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is a rule of right reason that general words may be qualified by particular clauses of a statute, but that on the other hand a thing which is given in particular shall not be taken away by general words. This in the civil law is expressed by the phrase, In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur, et illud potissimum habitum quod ad speciem directum est. In the less classical Latin of the early English law, the same idea is conveyed in the words generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quæ specialiter sint comprehensa. In conformity to this doctrine it is held that where a general intention is expressed in a statute, and the act also expresses a particular intention, incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention shall be considered as an exception.* Where general words follow particular words, the rule is to construe the former as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned. So, a statute treating of persons or things of an inferior rank, cannot by general words be extended to those of a superior.

Statutes in regard to Wagers.-At common law, wagers are not unlawful, unless immoral or against public policy; but the tendency of legislation in this country, is to make them so without exception. In New York, a statute | declares all wagers, bets, or stakes, on racing, gaming, or any lot, chance, or unknown or contingent event, void, and all contracts for or on account of any money or property, &c., wagered, bet, or staked, void; the act, however, being declared not to apply to insur

* Churchill v. Crease, 5 Bing. 180-492-3. + Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 100.

4 Rep. 4; 2 Rep. 46; 2 Inst. 478; Dwarris, 656. But see, contra, 2 Inst. 136. 1 R. S. part i, chap. xx, title 8, art. 3.

certain statements under certain penalties) was implied from the harshness of any other construction and the omission of any provision for the making of such statements by guardians, etc. Coy v. Coy, 15 Minn. 119.

General Language Limited by the Object of the Act.-A statute contained the following: "The original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the Southern District of N. Y. shall be confined to causes arising within said district, and shall not be construed to extend to causes arising within the Northern District; " held only to exclude causes arising within the Northern District, and not those arising outside of both districts, the object being to apportion jurisdiction between the two districts. Wheeler v. McCormick, 8 Blatch. C. C. 267. And where insurance companies before commencing business were required to have a certain amount secured by mortgage "on unincumbered real estate," it was held that the land must be within the State. State v. King, 44 Mo. 283.

ances on interest, nor to contracts on bottomry or respondentia. Under this statute it has been held, that an agreement in the sale of a horse,-that the animal should on or before a given day trot a certain distance at a certain rate of speed, and in case he failed, then that the vendor should deduct or pay back to the purchaser one-half of such sum as the failure might take from the market value of the horse, is an agreement in the nature of a stake or wager on a race, and as such void under the statute.*

Corporations.-The Revised Statutes of New York declare that the charter of every corporation that shall hereafter be granted by the Legislature shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal in the discretion of the Legislature.+ In construing this provision, it has been said that the Legislature could not convert a railroad company into a banking, insurance, or mining company, for the obvious reason that such an act would create a new company of a new and distinct character; but that an act authorizing the railroads of the State, with the consent of two-thirds in value of the stock-holders, to subscribe to a railroad in Canada, was constitutional, as the subscribing companies would remain the same as before as to their character, structure, objects, and business.

But in cases where no such power is reserved by the Legislature, the true doctrine is that no radical change or alteration can be made or allowed in the charter of a corporation, by which new and additional objects are to be accomplished, or new responsibilities incurred, so as to bind the individuals composing the company without their assent.

Interpretation and Proof of Foreign Statutes.-When the

* Hall v. Bergen, 19 Barb. 122.

The policy of different countries varies very much on the subject of wagers. In England, at common law wagers are valid contracts, unless contrary to public policy, or immoral, or in any way tending to the detriment of the public; or, unless they affect the interest, feelings or character of a third person (see Chitty on Contracts, in voc. Wagers). But the courts have frequently expressed their disapprobation of these contracts, and in some cases, where trivial or contemptible, have refused to try actions upon them. Gaming debts and securities are void by statute.

The French Code declares as a general

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statutes of other countries, or of other States of this Union, come up for construction, the decisions of the courts of the State enacting the law are held to be a conclusive or authentic interpretation; and this very rightly, for it must always be impossible for any tribunal to have the same. means of judging of the true intention, scope, and purport of a foreign statute as the courts of the State or country where it was framed, and the institutions of which it was intended to fashion or control.

The Supreme Court of the United States has said, that where English statutes, such for instance as the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations, have been adopted into our legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by their courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts, or has been received with all the weight of authority. It was said that this rule did not strictly apply to the English statute of monopolies, under which the grants of patents have there issued; but that the principles and practice which have regulated their grants of patents, as being tacitly referred to in some of the provisions of our patent statute, afforded materials to illustrate it.t

Connected with this subject, another and very interesting question has arisen, which is whether the interpretation of foreign laws is a question for the jury, or for the court. In some cases it has been intimated that the interpretation of foreign law is matter of fact, for the jury. "The question in such a case," says the Supreme Court of Ohio, "is not what is the just and true interpretation, but what is the actual interpretation of the statute by the foreign tribunal. It is a matter of fact." In a case in Massachusetts, turning on the construction of a statute of the State of Georgia, the statute itself was proved, and the depositions of eminent lawyers in that State, relating to the construction given there to the statute in question, were also read, and the court was requested to decide what was the law of Georgia in regard to the matter

*Thompson v. Alger, 12 Met. p. 428.

