McCarran, C. J., concurring laws are enacted to meet the rule of the employers' liability for injury to employees. The premise is fallacious. The proper theory, and that on which the original Bismarckian compensation acts were founded, and that which appears as the spirit underlying all such laws subsequently created, is rather that the thing which requires human labor and consumes human energy in its operation shall bear an equitable share by way of compensation to those or the dependents of those who are deprived of the fruits of their labor, where such deprivation grows out of or is sustained in the course of employment. REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA APRIL TERM, 1918 [No. 2315] THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT, v. AL. SNYDER, APPELLANT. [172 Pac. 364] 1. ROBBERY-ADMINISTRATION OF POISON-STATUTE "FORCE." Where defendant administered poison to produce unconsciousness and took money from cash register in saloon of which unconscious person had charge, he was guilty of "robbery," defined by statute to be unlawful taking of personal property from person of another or in his presence against his will by means of force or violence or fear of injury, since the administration of the poison constituted "force." 2. ROBBERY-POISON-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In a prosecution for robbery by administering chloral hydrate to produce unconsciousness, evidence held not to show that the condition in which the person robbed was found could not have been so caused. 3. ROBBERY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In a prosecution for robbery by administering chloral hydrate to render unconscious the barkeeper whose cash register was robbed, evidence connecting defendant with the crime, alleged to have been committed by himself and two others, held to sustain conviction. APPEAL from Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; E. J. L. Taber, Judge. Al. Snyder was convicted of robbery, and appeals. Affirmed. Argument for Appellant Withers & Withers, for Appellant: The court erred in refusing to advise the jury to bring in a verdict acquitting the defendant, when requested so to do. There was no proof that chloral had been administered; and if in fact it had been administered, there was no proof that the defendant had been in any way connected with such administration. The possession of chloral hydrate and opportunity of administering it are of themselves no evidence to support the crime of robbery. The state must show, or at least introduce evidence tending to prove, that the victim was actually suffering from this specific drug. The state had it in its power to make all necessary tests. Even though the court may find the evidence sufficient to show the administration of chloral-the only force alleged-that finding would embrace two distinct presumptions, which would be based on two grounds, each supported merely by circumstantial evidence. First, the presumption that chloral was actually used, and, second, that it was used in such quantity, quality and conditions that it caused insensibility in the victim. Even should this finding be had, there can be no conviction, because the court will not uphold the still further presumption that because this defendant was present at the time of the robbery he presumably was connected with it, and presumably helped in the presumed administration of chloral which presumably might have caused death. A complete chain of circumstances must be proven. (Horgan v. Indart, 41 Nev. 228, 168 Pac. 953.) The administration of chloral does not constitute the force and violence required under our statute defining robbery. There is no evidence of fear in the case. Force is an essential element of the crime of robbery. By "force and violence" is meant the physical application of force; physical and muscular effort that will overcome the resistance of the victim. (24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 992; Nelson v. State, 145 Pac. 315; 2 Bishop, Crim. Law, 7th ed. 1166; 34 Cyc. 1796; Wharton, Crim. Law, 3d ed.; Brown v. Comm., 13 Am. St. Rep. 478; State v. McCune, 70 Argument for Respondent Am. Dec. 178; Reynolds v. State, 132 Pac. 434; Monaghan v. State, 134 Pac. 77.) It has been decided by this court in numerous cases that the judgment will be reversed and the verdict of guilty set aside if there is not sufficient evidence to support it, and that in order that the evidence be sufficient there must be a substantial conflict. There is no substantial conflict in this case. (State v. V. & T. Ry. Co., 23 Nev. 283; Horgan v. Indart, 168 Pac. 953; State v. Thompson, 101 Pac. 557; State v. Whitaker, 39 Nev. 159.) Geo. B. Thatcher, Attorney-General, E. T. Patrick, Deputy Attorney-General, William McKnight, Deputy Attorney-General, and E. F. Lunsford, District Attorney, for Respondent: The administering of drugs and poisons constitutes assault and battery. (2 R. C. L. 539.) "It has always been regarded as permissible to charge the administering of poison as an assault, and the same reasoning applies to the application of injurious drugs." (2 Wharton, Crim. Law, sec. 1246.) The administering of croton oil was held to constitute assault and battery. (State v. Monroe, 43 L. R. A. 861.) "A man may be said to take by violence who deprived the other of the power of resistance by whatever means he did it." (Russell on Crimes, 2d ed. vol. 1; Commonwealth v. Stratton, 19 Am. Rep. 350.) It has been decided in numerous cases that if there is any evidence tending to support the verdict this court will not reverse the case. (State v. McGinnis, 6 Nev. 109; State v. Glovery, 10 Nev. 24; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17; State v. Raymond, 12 Nev. 98; State v. Crozier, 12 Nev. 300; State v. Mills, 12 Nev. 403; State v. Wong, 22 Nev. 336; State v. Buralli, 27 Nev. 41; State v. Preston, 30 Nev. 301; State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209; State v. Whitaker, 39 Nev. 159.) "The rule is that judgments will be reversed for alleged errors in instructions only when, looking at the testimony, we can see that the jury may have been misled by them to the prejudice of the |