Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J.

that there was no competent evidence to show that chloral was actually administered.

Geo. B. Thatcher, Attorney-General, E. T. Patrick, Deputy Attorney-General, William McKnight, Deputy Attorney-General, and E. S. Lunsford, District Attorney, for Respondent:

The expert witnesses did not seem to agree as to the effect which the administration of chloral should have produced upon the victim of the robbery. It can make little difference in law whether he was rendered unconscious by pure chloral or by chloral mixed with some other poison. Medical writers do not agree with some of the expert testimony offered at the trial. (1 Hamilton, Medicine, 469; Taylor, Medical Juris. 208; Reese, Medical Juris. 572; Herold, Manual of Legal Med. 104; Holland, Med. Chem. & Tox. 384.)

It is difficult to understand why the facts of this case do not bring it squarely within the definition of robbery. The poison administered to Cooper was certainly for the purpose of obtaining possession of his property and to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking. "Experience has shown the most common abuse of poison to consist in its application as an auxiliary to the commission of other crimes. And it is wonderfully adapted to the nefarious purpose. Easily disguised in most kinds of food, capable of producing effects through small quantities, subtle and overpowering in its operation, it may be administered with ease and secrecy, and accomplish every villainous purpose, from producing sleep and stupor to insanity and paralysis and death; and there are no agencies more difficult to detect." (People v. Carmichael, 5 Mich. 20.)

By the Court, COLEMAN, J.:

The facts in this case are substantially the same as those in the case of State v. Al. Snyder, 41 Nev. 453, 172 Pac. 364, this day decided. The only question which we deem it necessary to consider is that raised by the

Opinion of the Court-Coleman, J.

assignment of error based upon the action of the court in refusing to give, without modification, instruction D2, which reads as follows:

"You are further instructed that although you may find from the evidence that the defendants, or either of them, may have had in his possession chloral hydrate and may have had the opportunity to use the same, such facts alone are insufficient to convict the defendants of the offense charged, to wit, robbery; but the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such chloral hydrate was actually administered to the said Cooper and was actually taken by him, and that such drug, and not some other cause, made the said Cooper become unconscious and insensible."

The court modified the instruction by substituting for the italicized words the following, "a drug," and as thus modified it was given.

The information charging the defendants with robbery did not allege the use of chloral hydrate, or any drug, but alleged that robbery was committed by the use of force and violence; and the evidence showed that, while a large quantity of chloral hydrate was found upon the defendants, some of it was in solution, and the analysis of one bottle containing the solution showed that a foreign substance, such as sugar or digitalis, had been mixed with chloral hydrate. We are unable to see wherein the defendants were prejudiced by the instruction. What does it matter whether the jury found from the evidence that the defendants administered pure chloral hydrate or chloral hydrate in solution?

Hawley, C. J., in State v. Loveless, 17 Nev. 424, 30 Pac. 1080, quoted with approval as follows:

"The rule is that judgments will be reversed for alleged errors in instruction only when, looking at the testimony, we can see that the jury may have been misled by them to the prejudice of the defendant, or when, in the absence of the testimony, it is apparent that the instructions would be improper under any possible condition of the evidence."

Points decided

We do not think the defendants were in any way prejudiced by the action of the court, and the judgment is affirmed.

[No. 2333]

DONALD MACLEAN, RESPONDENT, V. GEORGE BRODIGAN, AS SECRETARY OF STATE, AND MAURICE SULLIVAN, AS LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR AND EX OFFICIO ADJUTANT-GENERAL, APPELLANTS. [172 Pac. 375]

1. STATUTES-REVIVOR OF STATUTE BY TITLE-ELECTIONS-ELECTORS IN MILITARY SERVICE-"AMENDMENT”—“RevisiON"-"REVIVE.” The provision of Const. art. 4, sec. 17, that no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only, does not render invalid the provision of Stats. 1917, c. 197, that electors in the military service of the United States may vote in accordance with Stats. 1899, c. 94, which was repealed by Stats. 1913, c. 284; revival by title not being prohibited; for an "amendment" is an alteration effecting a change in the draft, or form, or substance, of a law already enacted, or of a bill proposed for enactment, but, when the legislative body attempts to revise, it thereby assumes to make additions or changes or corrections to alter or reform something then in force and effect, and "revision" in a legislative sense applies only to a measure, bill, or law then having existence, life, and force, and cannot, in the nature of things, apply to a nullified or repealed act; and the term "revive," as applied to legislative proceedings, signifies the reconference of validity, force, and effect, at least the reconference of validity, force, and effect as the revived measure, law, or bill formerly possessed.

