be reviewed in a Court of equity, without the suggestion of some equitable circumstance, of which the party could not avail himself at law Decree affirmed, with costs. 1824. Mollan V. Torrance: [PRACTICE. JURISDICTION.J MOLLAN and others v. Torrance. An endørsce of a promissory note, who resides in a different State, A plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court must show that the ERROR to the District Court of Mississippi. This cause was argued by Mr. Jones," for March 6th. a He cited Young v. Bryan, 6 Wheat. Rep. 146. Dugan v. U. S., 3 Wheat. Rep. 180. Chitty. Bills, 149. 370. 1824. the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Rankin, for the defendant. Mollan Torrance. March 10th. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. The declaration in this cause contains two counts. The first is against the defendant, Torrance, as endorser of a promissory note, made by Spencer & Dunn, payable to Sylvester Dunn, and endorsed by him to the defendant, Torrance, by whom it was endorsed to H. J. Lowrie, and by him to the plaintiffs. The other count is, for money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiffs' use The declaration states the plaintiffs to be citizens of New-York, and the defendant to be a citizen of Mississippi, but is silent respecting the citizenship or residence of Lowrie, the immediate endorser of Torrance, through whom the plaintiffs trace their title to the money for which the suit is instituted. The case of Young v. Bryan, (6 Wheat. Rep. 146.) has decided, that an endorsee who resides in a different State, may sue his immediate endorser, residing in the State in which the suit is brought, although that endorser be a resident of the same State with the maker of the note; but in this case the suit is brought against a remote endorser, and the plaintiffs, in their declaration, trace their title through an intermediate endorser, b He cited Turner v. Bank of N. Ame.. 4 Dall. 8. Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 4€. The without showing that this intermediate endorser The defendant has filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court, in which he states, that the promises laid in the declaration were made to H. J. Lowrie, and not to the plaintiffs, and that the said H. J. Lowrie and the defendant, are both citizens of the State of Mississippi. The plaintiffs demurred to this plea, and the defendant joined in demurrer. On argument, the demurrer was overruled, the plea sustained, and judgment rendered for the defendant. The case is now before the Court on a writ of error. The plaintiffs contend that the plea is defective, because it avers that the said H. J. Lowrie and the defendant are both citizens of the State of Mississippi, at the time of the plea pleaded, not that they were ciuzens of the said State at the time the action was brought. It is quite clear, that the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. Since, then, one of the counts shows jurisdiction, and the plea does not contain sufficient matter to deny 1824. Mollan V. Torrance Mollan 1824. that jurisdiction, we think that judgment ought not to have been rendered on the demurrer in favour of the defendant. It must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Court for the District of Mississippi, where the parties may amend their pleadings, which are very defective. Torrance. Judgment reversed. JUDGMENT. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the District Court of the United States for the District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that there is error in the judgment of the said District Court, in overruling the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the plea of the defendant, and in giving judgment for the defendant; wherefore it is considered by this Court, that the said judgment be reversed and annulled, and it is hereby reversed and annulled accordingly; and the said cause is remanded to the said District Court, with liberty to the parties to amend their pleadings, and that further proceedings may be had therein, according to law. 1824. Walker [LOCAL LAW.] Den ex dem. WALKER V. TURNER. By the statute of limitations of Tennessee, of 1797, a possession of seven years is a protection, only when held under a grant, or under mesne conveyances which connect it with a grant. A Sheriff's deed, which is void for want of jurisdiction in the Court under whose judgment the sale took place, is not such a conveyance as that a possession under it will be protected by the statute of limitations. V. Turner. Mr. Justice WASHINGTON delivered the opinion March 19th. of the Court. This was an ejectment brought in May, 1818, in the Circuit Court for the District of Tennessee, by the plaintiff in error, to recover possession of a lot of ground in the town of Nashville, distinguished in the plan of the town, as lot No. 85. Upon the trial of the cause, the plaintiff gave in evidence, a deed for the lot in controversy, from the commissioners of the town of Nashville to the lessor of the plaintiff, bearing date the 6th of August, 1790, and then proved the defendant to be in possession of the same at the time the suit was brought. The defendant then gave in evidence a record of the County Court of Davidson, in the State of Tennessee, by which it appears, that upon the complaint of Roger B. Sappington, administrator of Mark B. Sappington, deceased, to a Justice of the Peace for the said county, supported by his oath, that George Walker (the lessor of |