Argument for Respondent did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. (Rev. Laws, 7469, 7302; State v. Geiger, 49 Cal. 643; State v.Mircovich, 35 Nev. 485.) At common law a grand juror was not disqualified by his previous knowledge or opinion; such disqualification is entirely statutory. (27 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 1267.) Full power rests in the state over remedies and procedure in its own courts, and any order it pleases may be made in respect thereto, provided the substance of the right is secured without unreasonable burden to the parties and litigants. Statutory limitation of the time and manner of making objections to grand jurors is not against the fourteenth amendment to the constitution under the "due process of law" clause. States may even do away entirely with the grand jury, or the necessity of indictment thereby as a prerequisite to prosecution. (Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 263; York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 20; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 149; In Re Krug, 79 Fed. 311; Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229.) The objection made to the grand jurors is not such a one as affects the jurisdiction of the court; disqualification of grand jurors does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court; the objection may be waived by not being made at the proper time. (Eureka County Bank Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 678; McComb v. District Court, 36 Nev. 417, 136 Pac. 563; People v. Stacey, 34 Cal. 307.) Even if the admission of the testimony of appellant on the habeas corpus proceedings in a sister state was erroneous, the error was positively cured when he took the stand in his own behalf and testified substantially in accordance with the testimony in question. (State v. O'Keefe, 23 Nev. 127; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333; State v. Buster, 23 Nev. 346; State v. Johnny, 29 Nev. 203, 219; State v. Williams, 31 Nev. 360; State v. Urie, 35 Nev. 274.) However, the testimony was admissible in the first instance. (State v. Hopkins, 42 Pac. 627; Miller v. People, 74 N. E. 743; Rafferty v. State, 16 S. W. 728, 730; Tiner v. State, 161 S. W. 195; Dickerson v. State, 4 N. W. 321; People v. Gallagher, 42 N. W. 1063; Commonwealth v. Richardson, Opinion of the Court-Sanders, J. 79 Atl. 657; Hall v. State, 32 South. 750; State v. Rover, 13 Nev. 17.) There was no error in the refusal of the demand for the production of the alleged confession of the accomplice. (People v. Emmons, 95 Pac. 1032; State v. Laird, 100 Pac. 639; State v. Terry, 55 South. 15; People v. Fitzsimmons, 149 N. W. 976; Ex Parte Clark, 58 Pac. 546; Stole v. Fitzgerald, 32 S. W. 1117; People v. Jackson, 74 N. E. 565; Morrison v. State, 51 S. W. 358; Dorris v. M. Coal Co., 64 Atl. 855; Goss v. A. Weiman & Co., 59 South. 364.) By the Court, SANDERS, J.: Sam Bachman, the appellant, was indicted, tried, and convicted in the district court of the Fourth judicial district of the State of Nevada, in and for the county of Elko, of the crime of grand larceny. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, and from the judgment pronounced against him, he appeals. Prior to his indictment for the crime for which he was tried and convicted, the accused was in the custody of the sheriff of Elko County, and in default of bail was confined in the county jail to answer two indictments found against him by a prior grand jury. One of these indictments, upon motion of the accused, was by the order of the court directed to be resubmitted to another grand jury. The panel of the grand jury was then in attendance upon the court, but had not yet been selected. The accused remained in custody in default of bail. Before the grand jury was sworn to consider the case resubmitted, the accused interposed a challenge to the panel, upon the ground that it had been selected from twenty-three instead of twenty-four persons. The court overruled the challenge, the accused excepted, and then interposed a challenge to each individual member of the grand jury, upon the ground that a state of mind existed on the part of each juror with reference to the case and to the accused which would prevent them from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial right of the accused. (Rev. Laws, 7005, subd. 6.) Opinion of the Court-Sanders, J. The court declined to consider the challenge, refused to try the same, and also refused to permit the accused to inquire of each juror as to his state of mind with reference to the case and to the accused. The court's ruling is as follows: "The court will at this time decline to consider the challenges. The record will show that you made the challenges and that the court declined to consider them for the reason that the defendant has not been held to answer, and the better practice is not to consider the challenges at this time, and as you are advised, all the points that could be raised at this time may be raised if necessary at the proper stage of the proceedings. I want you to have your record full in the matter and save your exception to the action of the court in refusing to consider the challenges at this time." To this ruling the accused excepted. The grand jury returned three indictments against him, covering other and independent offenses than that of the accusation resubmitted, involving, however, the same subjectmatter, to wit, grand larceny. Upon arrangement on one of said indictments the accused made his motion to quash and set aside the same. The motion was predicated upon the exceptions taken by the accused to the rulings of the court upon his challenge both to the panel and to the individual grand jurors: 1. First, that the grand jury was not a legal body, in that it was selected from twenty-three instead of twenty-four persons. This court has in several cases had occasion to rule upon this point adversely to the contention of appellant. (State v. Casey, 34 Nev. 154, 117 Pac. 5; State v. Williams, 31 Nev. 360, 102 Pac. 974; State v. Weber, 31 Nev. 390, 103 Pac. 411.) 