2. STATUTES-INCORPORATION OF REPEALED ACT-EFFECT.

Where one act of the legislature specifically adopts the provisions of another act upon the same general subject, the effect is to incorporate the adopted act, making it effective for the designated purpose, and that the adopted act has been repealed is immaterial.

3. ELECTIONS-VOTING-PERSONS ENGAGED IN "MILITARY SERVICE." Stats. 1917, c. 197, providing for taking of votes of electors in the military service of the United States, is a compliance with Const. art. 2, sec. 3, and is not void for discrimination against electors in the naval service, or conscripted men in the military service, since "military service" includes every branch of service in either the army or the navy of the United States.

APPEAL from First Judicial District Court, Ormsby County; Frank P. Langan, Judge.

Argument of Amicus Curiæ

Action by Donald Maclean against George Brodigan, as Secretary of State of the State of Nevada, and Maurice J. Sullivan, as Lieutenant-Governor and ex officio AdjutantGeneral of the State of Nevada. From an order overruling a general demurrer to the complaint and judgment, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Geo. B. Thatcher, Attorney-General, E. T. Patrick, Deputy Attorney-General, and Wm. McKnight, Deputy Attorney-General (Hoyt, Gibbons, French & Springmeyer, of Counsel), for Appellants:

The statute of 1899 is in full force and effect, under the well-defined principle of law that where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to the statute or the provisions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute. (2 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d. ed. 405, 407; Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Fire Department, 117 Ala. 644; S. V. W. Works v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 439; Schwenke v. Union Depot R. R. Co., 7 Colo. 515; Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 285; Turney v. Wilton, 36 Ill. 393; People v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 85; Furbish v. County Commissioners, 93 Me. 127; Haston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 33; In Re Greenfield, 191 Pa. St. 295; Ex Parte Barry, 12 R. I. 51; Quinlin v. Railroad, 89 Tex. 372; Garland v. Hickey, 75 Wis. 183; Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 225.)

Appellants are justified in performing or attempting to perform the acts complained of. The demurrer should have been sustained. The decision of the lower court should be reversed.

H. V. Morehouse, Amicus Curiæ:

The only inhibition against the power of the legislature as to the right form and manner of legislation is contained in section 17, of article 4, of the constitution of Nevada, which reads: "Each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly

Argument of Amicus Curiæ

expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but in such case, the act as revised or section as amended, shall be reenacted and published at length." It will be observed that this provision of the constitution does not use the word "revive" or "revived," but the words "revised or amended." The word "revive" is not synonymous with "amend" or "revise," and has an entirely different meaning. This being so, there is no prohibition in our constitution against the legislature reviving an act by reference to the act, and making such act a part of a new act, even if such act has been heretofore repealed. "In the absence of a constitutional provision to the contrary, revival of a repealed statute by reference to its title only is valid. Where an act is revived by a subsequent act, it is revived precisely in that form and with that effect which it had at the time when it expired." (34 Cyc. 1724; 36 Cyc. 1102; In Re Woods, 31 Ch. Div. Eng. 607; Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276; Wright v. Overstreet, 50 S. E. 487; Gadkin v. Whitney, 63 S. W. 188.)

The word "military" is not limited solely to the army; it includes the navy. Military means "pertaining to war"; "concerned with war," and includes "volunteers." By subdivision 2, section 8, Federal Constitution, the President of the United States is made the commanderin-chief of the army and navy. (Stocker v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 300.)

James Glynn, Amicus Curiæ:

A repealed act may be revived, even upon the happening of a contingency. (The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch, 382.) Such an act may be revived either expressly or conditionally. (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 682; Pollock v. Bridgeport, 29 L. Ed. 148; Flanders v. Town of Merrimac, 48 Wis. 567; Stevens v. McCargo, 9 Wheat. 502; Potter's Dwarris, Stats. and Constitutions, p. 159.)

The acts of 1915 and 1917 revived the act of March 14, 1899. (Cutting's Comp. Laws, 1737.)

The act in question provides for "taking the vote of