1824.

Peyton

[JURISDICTION.]

PEYTON V. ROBERTSON.

In replevin, if it be of goods distrained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made, is the value of the matter in controversy; and if the writ be issued to try the title to property, it is in the nature of detinue, and the value of the article replevied is the value of the matter in controversy, so as to give jurisdiction to this Court upon a writ of error.

V.

Robertson.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the March 17th. opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of error to a judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, rendered for the sum of 591 dollars. The writ was dismissed in the early part of the term, for want of jurisdiction, the judgment being for less than 1000 dollars. The plaintiff in error now moves to reinstate the cause, alleging that the damages laid in the declaration, not the amount of the judgment, is the matter in controversy between the parties.

The property of the plaintiff in error had been seized for rent, upon which she sued out a writ of replevin, and laid her damages in the declaration at 1000 dollars. The defendant in error acknowJedged the taking charged in the declaration, and justified it as a distress for the sum of 591 dollars, due for rent in arrcar. The judgment of the Court was in favour of the avowant, for the amount of the rent claimed.

The plaintiff in error contends, that her suit was not merely for restitution of the property taken, but also for damages, and that, in such a case, the value of the matter in dispute is the sum laid in the declaration.

Her counsel relied on the case of Hulscamp v. T'eel, (2 Dallas, 358.) and on Cook v. Woodrow, (5 Cranch, 13.) to show that, in actions sounding in damages, the sum laid in the declaration is the standard of value. The case in Dallas, was an action of trespass, and that in Cranch, an action of trover. We think this case stands on different principles from either of those. In a writ of replevin, the real matter in controversy is the sum claimed as rent, or the property replevied. If the replevin be, as in this case, of property distrained for rent, the amount for which avowry is made is the real matter in dispute. The damages are merely nominal. If the writ be issued as a means of trying the title to property, it is in the nature of detinue, and the value of the article replevied is the matter in dispute. In this case, the judgment against the plaintiff in error being for less than 1000 dollars, this Court has no jurisdiction, and the motion to replace the cause on the docket must be overruled.

Motion denied.

1824.

Ex parte

PRACTICE. JURISDICTION.]

Ex parte BURR.

Quare, As to the authority of this Court to interferc, by mandamu:, in the case of the removal or suspension of an attorney of the District and Circuit Courts.

Whatever may be the authority of this Court in that respect, it will not be exercised unless where the conduct of the Court below has been grossly irregular and unjust.

In a regular complaint against an attorney, charges cannot be received and acted on, unless made on oath. But he may himself waive the preliminary of an affidavit, and the Court may proceed, at his instance, to investigate the charges, upon testimony, which must be on oath and regularly taken.

Burr.

Mr. Emmett moved for a rule to show cause March 16th why a mandamus should not issue to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, commanding that Court to restore one Burr, an attorney of that Court, who had been suspended from practice for one year, by order of that Court."

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the March 17th. opinion of the Court.

This is a motion for a mandamus to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, to restore Mr. Burr to his place of attorney at the bar of that Court.

It is a very unusual application, on which the Court has felt considerable doubts.

a Mr. Emmett cited Tidd's Fract. 59. 1 Johns. Cas. 134. 181. Bac. Abr. tit. MandamuE.

1824.

Ex parte
Burr.

On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised; and no other tribunal can decide, in a case of removal from the bar, with the same means of information as the Court itself. If there be a revising tribunal, which possesses controlling authority, that tribunal will always feel the delicacy of interposing its authority, and would do so only in a plain case.

Some doubts are felt in this Court respecting the extent of its authority as to the conduct of the Circuit and District Courts towards their officers; but without deciding on this question, the Court is not inclined to interpose, unless it were in a case where the conduct of the Circuit or District Court was irregular, or was flagrantly improper.

In the case at bar, the proceedings were supposed to be irregular, because Mr. Burr was put to answer charges not made on oath.

That the charges, in a regular complaint against an attorney, ought not to be received and acted on, unless made on oath, is admitted. It is a course of proceeding which is recommended by consi

Ex parte

Burr.

derations, too obvious to require that they should 1824. be urged. But this is not a proceeding of that description. The Court did not call on Mr. Burr to answer an accusation in the nature of an information against him. The inquiry was invited by himself; the charges were made at his instance; and the Court proceeded on them at his request. Mr. Burr himself, then, dispensed with the preliminary step of an affidavit to the charges which were to constitute the subject of that inquiry. He waived this preliminary. The testimony on which the Court proceeded was all on oath, and obtained in a manner which is not exceptionable. There is, then, no irregularity in the mode of proceeding which would justify the interposition of this Court. It could only interpose, on the ground that the Circuit Court had clearly exceeded its powers, or had decided erroneously on the testimony. The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession. Upon the testimony, this Court would not be willing to interpose where any doubt existed. It is the less inclined to interpose in this case, because the complaint is not of an absolute removal, but of a suspension, which is nearly expired, after which, Mr. Burr may be restored by the Court itself, should not very serious objections exist to that measure.

Motion denied.