2, 3. As to the second ground of the motion to quash and set aside the indictment, the question presented is more novel than difficult. The accused complains bitterly that the court's action in denying him the right to challenge the individual members of the jury before they were sworn, not only prejudiced him, but that he was deprived of his statutory and constitutional right. Opinion of the Court-Sanders, J. It is argued that he was in custody and held to answer in the sense of our statute. (Rev. Laws, 7003.) There is no doubt but that the right of the accused to challenge the panel or any individual juror was a substantial right, and we are of the opinion that he was included in that class of persons who are held to answer. Where an indictment is set aside the statute provides: "If the court directs that the case be resubmitted, the defendant, if already in custody, must so remain unless he is admitted to bail; or if already admitted to bail, or money has been deposited instead thereof, the bail or money shall be answerable for the appearance of the defendant to answer a new indictment; and, unless a new indictment is found before the next grand jury of the district is discharged, the court must, on the discharge of such grand jury, make the order prescribed by the preceding section." (Rev. Laws, 7093.) 4. We do not think, however, that the inquiry made by argument of the accused as to whether or not he was held or not held to answer is material to the question presented for our decision upon this point. The main question is, Was the accused, by the court's action in refusing to consider his challenges before the jury was sworn, deprived of his statutory and constitutional right, or did he, by the court's ruling, lose his substantial right of challenge? An accused who has been indicted without an opportunity to challenge the grand jury is not without a remedy. Under the ruling of the court, the accused was advised that all the points that could be raised at that time might be raised if necessary at the proper stage of the proceedings. We infer from this language that the court could have had in mind only subdivision 4 of section 7090, Revised Laws, which provides: * * * "The indictment must be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, in any of the following cases. 4. When the defendant had not been held to answer before the finding of the indictment, on any ground which would have been Opinion of the Court-Sanders, J. good ground for challenge either to the panel or to any individual grand juror." In the case of McComb v. District Court, 36 Nev. 417, 136 Pac. 563, this court declared that where an accused was held to answer and failed to interpose a challenge to the individual jurors before his indictment, he could not thereafter take advantage of his own neglect or failure; but in the case at bar it appears that while the court was of the opinion that the accused was not held to answer, he had the remedy provided by section 7090, Revised Laws, upon a motion to set aside the indictment. It is obvious that the accused endeavored to take advantage of this section of the statute upon his motion to quash and set aside the indictment, but he apparently preferred to rest his motion upon the denial of his right to challenge the individual members of the grand jury in the first instance, and offered no proof upon his motion to set aside that there existed on the part of any member of the grand jury a state of mind prejudicial to him or to his cause. In the case of State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 324, the accused was in custody at the time the indictment was found against him, and neither he nor his counsel had an opportunity to interpose a challenge to the panel or to any individual member of the jury, and he moved the court to set aside the indictment upon the ground that he was in custody and held to answer and had been deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to challenge the individual members of the grand jury which had found the indictment against him. The court, after duly considering the facts, stated to the defendant and his counsel that they could move to set aside the indictment by taking any objection thereto that might have been taken advantage of to the said grand jury or to any member thereof had the defendant appeared before said grand jury. No desire being expressed by the defendant, the court overruled the motion. In the case at bar, it appears that the accused was expressly granted the privilege, by the ruling of |