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the want of an equity jurisdiction, the practice has grown up, of giving an alternative judgment in such cases, for either the land or the money, or rather for the money to be levied on the 1d. But this Court is expressly prohibited from thus confounding legal and equitable proceedings, and the whole opinion of the Court bew proceeds on a recognition of the necessity of pursuing the two classes of legal and equitable rights, by their appropriate remedies. I have said, and in this I do not understand myself as differing from this Court, that the only practical effect of the terms of the warrants to individuals is, to create a debt and a lien; but surely a tenant may covenant to stand seised, subject to a charge in gross, and yet retain the legal estate. And even in the ordinary case of a mortgage, where the legal estate passes from the debtor to the creditor, and the conversc of the present case exists, an assignment of the debt is no conveyance of the legal estate to the assignee. A Court of equity will pass the one as an incident to the other; but in a Court of law, the assignee could not maintain ejectment. And that is the only question here. If it be said, that although in this suit the plaintiff below may not be entitled to recover the land, but may avail himself of this form of action to recover the purchase money due, I consider it as an abandonment of the question; for, the debt, if existing, was but an equitable lien, and the remedy here resorted to, is a common law remedy. I think, however, I shall show, that although the debt exists, the lien is taken away by the act of confiscation; and

though the debt be due, it is not due to these parties, but to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In following this act of confiscation through the detail of its provisions, we find, that after four sections, setting forth the views and motives of the Legislature, the fifth section, or first enacting clause, contains a general assumption of the soil and sovereignty of the State, and a revocation of the charter to Penn, as fully, to use its own language, "as if the same were therein transcribed and repealed." The sixth section asserts the future exclusive appropriation of the "soil and lands, hercditaments and premises, to be in the Legislature of the State;" and, under the operation of these two clauses, it is very clear, that every right, civil and political, of the proprietaries, "of, in, or to the soil" of Pennsylvania, derived under the charter, was (subject to the exceptions in the same act) vested in the Commonwealth, "freed and discharged," as the act expresses it, "from and against all estates, uses, trusts," "charges, incumbrances, titles, claims, and demands whatsoever." And all the title which they now hold therein, they hold by virtue of the provisoes contained in the 8th and 9th sections. But to understand the force and meaning of those two sections, I deem it material. that the language and effect of the 7th section should be duly weighed. This section contains a general confirmation of all the estates, legal and equitable, derived from the proprietaries, their officers, &c. or otherwise, or to which any person or persons, other than the proprietaries, were entitled, either by deed, patent, warrant, or survey.

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on the 4th of July, 1776. This clause operates in
favour of all persons "other than the proprieta-
ries," and confirms, unquestionably, the estates of
these defendants below, in common with every
other citizen. The next proviso, (8th section,) is
confined to the subject of the estates and interests
of the proprietaries. And here it is obvious, that
three subjects claimed the attention of the Legis-
lature. Their estates and interests were distri-
butable into three classes: they held property ac-
quired, in common with every other individual,
"by devise, purchase, descent," &c.; they held
other property, under the reservation of a tenth of
the soil, to their individual use; and they held, or
claimed, a third class of interests, as proprietaries,
which clashed with that eminent domain, which
was now about to be assumed by the State of
Pennsylvania. The latter, the State determined
to confiscate, and compensate them for; the former
two, to preserve to them unviolated. And these
considerations draw a line of demarkation between
the subjects of this act, infinitely more definite and
rational, than that marked out by trees or streams.
The estates held upon the common terms, were
those which constituted the third class; and the
phraseology of the act appears to me to be in per-
fect accordance with the general intent.
this point, I hold it to be an important fact, that,
without exception, throughout these two sections,
tenths and manors are never used apart; they are
constantly considered synonimous and equivalent.
Now, although a manor may, by common accepta-
tion, be considered as a geographical section,

On

tenth is a term of comparison and quantity, and has direct relation to that interest which the proprietaries had acquired, and might acquire, as a distinct individual property in the soil. I consider, therefore, both manor and tenth, as here used, as designating estate and interest, and not geographical limits. And why should it be held a reservation, by geographical limits? Let it be remarked, that it is no immaterial question to the defendants in the Court below, not only as it affects their interests, but as it affects their claims upon the justice and impartial legislation of country. There can be no reason assigned, why they should be excluded from the benefits which this act confers upon citizens of their class, and, in fact, subjected to confiscation. There are important interests growing out of this act to all other landholders, upon common terms; they are exempted from quit-rents, and the lien for the balance of purchase money is taken from off their lands. Can there be a reason assigned, why those of this class who, by the caprice or cupidity of the proprietaries, or their agents, have been embraced within the lines of their surveys, should be excluded from the common benefits extended to their fellow citizens? The injustice of such a discrimination is conclusive on the construction of thea ct, if an act is to be construed according to the intent of the Legislature. With regard to those who held of the manor, or held, as is usually said, on terms.agreed, the case is widely different. It is the effect of their own individual contracts with the proprietary. They are, by the nature of

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their relation to the proprietaries, distinguished from those of the other class, and have nothing to complain of. Their quit-rents and arrears were considered as debts due to their landlord, and the Legislature intended to take from the Penns nothing which belonged to them in their individual capacity.

Again; extending the construction of the act to the geographical limits of the manor, leads to the most absurd consequences.

It has been insisted, that it was lawful, in furveying the manors, to include within their boundaries the grants to individuals. This is readily conceded; and the inference from the fact, is directly the reverse of what has been attributed to it. Did the Legislature mean, by the proviso in favour of the Penns, to reserve to them their legitimate tenths; or did they mean, by possibility, to reserve to them half the State? There cannot be a doubt that, although any particular survey had embraced half a county, yet if the vacant land within it had amounted to no more than a tenth, the appropriation would have been duly made, and valid. But could the Legislature ever have intended to exclude all the individuals thus circumscribed, from the common benefits of grantees on the common terms? to have subjected them to the most odious and unmerited exceptions? Could the State have intended to permit the proprietaries, under the pretext of surveying a tenth, to cast their net over half its limits? It was for the very reason that including individual surveys made them no part of the manor, that the right to include previous