are established with such gravity, wisdom, and universal consent of the whole realm, for the advancement of the common. wealth, they ought not, by any constrained construction out of the general and ambiguous words of a subsequent act, to be abrogated; sed hujusmodi statuta tanta solemnitate et prudentia edita (as Fortescue speaks, cap. 18, fol. 21) ought to be maintained and supported with a benign and favorable construc tion." So in this country, on the same principle, it has been said that laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject; and it is, therefore, but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any prior law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable; and hence, a repeal by implication is not favored; on the contrary, courts are bound to uphold the prior law, if the two acts may well subsist together.† So, in Pennsylvania, it has been decided that repeals by implication are not favored; and it has been declared that one act of Assembly is held to repeal another by implication only in cases of very strong repugnancy or irrecon cilable inconsistency. So again in a recent case in New York, it is said that the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Unless the latter statute is manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to the former, both remain in force. Courts are bound to uphold the prior law, if the two may subsist together. So, too, in Massachusetts, to annul the prior statute, the latter act must be clearly repugnant to the former, and the implication by repeal will not be favored. Where an act was passed in 1836, prohibiting the sale of "spiritous" liquors, and in 1850 an act was passed professing to amend the prior statute, by inserting the word "intoxicating" in the place of the word "spiritous," it was argued that the act of 1850 repealed that of 1836; but on the ground that the word “intoxicating” includes a larger class of cases than “spiritous,”

Dr. Foster's Case, 11 Rep. 63; Dyer, 347; King v. The Justices, &c. 15 East, 377; Dwarris, vol. ii, 533.

Street v. Commonwealth, 6 W. & S. 209; Commonwealth v. Easton Bank, 10 Barr, 442; Brown v. County Commis. 21

Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill, 221; Canal Co. Penn. 37. v. Railroad Co. 4 Gill & John, 1.

Williams v. Potter, 2 Barb. S. C. R. 316.

that all spiritous liquors are intoxicating, but all intoxicating liquors are not spiritous, it was held that they might well stand together.*

On the very opposite of these general principles, it has been said in England, with that deference for the rights of the crown which we have already had occasion to notice, that clauses which limit in any way the right of the sovereign must be considered as repealed by subsequent statutes, unless expressly re-enacted. But I believe the principle has never been recog nized in this country; nor do I understand why the Govern ment should be exempted from the operation of general rules of law, or the fair interpretation of language.

In this country it has been held, that a statute may be repealed by the abrogation of a State Constitution. So the statute of the State of New York, passed under the Constitution of 1821, which prohibited the judges of appellate courts from taking part in the decisions of causes determined by them when sitting as the judges of any other court, was held to be virtually repealed by the Constitution of 1846, which abrogated the Constitution of 1821.

Some special rules may be here noticed. We have already had occasion to observe the doctrine, that if the latter part of a statute be repugnant to a former part of it, the latter part shall stand, and, so far as it is repugnant, be a repeal of the former part, because it was last agreed to by the makers of the statute. Questions may arise as to whether a repealing act is to operate as a total, partial, or temporary repeal; and it is said that the word repealed is not to be taken in an absolute, if it appear on the whole act to be used in a limited sense.T If a statute, originally perpetual, be continued by an affirmative statute for a limited time, this does not amount to a repeal of it at the end of that time.** But when a statute absolutely repeals a prior law, and substitutes other provisions, to continue only for a limited

time, the prior law does not

pany of Chelsea Water Works, Fitzgibbons, 195; Dwarris, vol. ii, 515 and 534; ante, pp. 47 and 50.

T Rex v. Rogers, 10 East, 569; Camden v. Anderson, 6 T. R. 723. ** Raym. 397.

revive at the expiration of the time fixed by the repealing law.*

We have next to consider the effects of the repeal which, when it is clear and absolute, are of a very sweeping character. (a) "The effect of a repealing statute," says a very

* Warren v. Windle, 3 East, 205.

(a) Effect of Repeal and Amendment.

Revival of the Old Law.-The general rule, independent of any statutory change in it, is that the repeal of a repealing statute revives the original statute. Brinkley v. Swicegood, 65 N. C. 626; James v. Buzzard, 1 Hemps. 259. And this is so, although the repeal is by implication. People v. Davis, 61 Barb. 456.

