his conduct or judge of his actions by the standard of duty.' All just ground of punishment even in this life would be gone, for the culprit might justly urge that he was impelled to this course of action, however injurious to another or to the community, by the force of circumstances over which he could exercise no control. It is true that he might be unaware of any such impelling or constraining influence, but this would not alter the fact that they were present as operating forces.

That all men act, speak, and think as if the will were free is admitted on all sides, and it is clear that to think otherwise would deprive us of all motives to action and all sense of right and wrong. It is only because men cannot conceive how due effect can be given to God's grace, and man's will be regarded as free at the same time that they call upon others to surrender their consciousness and their moral principles.

One author has well stated in fitting language the controversy between Providence and Freewill. "A universal providence disposing all events without exception leaves no room for freedom. But there is such a providence, therefore no freedom; or, on the other side, there is a freedom of the will, therefore no such providence. Thus both parties lay down the same major, without which they would make no scruple to admit the minor assumed by their antagonists. But the most sober and considerate part of mankind, induced by the strong evidences both of freedom and providence, have forborne to pronounce them incompatible, the only obstacle against the reception of either, yet look upon their consistency as one of those mysteries which we are forced to admit though we cannot explain.3

united with will, and a certain action; but not any compulsion and opposition to our will. But if it be impossible to me to act otherwise than I do, which it is, if God foreknows my action, how can I be 'free?' This is but the very same fallacy, in another form of expression: for 'impossible' and 'necessary' correspond throughout all their senses, and are constantly opposed; and as necessary' is sometimes employed to denote compulsion to do any thing, so is 'impossible,' to denote restraint or absence of power to do it; which last indeed seems to be the original meaning of impossible. But 'impossible' is also often used so as to correspond with another sense of the word 'necessary,' to imply merely the absence of all room for doubt, or (as we often express it) of all 'chance' and contingency.' For instance, we say, 'such an one, since he possesses the utmost courage, will necessarily stand to his post'; or it is impossible he should fly'; not meaning that he is under any restraint; so far from it, the very ground of our pronouncing it impossible for him to fly, is our knowledge that it depends on him to do which he pleases, and our knowledge at the same time from his character, that he has no such inclination. If then this be all that is meant when one speaks of the 'impossibility' of a man's acting otherwise than he does, it is plain that it does not at all infringe on liberty; since it is evidently possible in the other sense, for instance, for the brave man to run away; that is he has the power to do so, and may if he chooses; according to this sense of the word, therefore, we admit the position, but deny the inference. But if on the other hand it be meant that the divine prescience implies impossibility in the other sense, that is, implies that it is not in our power in any case to do either this or that, according to our choice, the answer is to deny the position; which rests, in fact, on the fallacy of ambiguity, and which contradicts the evidence of each man's consciousness."

1 See the argument of Cyril of Alex. contra Julian, lib. iv. and viii.; and St. Bern., de Grat. et lib. Arb.; and Hilary in Ps. cxix.; St. Basil in Hex. Hom. vi. §7; Hom. in Ps. Ixi. end of § 4.

* Tucker's Light of Nature, vol. iv. c. 25.

The exact mode in which the will of man is acted upon we are not of course, in our present condition, in a position to show; all we can safely assert is that the grace of God is marvellously preventing, wondrously assisting. As the wheel of the watermill is set and kept going by the continual flow of water, so man's will is set and kept going in the right direction by the perpetual stream of God's grace. And this grace never so operates as to set aside man's will, understanding, reason, or affections-it works so as to regulate these, moderate or lift them up, but it always preserves those powers and faculties which belong to him as a reasonable and responsible creature.

