morality of common sense.1 The preacher and the teacher, whose aim is practical, are the natural upholders of dogmatic intuitionism.

We may state in the words of Locke the essential point of what is called

§ 5. Philosophic Intuitionism.

"The idea of a supreme being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein, I doubt not, that from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to anyone that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences." (Essay, bk. iv., chap. iii., $ 18.)

This statement clearly places ethics on the foundation of theology; and Dr. Clarke lays down the main positions of his system in close connection with certain theological propositions :

"The same necessary and eternal different relations that different things bear to one another; and the same

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Even Reid's discussion shows the beginning of such an attempt.

consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; ought likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their respective stations. That is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty or lay an obligation upon them so to do, even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive will or command of God; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension of any particular private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or future; annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those rules." (Boyle Lectures, 1705, p. 176, 9th edition.) In other words, there are between things certain ultimate relations existing; amongst them are certain relations we call moral, and these moral relations subsist apart from the direct command of God, in consequence of the existence of the objects of thought themselves. As examples of such ultimate and unalterable relations Clarke cites several theological propositions; e.g., "that God is infinitely superior to men," and "that men should honour, worship, obey,

and imitate God;" and several ethical ones, e.g., "that all men should endeavour to promote the universal good and welfare of all." From the apprehension of these truths follow corresponding obligations. (1.) "That we must honour and worship God."

(2.) That we so deal with every man as in like circumstances we could reasonably expect he should deal with us" (Rule of equity); and "that we endeavour by a universal benevolence to promote the welfare and happiness of all men " (Rule of love).

(3.) "That every man preserve his own being as long as he is able, and take care to keep himself at all times in such temper and disposition both of body and mind as may best fit him to perform his duty." From this rule of sobriety flow the duties of temperance, selfrestraint, contentment, and (apparently) courage and prudence, though Clarke does not explicitly mention them (p. 209).

Pro

Putting aside his rule of piety, as belonging to the sphere of religion rather than that of morality, we note that the third rule-that of sobriety-involves a reference to duty as determined independently of it; the third rule is dependent on the second. fessor Sidgwick regards the first branch of the second rule, viz., that of equity, as equivalent to the statement (so far as altruistic action goes) that "if we assert any action to be right, we imply that it would be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances; that is, to an assertion of the objectivity of morality.

This axiom, says Dr. Sidgwick, is implied in all

moral reasoning; for this involves the assumption that all ethical principles which are valid at all are ultimately reconcilable; or perhaps we may say that the moral system is a continuum from any part of which we can pass to any other. It has all the certainty and the self-evidence of a mathematical axiom ("Methods," bk. iii., chap. xiii., § 4).

"Do to others as you would they should do to you" is a practical rule which partly covers this, but also includes other elements; it suggests to us that gentleness and kindness are, as a fact, likely to produce gentleness and kindness in return, and it therefore does not exclude the immoral possibility that I may assist wicked people in evil in order that they may assist me in some improper enterprise of my own.

The rule of love, as Clarke states it, can hardly be considered as axiomatic. On the face of it it does not seem self-evident that I ought to aim at the good and welfare of all men. And in point of fact Clarke exhibits the evidence for the rule in the following series of propositions:

"If there be a natural and necessary difference between good and evil; and that which is good is fit and reasonable, and that which is evil is unreasonable, to be done and that which is the greatest good is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen: then as the goodness of God extends itself universally over all His works through the whole creation by doing always what is absolutely best in the whole: so every rational creature ought to do all the good it can to its

fellow-creatures; to which end universal love and benevolence is plainly the most certain, direct, and effectual means." The first part of this assures the existence of a summum bonum, a something which it is intrinsically reasonable to desire for ourselves. The next part makes a theological assumption, and on this apparently rests the obligation of universal beneficence. The third part asserts that universal love and benevolence is the most certain means of fulfilling this obligation. Professor Sidgwick, however, regards (with the slight condition affixed) this rule of love as axiomatic, and paraphrases it thus: "The good of any individual cannot be more intrinsically desirable because it is his, than the equal good of any other individual." ("Methods,” p. 360, 1st edition.) While this last statement may be admitted as axiomatic, it is difficult to regard it as equivalent to Clarke's.

At any rate, his intuitive acceptance of these two propositions, (1) that what is right for one is right for any other, (2) that what is desirable for one is desirable for all, together with certain others, viz., that pleasure is the summum bonum, justifies us in placing Dr. Sidgwick amongst the intuitionalists. This does

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1 Dr. Sidgwick in other places lays down two propositions as intuitively and finally certain, viz. (1) that it is irrational to sacrifice any part of my own happiness unless I myself gain an equivalent amount of happiness, and (2) that it is rational to sacrifice my own happiness if some one else gains an equivalent increase of happiness. These two propositions constitute together what he has called the "Dualism of Practical Reason." Cf. "Mind," 1889, p. 483; 4th edit. of " Methods," pp. 504 seq.

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