ties, to cripple our commerce, and to strike us down from our high position in the comity of nations ?

This question is anxiously pondered by all reflecting English

men; and the desire that our island should be placed in a condition to meet and repel invasion has become almost a feature in our national character. Every movement that takes place in France-every word that escapes from the lips of her ruler, is anxiously scanned to see what it forebodes. Every increase to our own forces, every ship launched or commissioned, every gun mounted on a neglected battery, is felt to be something done in a right direction, and is hailed with satisfaction. It is no passing-no senseless panic. With the multitude, indeed, who can only see for the moment, it may have died away; and the prospect of the navies of England and France approaching side by side the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus may seem to remove further than ever all fear of such a catastrophe; but those who reflect, look beyond such a passing movement; they want to know what is doing in France, and, above all, what is purposed.

The words uttered by the present Emperor at his trial before the Chambre des Pairs-that his mission was to revenge Waterloo-are remembered; and it is hoped, that with the success which has led him up to the pinnacle of his loftiest desires-with the soberness that maturing years should bring, this wild notion of his youth may have passed away. It is hoped so.

Does the Prince de Joinville now, in his banishment, reprint at Brussels his famous Note sur l'Etat de la Force Navale de la France, which astounded us in 1844? Does he in another work,* also published at Brussels, but penned at Claremont -penned, perhaps, on the very day when the gracious sovereign of these realms has honoured his family by visiting them,-does he break out into longings, poetically passionate, for the outbreak of war between the two nations, and, referring to events of no ancient date, exclaim,

It was a sight both new and unplea

sant to English officers, to see a numerous French fleet, full of ardour, well disciplined, and boldly handled, with ships dashing, as in sport, amongst rocks and currents, without any accidents, guns well pointed, rarely missing their mark; but for us, on the other hand, this sight was nothing less than the naval resurrection of France; to us it afforded an enjoyment of self-love, and a patriotic satisfaction, such as I cannot express. Little did we care that the peace of the world, after a lapse of twenty-five years, was about to be staked at the game of battles ;-little did we care. Nous avions de longs revers à effacer.

We do not wish to be hard upon this Prince. We can sympathize with the feelings of a Frenchman in so exciting a moment as the supposed eve of a battle, while pacing his quarter-deck, in command of a fleet of which he was, justly proud. For all this we can make abundance of allowance; but we can make no allowance, yea, we must express disgust and abhorrence, at such sentiments deliberately and calmly recalled, and written down, and that for the express purpose of exciting his too-excitable countrymen, while the green and peaceful fields of England are smiling before him, and he is enjoying the hospitality and protection afforded by a free and peace-loving people. Shame on such base ingratitude!

Further on, in the same work, he says:

:

crut toucher à l'accomplissement de tous Il y eut un moment où nôtre flotte ses voeux elle crut que la guerre allait éclater avec l'Angleterre. Sa confiance était extrême. Elle attendait avec impatience le jour d'une réhabilitation glorieuse pour la Marine française. jour ne vint pas. L'escadre fut rappelée et son chef remplacé. On pleura amèrement sur les vaisseaux cette belle occasion perdue; mais on ne se laissa pas aller au découragement, &c.

Le

Vienne la guerre, qu'il est permis moins que jamais aujourd'hui de désirer, mais qu'il faut toujours prévoir; vienne la guerre, et le télégraphe électrique transmettra, jour et nuit et en quelques minutes, de Paris à Toulon, les instructions les plus detaillées. Les chemins de fer y amèneront en quelques heures

nos braves soldats, et au bout du chemin de fer, nos soldats trouveront ces rapides vaisseaux à vapeur qui, defiant et dejouant par leur vitesse toute la vigilance ennemie, les porteront à coup sûr et à heure fixé sur le point que la pensée des chefs aura assigné à leur débarquement.

Why, still we hope these are but the ruses of a banished prince to regain popularity. We regret to see that, with the knowledge he must possess of the feelings of the French navy on this subject, he should consider this a likely topic to gain their hearts and voices. We regret it. He may be mistaken. Such hostile feelings cannot widely animate the rising navy of France. It cannot be at least, it is hoped so.

In this state of doubt and uncertainty, of hope and fear, for Eng: lishmen hope for peace, and are not ashamed to fear the approach of so awful a scourge as such a war,in this state of the public mind it is satisfactory to have SOMETHING DEFINITE whereon to found conclusions, or whereby to test those already formed. If it is indeed soif we can only maintain peace with our neighbour by making ourselves too strong for him to dare to touch us; if fear alone can keep France from violating our soil-unsullied for well nigh a thousand years by

the touch of a foeman's tread-then let us know the worst.

To return to our former simile-if the insurance be what companies call a hazardous one, then let us know it, and have a valid policy. If Napoleon I. could say to Admiral Decrès, in the despatch already alluded to-Les Anglais ne savent pas ce qui leur pend à l'oreille, let us, at least, in the days of Napoleon III. be a little better informed.

