Argument for Respondents

electors who may be in the military service of the United States." Soldiers in the navy are certainly in the military service, the navy being a branch of that service. Consid

ering the purpose and intent of the act, this construction violates no rule. It is true, as a general rule, that statutes have no extraterritorial effect, but personal statutes are not unknown to the law. "If the object be of a personal nature, the statute is purely personal, and the quality accompanies the person everywhere." (Potter's Dwarris, Stats. and Constitutions, pp. 90, 91, 92.)

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Warren E. Baldy, District Attorney (R. A. McKay, of Counsel), for Respondents:

The appellants have relied solely upon the general proposition that where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another statute by a specific and descriptive reference thereto, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted have been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute, and contend that by the provisions of the statute of 1917 appellants are authorized to proceed under the provisions of the statute of 1899 with reference to the taking of votes of electors in the military service of the United States. This position is challenged as unconstitutional, in that it violates section 77, article 4, of the state constitution, which provides that "each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but, in such case, the act as revised, or section as amended shall be reenacted and published at length." The act of 1917 refers to the date of approval of the act of 1899 only, and does not even state the title. It attempts to revive an act which has been repealed. (Stats. 1913, p. 568.)

The act of 1899 unduly and unjustly discriminates between volunteers in the "military service" and volunteers in the "naval service," and between volunteers and "conscripted" men, being in violation of section 3, article

Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J.

2, of the state constitution, which provides that "the right of suffrage shall be enjoyed by all persons, otherwise entitled to the same, who may be in the 'military or naval service' of the United States."

By the Court, MCCARRAN, C. J. :

This action was commenced in the district court to enjoin the appellant Sullivan, as adjutant-general, from certifying to the secretary of state any list or lists of electors now engaged in the military service of the United States, and to enjoin the appellant Brodigan, as secretary of state, from incurring any expense in the purchase of ballot paper or registration supplies for the taking of the votes of the electors of the State of Nevada now engaged in the military service of the United States, and from incurring any cost or expense therefor to the State of Nevada, and to restrain both appellants in their official capacity from doing anything whatever imposed upon them or either of them by the act of the legislature of Nevada of March 14, 1899. From the order overruling a general demurrer, an appeal to this court is taken.

1. One question only is here involved, to wit: Is the statute of March 14, 1899, entitled "An act to provide for taking the votes of electors of the State of Nevada, who may be in the military service of the United States," now in force and effect as a mode by which citizens of this state now in the military forces of the United States may vote in our state elections? The act just referred to (Stats. 1899, p. 108) was one the original purpose of which was to take the vote of the electors of the State of Nevada who might be in the service of the United States and beyond the territorial limits of the state. It provided that the adjutant-general of the state should in due time make and deliver to the secretary of state duly certified separate lists for each county having soldiers in the service, giving the names of all qualified electors under the law of this state at the time of their enlistment, etc. By the provisions of the act, the secretary of state was required to immediately transmit duly

Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J.

certified copies of such lists to the commanding officer of each of the organizations of which electors of this state might be members. The act then proceeds to prescribe for the holding of an election at a place beyond the territorial limits of this state, where electors of this state might be engaged in the military service. It designates who should be the officers of such election, how the vote should be counted and canvassed, and how the same should be returned or transmitted after the election was conducted.

By an act approved March 31, 1913, entitled "An act relating to elections and removals from office," the act of March 14, 1899, was specifically repealed. (Stats. 1913, p. 568.)

By section 149 of an act entitled "An act relating to elections," approved March 29, 1915, it is provided:

"Electors of the State of Nevada in the military service of the United States may, when called into such service, vote in accordance with the provisions of the act approved March 14, 1899." (Stats. 1915, p. 507.)

By section 101 of an act entitled "An act relating to elections," approved March 24, 1917, it is provided:

"Electors of the State of Nevada in the military service of the United States may, when called into such service, vote in accordance with the provisions of the act approved March 14, 1899." (Stats, 1917, p. 385.)

It is the contention of respondent here that section. 101 of the act of 1917, just quoted, is without force or effect, and that the act of March 14, 1899, is not revived. We have been referred especially to our constitutional provision (section 17 of article 4), reading as follows:

"Each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but, in such case, the act as revised, or section as amended, shall be reenacted and published at length."

In furtherance of respondent's contention reference is made to decisions bearing upon constitutional provisions

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somewhat similar to ours, but a studied difference may be noted when comparing our constitutional provision with the provisions in states like Alabama, New Jersey, and Kansas, in each of which it is provided:

"No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred, shall be reenacted and published at length." (Const. Ala. art. 4, sec. 45.)

A like provision is found in the constitution of New Jersey (Const. N. J. art. 4, sec. 7), and also in the constitution of Kansas (Const. Kan. art. 2, sec. 16).

If by our constitutional provision the legislature was prohibited from reviving statutes by title only, then the rule recognizing the effect of the constitutional inhibition might be relied on by respondent here.

In Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444, we expressed the rule directly applicable here:

"Congress is authorized only to enact such laws as the national constitution expressly grants it or is clearly implied with the grant; while the law-making power of the state is authorized to enact legislation on all subjects which are not expressly prohibited by our state constitution or in contravention of the federal constitution."

The legislature of 1917, steeped as it must have been in the atmosphere of contingency, when the aurora borealis of war was all too visible, sought to make provision for the taking of the votes of citizens of this state who might, at the time of the holding of the next election, be in the military service of the country. The legislature of 1899 had enacted a law comprehensive and effective at least for conditions then prevailing. A subsequent legislature had repealed that statute, but the legislature of 1917 sought to make it operative, not as an individual statute, but as a part of the working plan of the general election law.

Acts of the legislature which attempt to revive a statute formerly nullified are not to be confused or confounded with acts attempting to amend or revise. An

Opinion of the Court-McCarran, C. J.

amendment is an alteration effecting a change in the draft, or form, or substance of a law already enacted, or of a bill proposed for enactment. (State v. Wright and Harris, 14 Or. 365, 12 Pac. 708.) When the legislative body attempts to revise, it thereby assumes to make additions or changes or corrections to alter or to reform something then in force and effect. Revision in a legislative sense can only apply to a measure, bill, or law then having existence, life, and force, and cannot, in the very nature of things, apply to a nullified or repealed act. The term "revive," as applied to legislative procedings, signifies the reconference of validity, force, and effect; at least, the reconference of such validity, force, and effect as the revived measure, law, or bill formerly possessed. While revision or amendment by title only is by our constitution prohibited, such prohibition does not extend to revival by title, hence the legislature of 1917, in enacting section 101 of the election law, did not run counter to the constitutional provision.

2. Where one act of the legislature specifically adopts provisions of another act, the latter being of the same general subject-matter, or being by nature or substance properly connected therewith, the effect of the adopting act is to incorporate the adopted act and make the latter effective in the policy and for the purpose designated. The fact that the adopted act may have been at a former time repealed or nullified does not operate against its effectiveness when revived by adoption into a valid and effective law. (Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Const. 2d ed. p. 788; People v. Glassco, 203 Ill. 353, 67 N. E. 499.) The rule which we have applied here has found sanction even under that strict rule of construction which applies to criminal statutes. (State v. Caseday, 58 Or. 429, 115 Pac. 287.)

In reviving a statute by making the same a part of another and newer act, the revived or adopted statute takes its new validity, or new life, so to speak, not from its former existence or enactment, but rather by virtue of the force, effect, and life of the adopting statute. A