in the same session and to come into operation on the same day, are repugnant to each other, it is held that the act which last received the royal assent must prevail.* This affords a curious instance how difficult it is to make the ancient rules of law conform to those of logic and reason. It is very plain that both of these provisions are contrary to common sense, and may often produce great injustice. It is impossible that the citizens or subjects of an extensive and populous country, can obtain any accurate knowledge of the purport of an act on the day of its passage; and the doctrine that the act last signed is to prevail over one assented to a few hours previous, is obviously arbitrary and unreliable. The evils likely to result from the first of these rules are now often obviated by a section declaring when the act shall go into effect; and on a clause of this kind it has been decided, that although in an act it is expressly declared that it shall commence and take effect from a day named, yet if the royal assent be not obtained till a day subsequent, the provisions of a particular section, in its terms prospective, do not take effect till such subsequent day.† The Code Napoleon first established the true principle as to when laws should take effect. It declared laws to be binding from the moment that their promulgation should be known; and that the promulgation should be considered as known in the department of the consular or imperial residence one day after the promulgation, and in each of the departments after the expiration of the same space of time, augmented by as many days as there were distances of twenty leagues between the seat of government and the place.‡ In this country, the mischievous results of the original English rule are usually obviated either by constitutional or statutory provisions. So in Michigan, a constitutional provision declares that "no public act shall take effect or be in force until the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house." In Mississippi, the Constitution provides, " that no law * Rex v. Justices of Middlesex, 2 B. & A. 818 2 Bing. N. C. 682; Dwarris. p. 544. + Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Nev. & Man. 889. Code Civil, Art. i; Kent's Com. i, p. 458. of a general nature, unless otherwise provided for, shall be enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof." And in New York it is declared, by a general statute,† that "every law, unless a different time shall be prescribed therein, shall commence and take effect throughout the State, on and not before the twentieth day after the day of its final passage, as certified by the secretary of state." But, in regard to federal legisla tion, the rule is supposed to be identical with that now in force in England: that every law takes effect on the day of its passage. This subject is of no small consequence, as the law is assumed to be known by every citizen from the time fixed. for it to go into operation; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. (a) * Cons. Art. vii, § 6. 1 R. S. 157, part i, ch. vii, tit. v, § 13. Ann, 1 Gallison, 62; 1 Kent's Com. 455; but see 1 Paine, 23. and a (a) Unless a different time is specified, an act takes effect from its approval. Taylor v. State, 31 Ala. 383. The " time of passage" is when the act has gone through all the constitutional forms, including the approval of the governor ; law cannot impair the obligation of a contract made before its final passage. Wartman v. Phil. 33 Penn. St. 202. When a statute goes into effect from its approval, it is in force the whole day of its approval. Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 53. But when an act taking away jurisdiction from justices of the peace, except in actions, already pending, is by its terms to take effect from its passage, it will not affect an action brought on the same day of its passage, unless shown to have been commenced at a later hour. Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316. "Prior to the passage," means prior to the going into effect of a law. Charless v. Lamberson, 1 Clarke (Ia.) 435. That where an act takes effect from its passage, it is in force from the first day of the session, see Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones, Law, 36. Where a Constitution declared that no bill should have the "force of law" until read three times, and signed by the President and Speaker, and sealed with the great seal, it was held that statutes took effect on the completion of these ceremonies, and not from the first day of the session. State v. The Banks, 12 Rich. Law, 609. A statute passed Feb. 4, 1859, and not going into effect until ninety days after the close of the session, namely, in May, 1859, and which provides for an election to be held in " April next," must be understood to mean April, 1860. A law speaks from the time of its going into effect. Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125. But an act by its terms taking effect on the 15th of May next," passed in April, but not approved until May 3d, was held to mean the May then current. Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio N. S. 472. Where a statute by its terms was not to go into effect until a certain day, and yet provided for an election at an earlier day, such provision for the election was held to be a nullity. People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 673. If a revision is not to go into effect at once, the clause of repeal in it does not take effect until the revision does. McArthur v. Franklin, 16 Ohio, N. S. 193. And a repealing clause, though in the present tense, does not operate until the act itself does. Lyner v. State, 8 Ind. 490. The Constitution of Indiana provides: "No act shall take effect until the game shall have been published and circulated, etc., except in case of emergency, which emer This maxim has, however, no more than the laws themselves, any extra-territorial application; for the doctrine has been declared to be, that citizens of another country, and even, in America, of another State of the Union, are not chargeable with a knowledge of the laws emanating from any jurisdiction, except that to which they belong. This, however, must be certainly taken with the qualification in regard to mala prohibita and mala per se, to which I have already referred, and also with the general limitation that it is to apply rather to civil than to criminal law.* Connected with this branch of our subject is another arbitrary rule of the English law, as to amendatory statutes. An act of Parliament made to correct an error of omission committed in a former statute of the same session, relates back to the time when the first act passed; and the two must be taken together as if they were one and the same act, and the first must be read as containing in itself, in words, the amend ment supplied by the last; therefore, goods exported before a second law passed, but only shipped before the first, of which the second was an amendment, was enacted, were held liable * Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 312, 317; and Merchants' Bank v. Spalding, Court of Appeals; cited in the same. gency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law." A clause in a statute that it should go into effect on a day certain, was held not to amount to the requisite declaration of emergency by implication. