely void." The statute in express words requires that there shall be an actual recording in books specially provided for the purpose. "We cannot agree with counsel for the appellant that the record of a mortgage of real estate in the office of the register of deeds is notice to the world of the mortgage of chattels included in the same instrument, and it is not the place provided by law for obtaining such notice, and it cannot be supposed that interested parties will look there for such mortgages. 'A public record is not notice for any purpose not declared by statute.' (Burton v. Martz, 38 Mich. 762.)" (Ramsdell v. Citizens E. L. & P. Co., 61 N. W. 275.) By the Court, MCCARRAN, C. J.: As security for a lien of $1,200, appellant took a promissory note signed by E. U. Hooper and Josephine Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J. S. Hooper, his wife; and to secure the payment of said promissory note, the Hoopers made and delivered a real estate and chattel mortgage covering certain real property in the city of Reno, and also the machinery and implements used by Hooper in his vocation. This mortgage was made on March 17, 1913, and on the following day, March 18, the instrument was filed with the county recorder of Washoe County and by him recorded in a book containing the records of realty mortgages. On June 4, 1914, C. G. Pierson commenced an action against the respondent E. U. Hooper, and caused a writ of attachment to issue. On June 11, 1914, the mortgage given by the Hoopers to Green, the appellant here, was again filed for record with the county recorder, and was recorded as a chattel mortgage. On the same day, to wit, June 11, Green, the appellant here, commenced suit to foreclose the mortgage. On June 14, 1914, pursuant to motion, the district court set aside and discharged the attachment as to certain mentioned articles of machinery and equipment used by Hooper in his regular vocation, which said articles were included in the mortgage given by the Hoopers to Green. On the same day on which the order discharging and dissolving the judgment was entered, to wit, June 14, 1914, the property was delivered to Hooper by the sheriff of Washoe County, the attaching officer. The sheriff demanded and received a receipt for the property from Hooper, and never again attempted to take control or possession of the property or to exercise any control over it. From that time until the property was taken in charge by the referee in bankruptcy it remained in the possession, custody, and control of Hooper. On July 25, 1914, Hooper filed a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, and on the same day he was adjudged a bankrupt. On July 18, 1914, C. G. Pierson perfected his appeal from the latter order of the district court dissolving and discharging the writ of attachment, and at the same time secured an order of the district court, made by the same judge who had made the order dissolving the attachment, VOL. 41-2 Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J. staying the operation of said order dissolving the said attachment and fixing the amount of a stay bond in the sum of $3,000, which bond was given and approved. Section 405 of our code of civil procedure, as amended by the legislature of 1915, provides: "If the appeal be from a judgment or order directing the payment of money, or from an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, it shall not stay the execution of the judgment or order unless a written undertaking be executed on the part of the appellant, by two or more sufficient sureties, stating their place of residence and occupation, to the effect that they are bound in double the amount named in the judgment or order, or double the sum of the value of the property attached, as the case may be; that if the judgment or order appealed from, or any part thereof, be affirmed, or such appeal be dismissed, the appellant shall pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment or order, or the part of such amount as to which the judgment or order shall be affirmed, if affirmed only in part, and all damages and costs which shall be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal, and that if the appellant does not make such payment within thirty days after the filing of the remittitur from the supreme court, in the court in which the appeal is taken, judgment may be entered on motion of the respondent, in his favor against the sureties for such amount, together with the interest that may be due thereon and the damages and costs which may be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal. When the judgment or order appealed from is made payable in a specified kind of money or currency, the undertaking required by this section shall be drawn and made payable in the same kind of money or currency specified in said judgment or order, and in case of any appeal from an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, such undertaking shall be conditioned that if the order appealed from or any part thereof be affirmed, the appellant shall pay to the opposing party, Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J. on such appeal, all damages and costs caused by him by reason of said appeal and the stay of execution thereon." (Stats. 1915, p. 219.) The trial court held that the mortgage, in so far as the personal property therein described is concerned, as against the creditors of E. U. Hooper, is invalid for any purpose, void, and of no effect; that plaintiff George S. Green, appellant here, has no right, title or interest in or to or lien upon said property. Of the several contentions relied upon by appellant for a reversal of this judgment, we shall confine ourselves to but one. The trial court took the position, and by reason of such position the judgment followed, that notwithstanding the order of the district court made June 14, 1914, dissolving the attachment and discharging the property from the lien, and notwithstanding the delivery of the property by the attaching officer to the defendant in that case, nevertheless the property was at all times, after the levy of the attachment by the sheriff, in custodia legis and at all times subject to the attachment lien; that the latter took precedence over the mortgage and that the referee in bankruptcy was subrogated to the rights of the attaching officer. It is the contention of appellant here that on the making of the order dissolving the attachment and on the delivery of the property by the sheriff to the respondent Hooper, the chattel mortgage made by Hooper and his wife to appellant, having been recorded in the interim, became immediately effective. On the other hand, it is the contention of respondents that the referee in bankruptcy became subrogated to the rights of the attaching officer, and the property should be retained in the estate of the bankrupt and disposed of for the benefit of his creditors. 1. While the remedy by attachment as it now exists in many of the jurisdictions of the United States was not of common-law origin, a somewhat similar process, whereby a creditor under some circumstances might attach his Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J. debtor's property as security for the obligation, was of ancient usage in the English law. (Barber v. Morgan, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 951; Franklin Bank v. Bachelder, 39 Am. Dec. 606.) The remedy as now recognized in the states of the union is of comparatively recent origin and is dependent upon statute. 2. In the first place, it may be observed that in order to effect an attachment of personal property, it must be taken into the custody of the officer serving the writ. Until this is done, no attachment can be said to exist. (Freeman on Executions, sec. 262; Wade on Attachment, vol. 1, sec. 129; Drake on Attachment, sec. 292.) 3. The statute of Nevada (Rev. Laws, 5152), as to how an attachment may be executed, prescribes: "2. Personal property capable of manual delivery shall be attached by taking it into custody." As to the nature of the custody required of an attaching officer in order to continue the lien in effect, the rule has been variously stated, but we think it may be asserted as a general rule that the custody required of the attaching officer should be such as to enable the officer to retain and assert his power and control over the property so that it cannot probably be withdrawn or taken by another without his knowing it. 4. It has been stated as a proposition of law, and such is well supported by authority, that it is the duty of the attaching officer to take the property attached into his possession; and the lien of such attachment, so far as subsequent purchasers and other creditors are concerned, is dependent upon the continuance of such possession. If, therefore, the officer abandons his possession, the lien will be ineffective as against such. (Chadbourne v. Sumner, 16 N. H. 129; Sanford v. Boring, 12 Cal. 539; Taintor v. Williams, 7 Conn. 271; Nichols v. Patten, 18 Me. 231; Baldwin v. Jackson, 12 Mass. 131; Sanderson v. Edwards, 16 Pick. 144.) In the case of Gower v. Stevens, 19 Me. 92, the rule is stated that: |