which it proceeds and you think of his character; think of his character as it produces results beyond these sentiments themselves and you have conduct." This comes again to motive, although a new element is added, namely, the strength of will, the constancy with which the will remains true to a motive and the degree of completeness with which it obliges action to correspond with motive.

As we have rejected the view that makes goodness or badness of motive the sufficient criterion, we are led back to conduct as the proper subject of moral judgment. By conduct we mean the action of a human being regarded as forming a connected series, in agreement with the permanent dictates of his intellect and feelings. The acts of the hypnotic patient or of the idiot are not conduct; but the acts of the madman in so far as under the control of his own mind, however disturbed and disorganized that mind may be, may be fairly described as conduct, and they are therefore in some degree open to the application of ethical judgments. Purely reflex acts form no part of conduct; but acts which, although normally unconscious or involuntary, may under suitable conditions (subject to our control) be rendered voluntary, are included in it. Thus psychological considerations are involved in the notion of conduct. But they are not the sole or chief thing to be considered. And although we have to take them into account, we shall have to define good

1 Alexander, "Moral Order and Progress," p. 49. Cf. Sully, "Outlines of Psychology," p. 439 seq.

motive and character by reference to good conduct and not vice versa.

Ethics then is the science of conduct. It seeks to ascertain what conduct is good or right, and what bad or wrong. It does not deal with the nature of the isolated act, or with the motive or intention alone, or with the character of the agent alone. It deals with acts as forming part of a connected series and takes. into account the psychological causes and effects of those acts.

§ 2. The Predicate of the Ethical Judgment. We find ourselves and others constantly making assertions about acts or series of acts, about motives or intentions, and about characters. We say that such an act, or impulse, or person, is brave, prudent, just: thereby tacitly implying that we can form an idea of bravery, prudence, or justice, and that we can form classes of acts, impulses, or persons possessing in common the attributes.

This is the first stage of the ethical judgment. The science of ethics took its rise in the attempt made by Socrates to isolate and define the common element which was to be found in all brave acts, all prudent acts, all just acts. And a great deal of the most useful part of ethics must consist in thus classifying and analysing our primary moral predicates. Unfortunately, however, modern writers on ethics have concerned themselves but little with this branch of their subject.

Their neglect is due partly to the revolt against casuistry, that is, the systematic consideration of difficult moral cases, because it is chiefly in the discussion of such limiting cases that we get accurate knowledge as to what we mean by the predicate whose applicability is called in question. It is partly due to the mainly psychological turn which English philosophy has always tended to take; which substitutes an investigation into the origin of an idea for a consideration of its validity.

And again, it is partly due to a desire to carry on ethical discussion in the region of the higher ethical categories, for it has usually seemed more hopeful to the philosopher to consider the good and the right at large, than to consider more concrete cases, just as the earlier biologists were always trying to analyse life in general, and the earlier psychologists preferred to start from the notion of the Ego, although this method of approaching the problems has of late fallen into disrepute.

The next step is to see what common element brave acts and prudent acts and just acts, motives or characters, all exhibit. But we must remember that they may be considered from the psychological or the æsthetic point of view as well as the ethical. The psychologist is interested in the general mental conditions and results of a brave act; the poet or artist is interested in the beauty of it. The ethical thinker, although not indifferent to either, is concerned with another aspect of the brave act. He judges it to be

good and right. What is the meaning of these terms which form the predicates of what may be called the secondary ethical judgments? What exactly is im

plied in these assertions? This is the part of ethics which has received most attention. It is certainly less practical, and it does not seem more easy, than the more concrete part; but it has proved more interesting.

Besides the terms good and right, there are a few others which may be resolved into them, or at any rate can be connected with them, such as obligatory, meritorious, virtuous, etc. The duty of the ethical thinker is obviously to examine (1) what is meant by each of these terms-what is its connotation? And (2) To what conduct each of these terms can be properly applied-what is its denotation? Of these two questions the former has received much more attention than the latter. Chapters ii.-vi. of this book will be devoted to it, while chapter vii. will deal with the second question.

In the typical ethical judgment, then, the subject will be conduct or act, motive or character in subordination to conduct; the predicate will be some primary term, such as brave or just, or some wider term, such as good or right.

§ 3. Ethical Judgments-Reasoning.

The greater part of ethical judgments are what logicians call synthetic or ampliative; that is, they

assert of the subject some attribute which is not implied by the subject itself. There are of course analytic judgments, as there are in other sciences, declaring the meaning of terms; but the ultimate premises do not belong to this class of proposition. If we say that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is a right end of action," our assertion is strictly synthetic. The question arises, is it synthetic à posteriori, like those of the positive sciences, that is, gained by observation and induction; or is it synthetic à priori, like the ultimate axioms of mathematics, that is, obtained by some process of direct inspection?

By what process do we come to form correct ethical judgments? In other words, what is the logical

method of ethics?

At first sight our moral judgments appear to have a very immediate character. They seem to record the result of a mere process of perception. When we say "this act is right," still more when we say "that act is wrong," the judgment seems to be almost as direct as when we say "this object is hot." Such judgments are usually regarded as the normal deliverances of conscience, which is supposed to speak instantaneously, and in normal cases unerringly. The child is taught to trust these quasi-perceptions without question; and the popular dislike of casuistry and scientific ethics is due to the belief that the usual effect of reasoning about questions of right and wrong is to obscure the naturally clear deliverances of what is