Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J. length all that is contained in that opinion relative to the evidence in the case. It reads: "In September, 1885, when the first contract was entered into, as alleged in the amended complaint, the custody of the plaintiff was surrendered by his mother to John F. Forsyth and Jane Forsyth, his wife, in whose custody he remained continuously, except during the period he was with his father. It was while he was in the custody of his father in 1890, at Reno, Nevada, the second alleged contract was entered into, and the custody of the plaintiff was surrendered by his father to John F. Forsyth and Jane Forsyth, his wife, in whose custody he remained. John F. Forsyth died on February 6, 1907, but prior to his death he conveyed all of his property to Jane Forsyth, his wife. Jane Forsyth died on April 26, 1913, leaving a last will and testament, which has been admitted to probate in this court, in which no provision was made for plaintiff, and the said Jane Forsyth bequeathed to other parties the property that came to her from her husband, the said John F. Forsyth. "The evidence in this case shows that John F. Forsyth, Jane Forsyth, his wife, plaintiff, and his mother called to see Richard Martin, when plaintiff was very small, with reference to having adoption papers prepared and both of the Forsyths stated to him they were there for the purpose of adopting the boy; that his mother gave him to them to adopt, as they had no children of their own, and called the boy theirs. "H. Lund testified the Forsyths said they took the boy to raise; that they took to adopt as their own. "H. R. Brown testified Mr. Forsyth introduced plaintiff to him as his son. "Ross Peterson testified of Mr. Forsyth speaking of plaintiff as his boy. "Herbert E. Watts testified Mrs. Forsyth told his mother they had adopted the boy. "William Watts testified he had a conversation with Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J. Mrs. Forsyth directly after 1885, in which she said she liked the boy and wanted to keep him as long as he lived and as long as they lived. "To Mary A. Dickinson the Forsyths referred to plaintiff as their own and said he was there to stay. Both said the boy was theirs; had taken him to raise; spoke of how much they thought of him, how handy he was, and how much he could do for them; also that in a conversation with Mrs. Forsyth she said that Mr. Forsyth said the affairs were settled now, and for her to see that he was not forgotten; that what was left was supposed to be his; that his wish was for Alex to get the property, and wanted Mrs. Forsyth not to forget him. This was said after Mr. Forsyth's death. "It appears from the time plaintiff went to the Forsyths he has always gone by the name of Forsyth and always called them Father and Mother. The fact that he was not their son was not mentioned to him, and it does not appear when he first learned they were not his parents. "The fact in issue is whether either or both of the contracts alleged in the amended complaint were made. Plaintiff contends he has established the contracts pleaded by him in his amended complaint and the full and faithful performance of all on his part thereof, while defendants contend that no such contract or contracts have been established. It is essential that a contract be established substantially as claimed by plaintiff. Such a contract may be established by circumstances, but these must be strong and satisfactory. "On two different occasions, as it appears from the testimony, the Forsyths were ready and willing to have the necessary and proper adoption papers taken out, and plaintiff's parents should have seen to it that it was attended to. A little attention to the matter then on their part would have avoided the trouble and litigation at this date, and the reason given by plaintiff's mother when she found it would be necessary to go to Susanville, Cal., for this purpose was that she was postmistress and could not get away, but on the second occasion, Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J. in 1890, no sufficient excuse can be offered by the father of plaintiff for not seeing to it and having the matter properly attended to. If plaintiff's parents were in this respect derelict in their duty, would it be right to cause the plaintiff to suffer for their seeming negligence, for in a case like this, where the alleged agreement was for the adoption of a young child, who was taken into the family and raised, the child could not be expected to see to the issuance of adoption papers. "It also appears that first one and then the other of the Forsyths stated to disinterested parties that plaintiff was their boy; they had taken him to adopt, and even went so far as to say they had adopted him; also what they had would be his. Then in 1890, when plaintiff was in the custody of his father, they threatened legal proceedings in order to regain his custody. The testimony covers a period of thirty years, and it is not likely the witnesses could remember everything that was said during that time. "The evidence upon which plaintiff relies to prove the alleged contracts consists of admissions and