Although there is an established statutory rule of the State, that the repeal of a repealing act shall not revive the original act first repealed, yet where a statute creating an exception from a prior general law is repealed, that general law, without the exception, becomes again wholly operative. Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wisc. 252. Where there is such a statutory rule as to the effect of repeals, as stated in the last preceding sentence, it applies to repeals by implication, as well as to express repeals. Stirman v. State, 21 Tex. 734. There being a general statute that the repeal of a repealing act should not revive the act first repealed without express words, the Legislature on one day passed a repealing act, and the next day passed an act supplementary to it, and excepting certain counties from its operation, and it was held that this second or supplementary act must be considered as a part of the first or repealing act, and as continuing the old law in force in those counties. Manlove v. White, 8 Cal. 376.

A mere declaration in a statute that a certain other statute, which repealed specified sections in a former act, "shall not repeal" such sections, does not operate to revive them, and is in fact a nullity. State v. Conkling, 19 Cal. 501.

When the remedy upon a contract has been suspended by a statute, the repeal of that statute restores the remedy, except as to rights which have become vested under the statute while in force. Johnson v. Meeker, 1 Wisc. 436. When a statute is impliedly modified by a later statute, upon the repeal of the later statute the implied modification ceases. Glaholm v. Barker, Law R. 1 Ch. 223.

Effect of Repeal upon Individual Rights.-Civil rights dependent upon a statute, unless vested, fall with it; e. g., where a statute had directed certain taxes to be applied, after collection, to a particular purpose, and had appointed commissioners to disburse the money, and the law was afterward repealed, no contracts having been made, nor rights vested under it. Tivey v. People, 8 Mich. 128.

Rights of action or defence given by a statute on grounds of public policy—e. g., stock jobbing act-are destroyed by a repeal of the statute, even though an action is pending. Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599. And mechanics' liens not fully perfected, fall with a repeal of the law. Bailey v. Mason, 4 Minn. 546; Dunwell v. Bidwell, 8 Minn. 34. But where fully perfected, the liens remain. Streubel v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. 12 Wisc. 67; Gazelle v. Lake, 1 Oregon, 119.

But a repeal cannot take away vested rights; e. g., where the State had by statute postponed its lien on a railroad, to enable the corporation to negotiate its bonds, it cannot by a repeal affect the priority of such bonds. Sinking Fund Comm'rs v. Northern Bank, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 174. The repeal of a granting act cannot take away

eminent judge,* "I take to be to obliterate the statute repealed as completely from the records of Parliament as if it

* Tindal, C. J., in Key v. Goodwin, 4 Moore and Payne, 341.

titles vested thereunder. Rice v. Railroad Co. 1 Black, 358. Nor could the repeal of a law allowing substitutes affect rights already vested. Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. Law, 277. And where the right to a payment of money has become vested in transactions under a statute, its repeal will not take away such right. Streubel v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. 12 Wisc 67. For example, the right to half pilotage vested by a tender of service. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450. Nor is the time of redemption from a tax sale shortened by a repeal subsequent to the sale. Adams v. Beale, 19 Iowa, 61; Myers v. Copeland, 20 Iowa, 22. And, it seems, the right to obtain possession by a summary process in force at the date of a lease, is not taken away by a repeal after the breach. Hoopes v. Meyer, 1 Nev. 433. Nor can the repeal of a general law for the formation of corporations affect corporations already organized under it, in the absence of a power reserved in the original act. Donworth v. Coolbaugh, 5 Clarke (Ia.) 300. Nor can the authority conferred upon a street contractor, to collect assessments from the abuttors, be taken away by repeal after the contract is entered into. Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115. Nor, it seems, can the right to costs, although the amount is to be determined by the discretion of the court, be taken away by a repeal after verdict. Cook v. New York, &c. Dock Co. 1 Hilt. (N. Y. C. P.) 556. And it seems that a statute prescribing a new method of commencing actions, and repealing the old law, will not abate actions in which process has been served in the old method. Beebe v. O'Brien, 10 Wisc. 481.

When a deposition has been begun, and a statute is passed to the effect that witnesses must testify ore tenus, the deposition, although afterwards completed, cannot be used. Craneford v. Halsted, 20 Gratt. 211.