Ingraham v. Hart, 11 Ohio, 255; BurchPennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 2 Peters, ard, J., dissented.

1, 18.

in hand; but the application was denied, and it was held to be a question of fact, for the jury to decide, as to what had been the construction given by the courts of the State of Georgia, to the statute before them.* But on the contrary, it has been expressly decided in Pennsylvania and Alabama, that the interpretation of a foreign statute belongs to the court.+

As to the proof of foreign laws, it has been said in Massachusetts, that a volume purporting on the face of it to contain the laws of a sister State is admissible as prima facie evidence to prove the statute law of that State: "The connection, intercourse and constitutional ties which bind together these several States, require that this species of evidence should be sufficient until contradicted." But it was said at the same time, that the court did not mean to decide that the law of any country merely foreign could be so proved. In Michigan, it has been said that the court will presume the law of a sister State to be the same as their own State, unless the contrary is shown. It has been held in Pennsylvania, that judicial cognizance will be taken of the law of another State, no proof of it whatever hav ing been given. It appears to me very proper that the interpretation of a foreign law, as of a domestic, should be confided to the court; and equally dangerous to assume the existence of the law of another jurisdiction, whether of another State or a wholly foreign country, as a fact, without submitting it to the ordinary tests of proof.

We may remark, as connected with the question of foreign statutes, in regard to the rule which we have already (p. 79) had occasion to notice, that ignorance of law is no excuse, that the principle does not apply to foreign law. Juris ignorantia

* Holman v. King, 7 Met. 388.

Bock v. Lauman, 24 Penn. 435. In Connecticut it is regulated by a statute; see Hale v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. 15 Conn. 539; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361; Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885.

Raynham v. Canton, 3 Pick. 293. Crane v. Hardy, 1 Michigan, 56. Bock v. Lauman, 24 Penn. 435. See, on the subject of proving foreign law as matter of fact, Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Exch. A student in a foreign university is incompetent to prove the law of that country. See also Trimby v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. C.

275.

151. In this case, in the King's Bench, the qustion being on a point of French law, grow ing out of the construction of the Code de Commerce, and the opinions of French advocates having been taken by consent, but appearing contradictory, the court examined the Code itself, and decided the case upon its own construction of the clause in question. Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 C. B. R. 817: Belgian laws proved by a merchant and stockbroker. Inglis et al. v. Usherwood, 1 East, 515, turned upon a question of Russian law, but the construction or meaning seems to have been admitted.

est cum jus nostrum ignoramus; and it had been held that ig norance of the law of a foreign government is ignorance of fact; and the laws of the other States of the Union being in this respect regarded as foreign laws, it has been decided in Massachusetts that money paid by mistake, through ignorance of the law of another of the United States, can be recovered back.*

Revision of Statutes.-It is proper here to notice some principles peculiar to this country, growing out of the frequent revision of our statutory law, and the changes consequent thereupon. (a)

In New York it has been said that "it has long been a cardinal and controlling maxim, that where a law antecedently to a revision of the statutes is settled either by clear expressions in the statutes, or adjudications on them, the mere change of phraseology shall not be deemed or construed a change of the law, unless such praseology evidently purport an intention in the Legislature to work a change. So in New Hampshire, it has been held that upon the revision of the statutes the construction will not be changed by such alterations as are merely designed to render the provisions more concise.

In the adoption of the Code, it has been said in Alabama

*Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112.

Yate's Case, 4 J. R. 359; Matter of Theriat v. Hart, 2 Hill, 380; Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, 77; Taylor v. Delancy, 2 C. C. in Error, 150; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 J. R. 722; Croswell v. Crane, 7 Barb. 191;

Young v. Dake, 1 Seld. 463; Elwood v.
Klock, 13 Barb. 50; Douglass v. Howland,
24 Wend. 35; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sand.
S. C. R. per Duer, J. 374, 409; Hughes v.
Farrar, 45 Me. 72.

Mooers v. Bunker, 9 Foster, p. 421.

(a) Revision.-Where a statute evidently is intended to revise the whole subject treated in a former statute, and to be a substitute therefor, it repeals such former statute. Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295; Farr v. Brackett, 30 Vt. 344; Giddings v. Cox, 31 Vt. 607; State v. Conkling, 19 Cal. 501; and see Stirman v. State, 21 Tex. 734; Conley v. Calhoun Co. 2 W. Va. 416; and though there is a plain casus omissus, the courts cannot supply it. Ripley v. Gifford, 11 Iowa, 367. Sections omitted in a revision are not revived but are annulled. Pingree v. Snell, 42 Me. 53. But where the revisory statute contains a repeal only of all inconsistent acts, etc., the repeal will extend no farther than the inconsistency. Lewis v. Stout, 22 Wisc. 234. And where a section is re-enacted with an addition, there being a constitutional provision that an amendment can only be made by setting out the section as amended, it will not be a repeal. Alexander v. State, 9 Ind. 337; but, per contra, see Billings v. Harvey, 6 Cal. 381. As to the effect of a substantial re-enactment of a former section in a later section of the same act, see Martindale v. Martindale, 10 Ind. 566. See note on "Repeal."

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