Muirhead, who defines motive as "the idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will." It seems unsatisfactory to give up a meaning which, on the whole, was a convenient one, and which was accepted by lawyers as well as moralists. But the transition from one meaning to the other is not uncommon in ordinary usage, and can be easily accounted for. In the words of Professor Sully, "A motive is a desire viewed in its relation to a particular represented action, to the carrying out of which it urges or prompts. The desire in this case ceases to be a vague, fluctuating state of longing, and becomes fixed and defined as an impulse to realize a definite concrete experience, viz., the known and anticipated result of a particular action; or, since the object of desire is now fore-grasped as the certain result of a particular active exertion, it assumes the form of the end of this action." It should be noticed that we seldom, if ever, act from a single motive. Dr. Sidgwick's emancipated Jew, who eats bacon from a "desire to vindicate true religious liberty combined with a liking for pork,” is a type of most good men. It is not so much the martyr as the madman whose motive is absolutely single. Even when we overrule an impulse it usually helps to colour the imperious and predominant feeling which led to its suppression. These considerations are important in 1 "Elements of Ethics," p. 58. 2 "Human Mind," vol. ii., p. 208. connection with Dr. Martineau's special form of intuitionism already alluded to.1 § 9. Freedom of the Will. The chief question which ethics raises with regard to the will is not so much a psychological as a metaphysical one. Psychology cannot settle the freedom of the will, because like all other sciences psychology must assume the validity of the categories of thought. It must take notice of the "consciousness of freedom" which we undoubtedly have, and it may explain how this consciousness arises, but it cannot settle the validity of the apparent intuition, although, as Dr. Sully rightly says, such a genetic explanation "would manifestly cut away the psychological ground of the common form of the doctrine of liberty." The question must be left over to the domain of metaphysic, which deals with the final concepts of different departments of knowledge, and examines the assumptions made not only in ordinary thought but in the systematic thinking of the sciences. What is meant by calling the will free? (1) That we are free to act as we please, that we can will to act as we see fit to act, that we can will to act as we see it is reasonable to act. This asserts the dependence of volition on thought, but not that volition is caused by thought. When the volition is in agreement with our judgment the volition is free. (2) There is a reference to an I-myself. This, however, is the empirical self, the group of psychological actualities and possibilities which we have come to know as we have come to know other objects of experience. Whether we imply a further and more intimate reference to the pure self, the metaphysical assumption which we seem driven to make as a necessary basis for all psychological explanation, is another matter. Without attempting a full examination of the question1 we may note the following points. (1)" The assumption of free-will is in a certain sense inevitable to anyone exercising rational choice." This is admitted by the Determinists but explained away. It merely means that I can act as I please; the action is my action, determined by my nature as a whole and not by any external force or by any one part of my nature to the exclusion of the rest. "The sense of freedom is the realization of the function of consciousness in its most complex and impressive manifestation." 3 (2) The purely phenomenalist psychology of Mill and his school has completely broken down. We are obliged to allow that there is something in mind besides ideas and motives, viz. the attending mind 1 See Appendix A, p. 199, for a full list of authorities. 2 itself, the intellectus ipse. This admission destroys the force of a great deal of the Associationist polemic. (3) The mere fact that we can draw no clear line between automatic and voluntary activity proves nothing. This is only another example of the continuity of experience. The inner world is no more made like a set of disconnected pigeon-holes than is the outer. Intelligence passes into instinct, consciousness into unconsciousness, volition into automatism, just as biological species shade off into each other. (4) On the other hand, one of the most important metaphysical arguments of the Libertarians seems to need reconsideration. Kant urges that our knowledge of our moral responsibility involves the assumption of free-will. I ought, therefore I can. But it is open to question whether any such thing as absolute moral responsibility is conceivable, except on a definitely theistic hypothesis. Unless this theistic basis is supplied the transcendental employment of the essentially relative conception of responsibility seems unwarranted. The categorical imperative turns out to be unthinkable.1 Dr. Sidgwick argues that we can construct a theory of ethics without the idea of free-will. The Deter minist can give to the terms responsibility, desert, and 1 See above, chap. iii., §§ 5, 9. Professor Sidgwick makes an exception with regard to one point. But even this exception has no practical bearing. so on, perfectly clear and definite meanings. He "allows that in a sense ought' implies 'can'; that a man is only morally bound to do what is in his power,' and that only acts from which a man could have abstained' are proper subjects of punishment or moral condemnation. But he explains 'can' and in his power' to imply only the absence of no obstacle that may not be overcome by sufficient motive. It is precisely in such cases, he maintains, that punishment and the expression of moral displeasure are required to supply the desiderated motive force." Virtuous conduct is obligatory when the only obstacle to prevent our following it is the comparative weakness of our moral nature and the comparative strength of our sensuous impulses. As long as a rational man is free from external compulsion he is bound by the laws of morality, and the object of moral discipline is to reinforce the good motives. It is clear, that whether we believe in freedom or not, we can construct an ethical theory which shall describe the ideally best conduct, the conduct which the wise man will follow because he is wise. But can we further say that it is morally binding on us, that we ought to follow it? We have seen that ought and obligation have a threefold reference. (1) to human law, (2) to divine law, (3) to the ideal law, moral truths under the aspect of rules (chap. iii., § 5). Clearly society may compel me to adopt the ideal conduct it prescribes. Clearly God can compel me to adopt it. Thus the |