The fact is that the fear of attributing glory to man in his own salvation and of detracting from the glory of God lies at the root of the evil of the doctrine of moral necessity and the denial of the freedom of the human will. But a man whose life is saved by the kindness of another never supposes that his mere consent to be saved detracts from the kindness or glory of the other, or takes its place as the meritorious cause of his being saved. If, for instance, a man has fallen into the sea and is in danger of being drowned, when a rope is thrown to him, surely he could not claim to have been his own deliverer simply because he laid hold of the rope and thus enabled his deliverer to pull him out of the water. Had no one thrown him the rope he would have perished; his consent and willingness to take hold of it had it been thrown to him could not have saved him had there been no deliverer near to cast him the rope. So the cord of love let down to us and the power to take hold of it are the free grace given to us in Christ Jesus; but faith is necessary to take hold of the deliverance offered, and this, though given by God, must be put forth in the exercise of our own freewill. He who is saved is saved by grace, not by his faith, nor his freewill-the latter is put forth only in the acceptance or rejection of the grace offered. "For by grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God."

It is a mistake to think that a denial of freewill brings greater glory to God. The truth is that by denying to man the gift with which God has endowed him, we take away his accountability for his actions, we impeach the wisdom and goodness of God, we outrage His justice and deny Him the rule of a moral government. We, in short, withhold from God the glory which He desires in man, and seek to force upon Him a glory of our own devising and for which He has no desire. Truth flatters neither God nor man, as, says Tertullian: "It is not the part of a good and sound faith so to refer all things to God's will, and so to flatter everyone by saying, nothing can come to pass without God's permission, as that we should imagine ourselves to be able to do nothing." In all the 2 De Exhort. Castitat prop. Princip.

1 Eph. ii. 8.

2

works of creation-in the heavens, in the seas, and in the earth— the Almighty receives a glory to His power: in the highest part of His creation He looks for more than glory merely to His power. He has bestowed upon man a freewill and made him a reasonable being, and He looks to him accordingly to render up to his God a higher glory—a glory to His love, a freewill offering, a glory which as a reasonable and responsible creature he could at least keep back, but which it should be his highest privilege and delight to render. It must be admitted the subject is most mysterious. The reconciliation of the knowledge and ordination of God, and His gift of grace with the freedom of the human will is one of those theological puzzles which has perplexed the most subtle intellects this world has yet produced, and the result has ever been unsatisfactory. As we have before observed in considering the foreknowledge of God, we may be able to apprehend the truths as such and apart from each other, but how they dovetail with one another-how they harmonise-it may be impossible to define with precision. Our intellect carries us thus far and no further. Further indeed we may go, but then we proceed not by sight but solely by faith, waiting for the time when "that which is perfect is come" and "that which we know in part shall be done away." Let us, however, guard on the one hand against leaning too much on the side of freedom and thus drifting into Pelagianism, and on the other hand against taking too exaggerated a view of the place which God has allotted to grace and thus drifting into Manicheanism, Lutherism, or Jansenism. As the late Bishop of Brechin justly observes, "The Church of God has to hold the balance between the two. On the one hand, she seeks to develope to the highest degree the sense of individual responsibility, seeking to convince every soul of the unspeakable importance of the passing of each hour, making our eternity to depend on the good or evil use of time; on the other hand, she systematises the beautiful doctrine of grace; maintains that all that is great and of good report in man is the result of a condescendence on the part of God to the creation of His hands; that the beginning, middle, and end of man's salvation is influenced by God; and that there is a perpetual overflowing effluence from the Person of our Lord and from His Spirit, sanctifying, illuminating the soul of man, and aiding him in the search for truth, and in the operation of good. Thus it will be seen that in every good action there are two factors-a divine and a human. As is right, God's holy work goes first, suggesting, exciting, quickening; then follows man, freely yielding himself to the divine impulse. God offers freely and man accepts, and the double work becomes a unity. For His own good purposes, God respects human freedom. He does not force things. Man may resist grace, for the moral order of the world is founded in liberty."

(b) Testimony of the Old Testament.

