age four hundred dollars per year, as no one will dispute, it will appear that the income of the poll-tax payers is charged $2, while these small property-holders are charged $19.57.

Here is a great disparity, but there is no exaggeration in the statement. From the same valuation and tax list, we take three farmers, having about one hundred and twentyfive acres each, with buildings and stock, and find their farms and stock average $3,757; and their average taxes, poll inclusive, amount to $47.03.

On the same calculation as before,

Farm and stock, $3,757, at ten per cent
Value of farmer's own labor

Farmer's total income.

$375.00 625.00

$1,000.00

Then, if the poll tax-payer is charged $2, with an income of $400, what ought the farmer to pay with an income of $1,000? Answer, $5.

Instead, then, of $5, the true proportionate amount, the farmers, as before shown, pay $47.03, or more than nine times as much.* There is no escape from these conclusions; and we appeal with confidence to those best qualified to judge, whether the estimate placed upon the incomes of farmers of the description we refer to is not essentially correct. In whatever way we look at the matter, we cannot fail to see great inequality. But the poll-tax is not only unequal as between those upon whom it is assessed, and whose incomes range from $150 to $600, and also unequal as between this class generally, and all property holders, but it is also very disproportionate to the advantages it confers. Let us see what these are.

1. Entire protection to persons and property.

2. Right of suffrage, and eligibility to office.

3. The most ample means of education in common and

* And the hardship, in this case, is often increased by the fact that the farmer is indebted for a large part of his capital, and paying interest upon it.

high schools, without charge, and a chance for a scholarship, provided by the State, in one of the colleges.

4. Complete maintenance, and the highest scientific treatment, for life, if need be, if himself or any member of his family should be deaf and dumb, or afflicted with blindness, idiocy, insanity, or, last of all, helpless poverty. What individual or corporation could be found to insure a laborer's family against all accidents and deprivations, physical and mental, from every source, through life, for one-half of one per cent on the income of the family head, or for twenty times that sum?

For all this, and much more that might be added, the recipient of a revenue from any occupation, trade, or profession, of any sum not exceeding six hundred dollars, if he has no visible property, pays an annual tax of not over two dollars, or four cents per week!. As we have already said, considered in itself, disconnected from other forms of taxation, this is very unequal, and consequently unjust, as between the different classes. The obvious result is to transfer an undue share of the burdens of State, county, and town expenditure from the mechanical and laboring classes to the agricultural; thus promoting the interest of the former at the expense of the latter.

But all this applies, it must be remembered, to taxes imposed under State or municipal authority only, from all which the poll-tax payer escapes entirely by paying two dollars.

Effect of the Two Systems. We are now able to compare the results of the two different systems; viz., national and State taxation. In the national, we find that the greater part of all taxes are indirect: the State and municipal taxes are, with slight exceptions, direct. The former fall almost wholly on consumption; the latter, upon property. The first is unjust to labor, or the non-property-holding classes the other is unjust to capital, or those who hold taxable estate. One operates as an offset to the other.

Neither is just in itself, nor does the action of the two systems conjointly establish perfect justice; but it approximates as nearly to it, perhaps, as any other system of taxation ever adopted, or likely at present to be adopted.

Before leaving the subject of State taxation, we will briefly notice the inquiry often made, why the UnitedStates government does not assign to each State its share of the public burdens according to its general valuation, and allow the State authorities to collect the amount at the same time, and in the same way, as all the direct taxes of the State are levied and collected. In reply to this, it may be said, that, if the national government could rely implicitly upon the fidelity and promptness of every State, it would be by far the most economical and efficient mode of collecting the revenue. The expense of collection would be almost nominal, probably not exceeding one-tenth of the sum now required; and an army of office-holders might be left free to engage in productive employments. But such has been the state of society in some of the States in times past, that reliance could not be placed upon their promptly assessing and collecting a national tax; nor can it be expected that the time will soon come when such a measure would be practicable.

TAXATION OF CREDITS.

It has sometimes been maintained that credits ought not to be taxed, but all assessments be made upon values, or property, personal and real. Taxes, it has been argued, ought not to be laid upon persons, but upon that out of which they can alone be paid; viz., property.

But credits are taxed as well as values. A holds a farm worth $10,000, mortgaged to B for $5,000. A pays taxes upon the whole valuation, and B upon $5,000, as money at interest. A, it is said, is doubly taxed. This is a practical question, that has puzzled legislators in every age and country. Let us therefore carefully examine it.

Suppose A and B aforesaid form an entire community, and that the whole tax of $150 is imposed on property. The whole valuation will then be $10,000 (A's farm), and the rate one and a half per cent, which A pays, and B goes untaxed. We will now change the principle, and have both property and credits taxed. The valuation will then be, A's farm, $10,000, and B's money at interest, $5,000; total, $15,000; and, with the same amount to be assessed ($150), the rate will be one per cent, of which A pays one hundred, and B fifty, dollars. So, then, we discover that A is not doubly taxed, as assumed, but at the worst pays only twenty-five dollars, or one-third, more than his share. Such must, in principle, be the result of this kind of taxation, taking a whole community together. All the amount taxed upon credit is so much relief to taxation upon property. This seems to be clear; and the justice of the thing is established by the fact that A bought his farm knowing that it would be subject to a full taxation, and bought it cheaper, as we have shown in another place, on that account. B, on the other hand, accepted his mortgage on the same ground, knowing it would be subject to tax on the common valuation. Is either party, then, wronged?

But perhaps another reason may be given why A should pay taxes upon the whole value of his farm; viz., that, having the usufruct of the whole, he is entitled to all the profits on the farm. "But he don't own the whole of the farm." True, that is his misfortune: if he did, he would obtain a larger amount of net profits; but his obligation to pay tax on the whole is not impaired, because he has the use of a part of B's capital. As the owner of the farm, A has a chance for all the profits that can be made from the whole; while, by the taxation of B on the mortgage, the former saves a part of what he would otherwise pay in taxes. One pays taxes for the profits of business; the other, for the income on his capital.

In this case we find another very clear illustration of the

correctness of the income-tax policy. If there were no other tax than upon income, the matter would stand thus:

Amount to be raised, one hundred and fifty dollars of this, A will pay one hundred dollars, and B fifty; and there would be no question as to the justice of the system by which both were thus taxed. If A's income should be more or less than nine hundred dollars, he would pay more or less, and B must pay less or more accordingly.

In the absence of the income-tax principle, what can be more equitable and just than the practice of taxing both mortgagor and mortgagee? If the former were allowed to deduct from his inventory the amount he owed the latter, it would often happen, that, the mortgagee not living in the same town or State, so much property would escape taxation altogether. This in some communities, especially our Western States, would be a great evil. That much hardship may often result from taxing credits as well as property is undoubtedly true; but that only affords additional evidence that the income-tax principle is the only correct one. Next to this would be the levying of all taxes upon property exclusively; and if adopted at the very commencement of a social organization, as at the landing at Plymouth in 1620, it would secure a just taxation, because all property would be created, held, and transferred under that wellknown condition.

TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT BONDS.

The question of taxing credits assumes great practical importance, when regarded in relation to the national debt