Repeal of a statute of limitations does not revive rights already barred. Right v. Martin, 11 Ind. 123; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wisc. 245; Baldro v. Tolmil, 1 Oregon, 176. Nor does a repeal give a right of action on a contract made in contravention of the statute while in force. Hathaway v. Moran, 44 Me. 67; Gilliland v. Phillips, 1 Rich. N. S. 152. But where the act repealed was a measure of public policy merely, leaving the moral and equitable consideration between the parties good, it seems a repeal of the prohibitory act will take away all impediment to enforcing contracts made while it was in force, e. g., where the prohibition was of circulating bank notes under the denomination of $5. Central Bank v. Empire Stone, &c. Co. 26 Barb. 23. Or the stock jobbing act. Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599.

Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute, fall to the ground with its repeal. Rice v. Wright, 46 Miss. 679; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272; Genkniger v. State, 32 Penn. St. 99; State v. Cross, 4 Jones, Law, 421; Johnson v. Meeker, 1 Wisc. 436 (a liquor law). Even if the repeal be after conviction and an appeal therefrom. Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322; Wall v. State, 18 Tex. 682; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; see also Ex parte McArdle, 7 Wall. 506; State v. O'Connor, 13 La. Ann. 486. And the same is true of actions for penalties. Mouras v. The A. C. Brewer, 17 La. Ann. 82; Gaul v. Brown, 53 Me. 496. Courts will take judicial State v. Henderson, 13 La. Ann. 489.

notice of the repeal.

That a repeal of a license law will not affect the validity of licenses under it for their unexpired term, but will prevent prosecution for a violation of their pro

had never passed, and that it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purpose of those actions or suits

visions. See State v. Andrews, 28 Mo. 14, 19. The repeal of a usury law relieves from the forfeitures provided for by it. Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68. And such repeal affects pending suits. Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149.

Where one statute refers to another for rules of procedure, and the statute thus referred to is repealed, it remains in force so far as to govern the proceedings under the statute making the reference. Spring, &c. Works v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 434. The repeal of a statute carries with it a supplemental statute so dependent upon the former, that it cannot be enforced without such original act. Ellison v. Jackson, 12 Cal. 542. Although the general statutes enact that in case of a legal conviction, where no punishment is provided by statute, the court shall award such sentence as is conformable to the common practice and usage, according to the nature of the offence; it seems this cannot apply to a case where a section declaring the punishment has been repealed. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 Allen, 581.

Unconstitutional Repealing Statutes.-If an express repealing clause is contained in a statute which is unconstitutional, it seems the repealing clause will not take effect. People v. Tiphaine, 3 Parker Cr. 241; but, per contra, Meshmaier v. State, 11 Ind. 482. But if the repealing clause is only of acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of the statute, which is itself unconstitutional and void, it has no effect. Shepardson v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. 6 Wisc. 605; State v. La Crosse, 11 Wisc. 51; Campan v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261. And the same was held of a similar repealing clause contained in a statute void in part, but the void portion being the only one that was inconsistent with any prior acts. Devoy v. New York, 35 Barb. 264; Harbeck v. New York, 10 Bosw. 366.

Amendatory Statutes.-Where an amendatory act sets forth the entire sections amended, they are to be construed as introduced into the place of the repealed sections, and in view of the provisions of the original act after such introduction. McKibben v. Lester, 9 Ohio, N. S. 627. Thus, the words in the amendatory act "under the limitations herein provided," must be held to apply to the limitations of the original act after the amended sections are in place. Ibid.; and see also Conrad v. Nall, 24 Mich. 275. And where, after the amendment of section 6, "section 6" is repealed, it is the amended section which has taken the place of the original one. Greer v. State, 22 Tex. 588. Quare, whether such repeal would restore the original section? See Tallamon v. Cardenas, 14 La. Ann. 514. The amendment of a statute by a subsequent one operates, as to all acts done subsequently thereto, as though the amendment had been a part of the original statute. Holbrook v. Nichol, 36 Ill. 161. Where a new proviso was substituted for an old one in nearly the same terms, it was held that the new proviso and the original statute must be read as one act, i. e., as though the proviso had originally been in the amended form. Queen v. St. Giles, 3 E. & E. 224. But where an act passed in 1865-6 appropriated 25 per cent. of the revenue for school purposes, with the proviso that it should not be applied until the year 1867, a repeal of the proviso was held not to make the act applicable to the revenue of 1866. State v. Auditor, 41 Mo. 25.

An amendment of a section which provides that it "shall hereafter read as follows," repeals entirely the original section. State v. Andrews, 20 Tex. 230; but see Moore v. Mausert, 5 Lans. 173; also, Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595.

Where an act increasing the salaries of certain officers who were in the receipt