declarations made by John F. Forsyth and Jane Forsyth, his wife, during their lifetime. The value of admissions as evidence depends on the circumstances under which and to whom and when they were made. Here it appears, when plaintiff was very small, in company with his mother and John F. Forsyth and Jane Forsyth, his wife, they called upon Richard Martin, who was a notary public, living at Summit, Cal., for the purpose of having him prepare adoption papers; the Forsyths stating they were there for the purpose of adopting the boy who had been given to them by his mother for that purpose. They had no children of their own, and were about 40 years old at the time." From a reading of the record, as well as from this statement of the evidence, we are of the opinion that no stronger deduction can be made than that a contract of adoption simply was entered into. There is no evidence tending to show an agreement to the effect that plaintiff should become the owner of whatever property the Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J. Forsyths might own at the time of their death. The strongest testimony tending to sustain such a contention was that given by the witness Mary A. Dickinson, to the effect that Mrs. Forsyth said to the witness that Mr. Forsyth had said to Mrs. Forsyth: "The affairs were settled now, and for her to see he [the plaintiff] was not forgotten; that what was left was supposed to be his; that his wish was for Alex to get the property, and wanted Mrs. Forsyth not to forget him." But this is not evidence of a contract that he should become the owner of property upon the death of the Forsyths. If it indicates anything, it is simply that Mr. Forsyth thought, in view of the relation which had existed, that plaintiff deserved consideration at their hands. In concluding his opinion, the trial judge said: "From the testimony introduced on the trial of this case it clearly appears that John F. Forsyth and Jane Forsyth, his wife, entered into the contracts with the plaintiff's father and mother for his adoption, and that plaintiff is entitled to a specific performance of the same, which entitled him to the property owned by Jane Forsyth at the time of her death, and that findings and decree should be prepared accordingly, and for costs of suit." 4. From this it will be seen that the judge based his conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to a decree of specific performance upon the theory that a contract of adoption simply had been entered into, and not upon the theory that he should become the absolute owner of the property of the Forsyths upon their death. The courts are almost unanimous in holding that an adopted child acquires no greater right than a natural child, that of inheritance, and that such adoption does not deprive the adoptive parent of the right to dispose of his property by will, unless he is deprived of such power by a contract binding him to give his property to the adopted child. (1 C. J., sec. 122, p. 1396.) 5. But conceding, for the purposes of this case, that Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J. the findings of the court are sufficient to sustain the judgment, we are clearly of the opinion that the findings are against the evidence. It is a well-established rule that the burden of showing, by clear and satisfactory evidence, a contract which it is sought to have specifically enforced, rests upon the party who sets up and asks its enforcement, and unless this is done specific performance will not be decreed. (Strange v. Crowley, 91 Mo. 287, 2 S. W. 421; Taylor v. Von Schraeder, 107 Mo. 206, 16 S. W. 679.) The Supreme Court of Oregon, in a suit for the specific performance of a contract to will property, quotes approvingly the following language: "In this class of cases,' says Barrett, J., in Gall v. Gall (Sup.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 332, 333, 'the ordinary rules which govern in actions to compel the specific performance of contracts, and which furnish reasonable safeguards against frauds, should be rigidly applied. These rules require that the contract be certain and definite in all [of] its parts; that it be mutual, and founded upon an adequate consideration; that it be established by the clearest and most convincing evidence. Even then, when the contract limits a man's right to dispose of his property by will, it is regarded with suspicion, and enforced only when it is apparent that the hand of equity is required to prevent a fraud upon the promisee.'" (Richardson v. Orth, 40 Or. 263, 66 Pac. 930.) In the case of Jones v. Patrick, 145 Fed. 440, Judge Hawley quotes approvingly as follows from Morrow v. Matthew, 10 Idaho, 423, 79 Pac. 197: "The courts have quite generally held that, in order to enforce the specific performance of a parol contract, it must be clearly and satisfactorily shown to the trial court as to its execution and the terms and conditions thereof. If the contract has not been reduced to writing, it must of necessity require a greater weight of evidence to establish its existence, and the terms and conditions thereof, and in those respects satisfy the mind of the court, than if the contract were in writing |