The following passages are among the many showing that choice is placed before man as to whether he will do right or wrong; and involve the exercise of freewill. Nothing can be more explicit than the way in which the freedom of man's will and his power of choice is set before the chosen people as the very foundation of their relations with Him. Though they had been chosen-were indeed God's chosen people-yet the very last scene of Moses* life and ministry towards them was an exposition of the choice which lay before them and the awful responsibility of that choice. Deut. xxx. 15-19.

1

When the Jews said to Moses, "Speak thou to us all that the Lord shall speak to thee, and we will hear it and do it," God answers, "They have well said all that they have spoken. Oh that there were such a heart in them that they would fear Me, and keep all My commandments always." Can anyone suppose that He who so earnestly desired they might have, and thus enquires who will give them this heart, should Himself withhold from them what was absolutely requisite that they might have it? "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea. "2 "O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end." "Oh that my people had hearkened unto Me, and Israel had walked in My ways.' Is it possible to conceive these sentiments coming from One who had from all eternity decreed the denial of means sufficient to enable His people to do what they were thus wished to do? Yet Calvin says, referring to the reprobate: "He calls to them, but 'tis on purpose that they may be more deaf: He sets a light before them, that by that lustre they may be more blind. He lays down a doctrine that He may more confound and amaze them. Lastly, He applies a remedy, but with this intent that it may not heal them." 5

"4

Of course, Calvinists assert that expressions like those cited above do not refer to God's desire for the eternal salvation of His people, but have reference only to their temporal good and welfare. This, however, is a limitation unjustifiable, and is in reality making God desire that He may act unjustly! When beaten from this position, they try to explain away the force of the words in a different method. They say the words should be rendered so as to express not a wish or desire on God's part, but rather what

1 Deut. v. 27-29.

2 Isai. xlviii. 18.

Deut. xxxii. 29.
Psl. lxxxi. 13.

5 Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit, sed ut magis obsurdescant; lucem accendit, sed ut reddantur cæciores; doctrinam profert, sed quâ magis obstupescant: remedium adhibet,

sed ne saventur.-Just. lib. iii. cap. 24, § 13.

was to be desired by the Israelites themselves-"it should be wished for by them that such a heart would continue in them." This position is too weak to require refutation, and will dissolve with the force of its own ingenuity.

Gen. iii. 17.

Because.... thou hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it, cursed is the ground for thy sake, in the sweat of thy face (or in toil) shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life.

The punishment was to come upon Adam and his offspring, not because of any absolute decree of God, but because of man's sin.

Gen. iv. 7.

If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And if thou doest not well, sin lieth (or croucheth) at the door.

Sin only, observe, not the decree of reprobation, hinders his being accepted.

Deut. vii. 12.

It shall come to pass if (or because) ye hearken to these judgments, and keep, and do them, that the Lord thy God shall keep unto (or with) thee the covenant and the mercy which he sware unto thy fathers.

Deut. xi. 26, 27, 18.

Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse: a blessing if you obey (or if ye shall hearken unto) the commandments of the Lord your God: and a curse if ye will not obey (or if ye shall not hearken). See, too, Deut. xxx. 15—19.

Deut. xxx. 19.

I call heaven and earth to record this day against you (or to witness against you this day) that I have set before you (or thee) life and death, (the) blessing and cursing (or the curse): therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live (or that thou mayest live, thou and thy seed).

If man had not a free will, but was constrained by God, or by any absolute decree of the Almighty to act in one way or the other, these words would amount to a solemn farce. Why were they counselled to choose life if this choice was not open to them? On these words Luther says: "The words are imperative, they assert nothing but what ought to be done; for Moses does not say, thou hast a power of choosing, but choose, keep, do. He

1

1 Verba adducta sunt imperativa: nihil dicunt, nisi quid fieri debeat; neque enim Moses dicit, eligendi habes vim, vel virtutem; sed elige, serva, fac. Præcepta facienda tradit, non autem describit hominis facultatem. De serv. arbitr. c. 97.