Now, this soMETHING DEFINITE has providentially come to light. We now fully know the mind of France on the subject. The publication-if published it be-of the Enquête Parlementaire* tells us what naval officers of all ranks, what ex-Ministers of Marine, what statesmen and legislators of various hues think on this subject. We now know that the invasion of England is the object of France if once war should break out; and with the

view of making our readers acquainted with some of the plans and devices by which it is proposed to accomplish this object, we shall make our selections from the valuable matter lying before us. We shall not, however, quote only to criticize. Doubtless we shall find in these volumes much to learn; and could we divest ourselves of the incessant remembrance that all this is aimed at us, it would be truly interesting to see a nation, great in so many respects-overwhelmingly great in her armies aiming at greatness also on that element which has so often witnessed her disasters and defeats. It reminds us of the efforts made by Rome, in the first Carthaginian adversary, when banks Punic war, to contend with her for rowers were erected on the shores of the muddy Tiber, and the denizens of the Seven Hills, and of Janiculum to boot, flocked to exercise their stalwart arms in the rower's art. And Rome proved successful, and the first naval triumph graced the Consulate of Caius Duilius.

We must investigate this matter, and we must do it with the interest of self-preservation; for we shall mighty to be despised in any of her find all the energies of a nation, too efforts, concentrated on one object. At first sight, we shall be surprised at seeing with how small a fleet of line-of-battle ships France is satisfied; but a deeper fathoming will reveal the secret. France has abandoned all idea of meeting us, as in days of yore, fleet to fleet and broadside to broadside, on the deep waters of sea or ocean. Rear-Admiral

Verninac, Minister of Marine under the government of Louis Philippe, says to this Committee of inquiry:

The application of steam to navigation changes all the problems of naval war, as it will yet change its strategy. Steam brings home to our coasts the struggles which, for their own safety, sailing vessels were obliged to carry on afar off. Steam threatens all lands with inroads, the more dangerous because unexpected. Steam revives those wars of invasion, almost abandoned since the days of the galleys.

Thus we shall find that, while

France is devoting unbounded attention to her navy, it is but as a means for another end. Her army is to strike the blow-her navy stands but as the pontoons with which her legions are to be pushed across the ditch, when the day

comes.

The formidable artillery mounted on the chaloupes of the Boulogne flotilla were not intended to fight withal. The mighty gatherings of French, and Dutch, and Spanish fleets were not intended to command the seas in perpetuity. Little recked Napoleon what had become of poor Villeneuve. A fleet lost was nothing to him, if by the destruction of that fleet another could but for twenty-four hours, for twelve hours, have swept the British Channel. To Lauriston he wrote: Nous sommes prêts partout, une apparition de vingt-quatre heures suffirait.* Again, to Decrès, Si nous sommes maîtres douze heures de la traversée, l'Angleterre a vécu. And to Villeneuve himself, L'Angleterre est à nous. . . . Paraissez 24 heures et tout est terminé.t This was the one thing wanted by Napoleon the Great; and steam has supplied this wantat least so think French seamenin the days of Napoleon the Third.

con

And this fact of belief-firm, settled belief, in the ease with which the invasion may be effected, is no unimportant element in our siderations. What Frenchmen believe they can accomplish, they will be ready to attempt. No man would attempt an impossibility. Ils ont une conviction, was a reason assigned to the writer by a French gentleman for believing that the Socialists would succeed in the days that preceded the coup d'état. They believed their own fantastic theories, and therefore they were to be feared. If Frenchmen believe-if they attain to a conviction that, in the event of a war, as Admiral Dupetit Thouars says, they have only one thing to do-to land, why, then, let us look to it. The matter grows serious.

On the 31st October, 1849, a law was passed by the National Legislative Assembly of the French Re

public, ordering an inquiry into the state and organization of the French navy, and appointing a committee for that purpose, armed with the fullest powers of summoning before them all persons whom they required, and laying open to them all the arcana of the naval service.

The members of this important committee were elected early in November, and the choice fell on MM. Collas, Daru, Hernoux, Jules de Lasteyrie, Benoist d'Azy, Dufaure, Lanjuinais, Laîné, Charnier, Fournier, Lacrosse, Dahirel, Charles Dupin, de Montebello, and Maissiat. They met for the first time on the 12th November, 1849, when they elected their officers :

President-M. Dufaure.
Vice-Presidents-MM. Daru and
Benoist d'Azy.

Secretaries-MM. Collas and Da-
hirel.

M. Ferré, one of the short-hand writers of the Moniteur, was appointed to attend the committee.

Between the 12th November, 1849, and the 19th November, 1851, when they met for the last time, having completed their arduous task, the committee held, whether in Paris or at the sea-ports, 203 sittings. The proceedings were all carefully transcribed from the short-hand writer's notes; and the Secretaries were charged by the committee to select from these copious records all that was important, and to prepare the same for publication; and before the dissolution of the National Assembly by the coup d'état of the 2nd December, 1851, the committee approved of the selection made by the Secretaries, and ordered it to be printed.

