Subd. S.-Morton vs. Folger, 15 Cal., p. 275; Cornwall vs. Culver, 16 Cal., p. 425.

Subd. 9.-Reynolds vs. Jourdan, 6 Cal., p. 108; Polk & H. vs. Coffin & G., 9 Cal., p. 57; Gwain vs. Naglee, 17 Cal., p. 417; Blood vs. Light, 31 Cal., p. 115.

TITLE II.

OF THE KINDS AND DEGREES OF EVIDENCE.

CHAPTER I. Knowledge of the Court.

II. Witnesses.

III. Writings.

IV. Material objects presented to the senses,
other than writings.

V. Indirect evidence.

VI. Indispensable evidence.

VII. Conclusive and unanswerable evidence.

CHAPTER I.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE COURT.

SECTION 1875. Certain facts of general notoriety assumed to be true.

Specification of such facts.

1875. Courts take judicial notice of the following Certain

facts:

facts of general notoriety

1. The true signification of all English words and assumed phrases, and of all legal expressions;

2. Whatever is established by law;

3. Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States;

4. The seals of all the Courts of this State and of the United States;

5. The accession to office and the official signatures

to be true. Specifica tion of such facts.

Same.

and seals of office of the principal officers of Government in the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of this State and of the United States;

6. The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every State or sovereign recognized by the executive power of the United States;

7. The seals of Courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of Notaries Public;

8. The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions and political history of the world. In all these cases the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference.

NOTE.-Subd. 3.-It was held that Courts will not take judicial notice of a private Act unless offered in evidence.-Ellis vs. Eastman, 32 Cal., p. 449.

Subd. 5.-Courts take judicial notice of the official character of Justices of the Peace in their own States. Ede vs. Johnson, 15 Cal., p. 53. Courts take judicial notice of the fact as to who holds the office of Tax Collector of a county or district, and as to who fill the various county offices within their jurisdiction, and of the genuineness of their signatures.-Wetherbee vs. Dunn, 32 Cal., p. 107.

Subd. 8.-Courts take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction and sovereignty exercised de facto by their own Government, and of the local divisions of the country into States, counties, cities, towns, or the like.-People vs. Smith, 1 Cal., p. 13; Irwin vs. Phillips, 5 Cal., p. 140.

CHAPTER II.

WITNESSES.

SECTION 1878. Witnesses defined.

1879. All persons capable of perception and communication

may be witnesses.

1880. Persons who cannot testify.

1881. Persons in certain relations to parties prohibited.

1882. When privileged persons must testify.

1883. Judge or a juror may be witness.

1884. When an interpreter to be sworn.

defined.

1878. A witness is a person whose declaration Witnesses under oath is received as evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on oral examination, or by deposition or affidavit.

capable of

munication

witnesses.

1879. (§ 391.) All persons, without exception, All persons otherwise than is specified in the next two sections, perception who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, per- manicat ceiving, can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Therefore, neither parties nor other persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their opinions on matters of religious belief; although, in every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, as provided in Section 1847.

NOTE.-See Secs. 1847, 2051.

1880. (§ 394.) The following persons cannot be Persons witnesses:

1. Those who are of unsound mind at the time of their production for examination;

2. Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.

NOTE.-There is no precise age within which children are excluded from testifying. Their competency is to be determined not by their age but by the degree of their understanding and knowledge. It is essential that they should possess sufficient intelligence to receive just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, sufficient capacity to relate them correctly, and sufficient instruction to appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath. It is a question for the Court to decide, the question of their competency, when they are offered as witnesses. If over ten years of age, the presumption is that they possess the requisite knowledge and understanding, but if under that age, the presumption is otherwise, and it must be removed upon their examination by the Court, or under its direction and in its presence.-See People vs. Bernal, 10 Cal., p.

who cannot testify.

Persons in certain relations

to parties prohibited.

1881.

66; Brazier's Case, 1 Leach, p. 238; People vs. McNair, 21 Wend., p. 609; Commonwealth vs. Hutchinson, 10 Mass., p. 225; Jackson vs. Gridley, 18 John., p. 104; Den vs. Vancleve, 2 South., p. 653; Rex vs. Williams, 7 Carr. & Paine, p. 320; 1 East. P. C., p. 442.

(§§ 395, 396, 397, 398, 399.) There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the following cases:

1. A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife, without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband, without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other;

2. An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;

3. A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be ex-. amined as to any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the Church to which he belongs;

4. A licensed physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient;

5. A public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the public interests would suffer by the disclosure.

NOTE.-Stats. 1865-6, p. 46, Sec. 1.

Subd. 2.-See Sec. 282, ante, Note 5. The rule applies, also, to attorney's clerk.-Landsberger vs. Gorham, 5 Cal., p. 450. In Gallagher vs. Williamson, 23 Cal., p. 331, the Court held that: "The rule is well settled, that the confidential counselor, solicitor, or attorney of the party cannot be compelled to disclose communications made to him in that capacity."Landsberger vs. Gorham, 5 Cal., p. 450. But this rule does not extend to any facts within his knowledge, or information acquired by him in any other way than by such confidential communication of the client.— Hunter vs. Watson, 12 Cal., p. 377. But any statements made by her to the other persons at that time, or by other persons to each other, or to her, were not privileged, and the attorney was bound to disclose them, the same as any other witness.-Coveny vs. Tannechill, 1 Hill., p. 33; Rochester City Bank vs. Suydam, 5 How. Pr., p. 254; Hutton vs. Robinson, 14 Pick., p. 416; Bramwell vs. Lucas, 2 Barn. & Cress., p. 745. If, pending the relation of attorney and client, the latter communicates to the former a fact foreign to the object for which the attorney was retained, the communication is not confidential. If an attorney is retained in a suit, and the client, after final judgment, makes disclosures respecting the subject of the foregone employment, the communication is not privileged. If an attorney, while managing a case for client, receives from his client a deed of client's property, without consideration, and then, at client's request, deeds property to another person, without consideration, these facts are not privileged communications, and an attorney may be required to disclose them.-Hager vs. Shindler, 29 Cal., p. 48. An attorney may be required to state by whom he was employed.-Satterlee vs. Bliss, 36 Cal., p. 507; Chirac vs. Rheinicker, 11 Wheat., p. 280; Gower vs. Emery, 18 Maine, p. 82; Brown vs. Payson, 6 N. H., p. 448; Beckwith vs. Benner, 6 Car. & Paine, p. 681; Foster vs. Hill, 12 Pick., p. 97. A general objection to all the testimony a witness may give, on the ground that he was the attorney of defendant, is not sufficient to be available on appeal. The particular portion of the testimony objected to must be pointed out, and the specific grounds of objection must be stated. See, also, generally, as to privileged communications of client to attorney.-Satterlee vs. Bliss, 36 Cal., p. 490. When it appeared that an attorney, called as a witness in a criminal prosecution, was unable to state whether admissions to which he had