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13. Where the Constitution provided that acts should not go into effect until sixty days after the end of the session, without the express direction of the Legislature, it was held not a sufficiently express direction that the act required an election to be held before that time, and the provision for the election was held to be void. Supervisors v. Keady, 34 Ill. 293. But where, by the Constitution, the going into effect of statutes was postponed "unless otherwise provided," it was held that the fact that statutes of the same session, in pari materia, alluded to a statute as in force, was sufficient to give it immediate effect. Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268. And where, by a general statute, it was declared that no act should take effect until sixty days after its passage, unless so expressed, it was held that the intent to have the law take effect earlier might be implied. Standeford v. Wingate, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 440. Though there be a general statute fixing the time at which acts are to go into effect, the Legislature has full power over the subject, and may provide that any particular act shall go into effect at once. New Orleans v. Holmes, 13 La. Ann. 502. "Forty days from its passage," means forty days from the signature by the governor, or passage over his veto, or expiration of time for its return, if neither signed nor vetoed. Logan v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 442. to duties imposed by the latter statute on the exportation of goods.* It may be observed in this connection, in regard to the authority and operation of laws, that in conquered or ceded countries which have laws of their own, those laws remain in force till actually altered; but it has been said in this country, that this rule "is for the benefit and convenience of the conquered, who submit to the government of the conquerors, or in the case of cession, for the benefit of the people who by treaty submit to the government of those to whom their country is ceded, and was not applicable to the condition of our ancestors, as the Indians did not submit to the government, but withdrew themselves from the territory acquired." + Contracts in Violation of Statutes.-The principle which enforces obedience to laws, is carried out by declaring contracts growing out of or based upon the infringement of a statute to be void, the courts refusing to aid either party in enforcing them. This is the general course of the decisions in England, and in this country. So, where sales of spirituous liquors are made in violation of the positive provisions of a statute, the sale being illegal, the whole transaction is void, and the seller can sustain no action therefor. So, where contracts are made on Sunday, in violation of the laws forbidding labor and business on that day. * Att.-General v. Pougett, 2 Price, 381; 2 Dwarris, 547. State v. Buchanan, 5 Harris and J. R. 317. Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61; Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; Brown v. Duncan, 10 B. & Cres. 93; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Ex parte Dyster, in re Moline, 1 Meriv. 155; Bloom v. Richards, 22 Ohio, 388. Boutwell v. Foster, 24 Vermt. 485; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Verm. 456; Barton v. Port Jackson and U. F. Plank Road Co. 17 Barb. 397; Nellis v. Clark, 4 Hill, 424; Hook v. Gray, 6 Barb. 398; s. c. 4 Comst. 449; Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276; Tylee v. Yates, 3 Barb. S. C. R. 222. ¶ Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. & C. 406; Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bing. 84; Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Maine, 464; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Verm. 379; Pattee v. Greely, 13 Met. 284; O'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala, 467; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. Mich. R. 73; Bloom v. Richards, 22 Ohio, 388; overruling, Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Nor is it necessary that the Ohio, 489; Omit v. Commonwealth, 21 Penn. 426; and other cases on the Sunday acts. In Ohio, where the Constitution declares the indefeasible right of all men to worship God according to the dictates of their conscience; that no human authority can interfere with the rights of conscience; that no man shall be compelled to attend or support any mode of worship without his consent; that no preference shall be given by law to any religious society; and prohibits all religious tests,-it has been expressly decided, that neither Christianity, nor any other system of religion, is a part of the law of the State, and that the statute prohibiting labor on the Sabbath is a mere municipal or police regulation; Bloom v. Richards, 22 Ohio, 387. In Pennsylvania and South Carolina, also, the Sunday laws seem to have been sustained on the same ground; Specht v. The Commonwealth, 8 Barr, 312; The City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. Law R. 508. The language of the Sunday laws varies in the contract should violate the express words of a law, for agreements contrary to the policy of statutes are equally void; so, an agreement to pay a creditor a sum of money if he will withdraw his opposition to an insolvent's discharge, is void, as contrary to the policy of the insolvent act.* Nor does it make any difference whether the law is a general one, or merely of local or municipal application. So, where the amended charter of the city of New York provided "that no member of either board of the common council should, during the period for which he was elected, be directly or indirectly interested in any contract, the expenses or consideration whereof are to be paid under any ordinance of the common council," it was held that a note growing out of a purchase for supplying the city alms-house with coal, under a contract in which a member of the city government was interested, given for the share of profits accruing to such member, was void, and could not be enforced either by the party himself or his assignee.† So an agreement to construct a roof, in the city of New York, of a kind prohibited by a statute entitled "an act to amend an act for the more effectual prevention of fires" in that city, is void, and the contract price cannot be recovered. † So, on the same principle, in New York, where an act for the enlargement of the canals of that State (July 10, 1851) was declared unconstitutional and void; contracts under the act were also held to be void. It has also been decided that the transfer of such a contract did not constitute a good consideration for a promise to pay money; and the circumstance that the purchasers stipulated to take the risk as to the valid ity of the act of the Legislature, while the question was pending in the courts, and of the contract, does not vary the law of the case. The pension acts of the United States, generally, different States. In New York, the statute, in addition to the prohibition of certain sports and the sale of goods (with certain exceptions), declares that "there be no servile laboring or working on that day, excepting works of necessity and charity." [R. S. part i, chap. xx, tit. 8, art. 8, vol. i, p. 676.] Under this statute it has been he'd that an attorney's clerk could not recover for work in the office of his employer, done on Sunday; Watts v. Van Ness, 1 Hill, 76; and that an agreement to insert an ad vertisement in a newspaper published on Sunday is equally void; Smith v. Wilcox, 19 Barbour, 581. * Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R. 17; Murray v. Reeves, 8 B. & C. 421; Hall v. Dyson, 17 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 785. + Bell v. Quin, 2 Sandf. 146. Beman v. Tugnot, 5 Sandf. 154. Newell v. The People, 3 Selden, 9; Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 63. Sherman v. Barnard, 19 Barb. 291. |