The new Minister of Marine, under Napoleon's regime, did not allow these valuable materials to be lost, and immediately communicated with M. Collas, who insisted on certain conditions, and, to the credit of the Government, obtained what he demanded-viz., the fullest liberty to publish the Enquête Parlementaire as it was left by the committee, without alteration. He distinctly states, 'We declare that

1853.]

Two volumes have accordingly issued from the Imprimerie Nationale, printed under the superintendence of M. Collas. A third volume would have followed, containing the Report of M. Dufaure, the President of the committee; whether this Report will ever appear is now doubtful; but in the two volumes which have been printed we have a mass of information such as has never yet been published, respecting the navy of France, in all its departments. The first volume contains the minutes, or procès-verbaux of the meetings of the committee, commencing with that held on the 16th April, 1850. The second contains the depositions of all the witnesses who were examined, given verbatim.

In some cases, passages in the evidence have been omitted by the committee in making their compilation for publication; and it is remarkable that a line of asterisks often ominously occurs where the witness is giving evidence on the question of war, a maritime war being always naturally enough assumed to mean a war with England.

The Commission occupied themselves in Paris in hearing witnesses, from the 12th December, 1849, to the 16th April, 1850, on which day it was resolved that the whole body should not proceed to visit the arsenals, and a sub-committee of nine members was named accordingly. This sub-committee

SAILING VESSELS.

Ships of the line

Frigates.

Corvettes

met at Toulon on the 1st May, 1850, and proceeded to business without loss of time; hearing complaints, examining witnesses, and inspecting most minutely every department of the arsenal. At their first meeting each member poured forth his budget of complaints which had reached his ear privately, relating to matters, some of considerable moment, and some almost triflingly minute. A scuttle in an officer's door had cost the state fortytwo francs-C'est une ne dépense énorme, remarks M. Hernoux.

One of the first questions which engaged the committee after their return to Paris and the commencement of their own peculiar labours, I was to decide what should be La Constitution de la Flotte-in other words, the effective strength of the French navy.

The number of ships was fixed by law in the year 1846, when Admiral de Mackau was Minister of Marine. He thus alludes to it in his evidence before the Commission:

I am naturally led to what was done in 1845 and 1846, when, in compliance with the laws of Finance, I set forth, in a report to the King, the state of our naval establishment, and the measures to be taken in order to organize the materiel of the navy on a satisfactory footing. In my opinion, what we then asked for as necessary, and what was then granted to us, is what we ought to seek after to day.*

In a paper read by M. Daru, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission d'Enquête, he gives the details of this establishment, constantly alluded to as the ordonnance of 1846, and as in the same paper M. Daru informs us what was the actual establishment of the navy, then in 1851, we may usefully throw the two into one comparative table, as follows:

Or to sum up

Thus a decided increase upon the establishment fixed by law had taken place of sixty-six vessels. The increase caused by the steam line of battle-ship Le Napoléon, and the ships with auxiliary power, may be readily accounted for. These ships were for the most part experiments. There is no such reason for the addition of six sailing line of battleships, six sailing frigates, and eleven steam frigates to the force. But we must especially notice the great increase in transports and light vessels from 46 to 88.

Admiral de Mackau was the first naval officer who was examined on this subject, and we have seen that he considered his own establishment of the ordonnance of 1846 the best suited to the wants and capabilities of France. He further adds:

In time of war, our naval force ought to be nearly equally divided between the Mediterranean and the ocean harbours. The Mediterranean is of great importance to us, on account of Algeria, and of events in the East. In proof of this, we see that, for many years, our squadron for evolutions has always been kept in this sea. Two great objects would be aimed at, by distributing our line of battle ships, steamers, and frigates, as I have suggested: to cover our own seaboard, and to threaten constantly that of our enemy. It cannot

be concealed, that, in case of a war with England, all our coasts, all our establishments, commercial or for war, would be exposed to great danger. We should be able, indeed, to return the harm done to us, as England is still more vulnerable than we ourselves are; and if there is any means of avoiding a calamity so great for both countries, it is for each to be able to say that, if unable to place herself entirely out of the reach of disaster, she is taking measures to deal the heaviest blows she can at her adversary.

Havre is a very exposed port; English steamers, under intrepid commanders, could pass up the Seine, and carry fire and sword as far as Rouen. It is true we can do the same in the Thames, and reach that forest of masts that floats upon its waters. It is important to finish the fortifications of Cherbourg. The Gironde may be forced; we had several instances of it in the last war. Our merchant ships will not be in safety at the anchorage of Blaye, nor at that of Pouillac, if there are not some land batteries and, above all, some war steamers, to protect them there, as on other points of our coast. In the Mediterranean, we shall have to pay much attention to Toulon and Marseilles. Above all, we must have ships of war equal to those which would attack us.

Here I would speak of the two steam floating-batteries, the principle of which, as to construction, was decided on in 1846. These ships, the number of which must necessarily be