the cowardly; through every age, rank, and sex. Private emotions, private interests, were silenced for the time, or contributed to swell the tide of popular feeling, more powerful than any conspiracy, because it mocks the suspicious watchfulness of rulers, and a hundredfold exceeds their power.

It was clear that the opportunity only was wanting for the smothered fire to burst out. Thus the year 1282 dawned in Sicily. The interruption given to the Easter festivities by the insolent or licentious conduct of some French officials supplied the occasion. The events which followed are too well known to require detail. The émeute gained strength and importance in its progress, and the sword, which was drawn to avenge only a private insult, was

not

sheathed till it had slain or expelled every foreigner in the island, and the power of Charles of Anjou had been trampled in the dust.

Perhaps we can hardly wonder, considering the combined suddenness, simultaneity, and success of the outbreak in all parts of Sicily, that historians who looked no further than these effects should have clung to the belief in its being the work of design, even after a doubt had occurred to

their minds. After the complete history of the various stages of the revolution which Mr. Amari gives us, we can no longer hesitate in attributing it to causes simply accidental. We are persuaded that, had the case been otherwise, had there really been a conspiracy of the Sicilian nobles with foreign princes, neither the Government would have assumed the form which it did, nor would the nation have been left so utterly unprepared to meet the vengeance of Charles, as we know to have been the case; we cannot get away from the alternative that, either no conspiracy existed, or if any did exist before the outbreak, that the tumultuary character which the movement assumed overpowered the original design, and carried the revolution de facto far beyond its predetermined limits. Either is destructive of the common tale.

For the first draft of the new constitution was the pure offspring of the popular will taking into its own hands the supreme authority. The

accounts, indeed, are scanty, and very slight information as to the institutions promulgated, or the names connected with them, has come down to us. But Mr. Amari's researches establish sufficiently for our purpose the democratic character of the Government, which was in fact modelled after the short-lived republic of 1254, the intention being that the chief executive, after the general Italian fashion, should be vested in the hands of a foreign podesta. Each city was to form a separate polity under one or more captains of the people,' and our author suggests that probably Messina and Palermo were to be heads of incorporations.

This view of things, we say, is more than hypothesis. It is illustrated by the condition of Messina, in which we find the people supreme till after the beginning of the siege, nearly three months from the date of the Vespers,' when they for the first time felt that, their own leaders being unsuited to the necessities of the time, they must look to the hitherto forgotten nobles as being by education and habit the fittest to direct their efforts. Where were the nobles, the so-called chief conspirators,' up to that time? It is more than probable that they had for years past been scattered in exile, and that they did not conceive the idea of returning till after the revolution. We may at least remark upon one fact as significant of the dearth of military capacity in those days of need. The citizens of Leontinum were glad to elect Macalda, the wife of Alaimo de Lentini, as their leader—a woman of masculine spirit and education, but still a woman; her husband, as is well known, filling a like situation in Messina during nearly the whole of the siege.

Again, had the ordinary version of the Vespers' been true, and the revolution been, in any sense of the word, designed, it is impossible that the authors should have been so careless of their interests as not to have provided for the defence of the island from the certain vengeance of Charles of Anjou, now at the height of his power, and about to take the command of a mighty armament. It would have been to little purpose that the mine was prepared with deep and dangerous artifice,' could it have been exploded so heedlessly

1853.]

and with so little effect. Besides, even had the outbreak been premature, we know enough of the character of Peter of Aragon to make it unlikely that he would willingly have risked the loss of the prize he so much desired by delaying his arrival in Sicily for more than four months. He did not sail from Spain on his African expedition till the beginning of June (Append. p. 347),

the Vespers' massacre having commenced on the 31st of March; and his ultimate landing in Sicily did not take place till late in August.

But it is time for us to account for the appearance of the Spaniard on the stage. Peter had married, before the French conquest of Naples, Constance, daughter (some say sister) of Manfred, the last king. Charles of Anjou, having closely imprisoned all the other children, or their existence having been forgotten, Constance was regarded as the sole heiress of the House of Suabia, and she failed not to keep her husband in mind of her rights. It was said, too, that Conradin, the grandson of Frederick the Second, and another of Charles's victims, had on the scaffold designated Peter his heir and avenger. As such his court had been for some time past the refuge of all who had suffered from Angevin ty ranny, and who looked for maintenance, or hoped for revenge. Among this number the most distinguished were Roger Loria and Conrad Lancia, themselves allied by birth or marriage with the Queen, and the immortal John of Procida. By their means Peter had doubtless frequent information as to Sicilian wrongs and views of resistance. He had besides embraced the cause of Michael Palæologus, the quasi legitimate occupant of the throne of Constantinople

against whom the Western kingdoms were leagued for the restoration of the Latin dynasty-and he might well consider a descent upon the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily as the best diversion he could devise in favour of his Eastern ally. Peter's attention in consequence for some time had been directed to the defence of his dominions at home, in case of his own absence; and, to throw Charles as much as possible off his guard, he had even proposed a treaty of marriage. Under cover of an in

685

tended expedition against the Moors, he also made considerable levies of troops and it may possibly be true that he was assisted by supplies from Constantinople. As far, therefore, as resolutions went, a Sicilian invasion had been contemplated as soon sa Charles should sail for the East, long before 'the Vespers' explosion. It will be remembered that all that has been objected to is any supposed connexion between such imperfect designs and the actual revolution. Had Gibbon been more attentive to dates he might have spared his sneer at the patriot Specialis,' for disclaiming any correspondence between Peter and the Sicilians. The national historian was, when he used the expression, nullo communicato consilio (as is often the case with Livy), truthfully relating a fact, of which perhaps he did not at the time recognise the importance. The words refer to any correspondence before the Vespers." Peter, as Mr. Amari's dates will elucidate, did not happen to be with a fleet and army on the African coast' till after the Sicilians had made a two months' experiment of an arrangement in which he bore no part; and when he did arrive in Sicily he was too late to render any assistance to Messina, whose daring citizens had, after a three months' siege, disheartened and repulsed the invaders.

Whether the Sicilians despaired of finding any Italian bold enough to accept the office of Podesta in the teeth of Charles, or began to mistrust their own powers of self-government, we are not informed. Each probably had its share of influence; while, in further favour of reaction, the nobles, returning from exile, were naturally desirous to restore the monarchy. Many eyes, therefore, were doubtless turned to the camp of Peter, and many hoped what none ventured to propose. In this suspense Peter's embassy to Rome, sent to ask for the assistance usually granted to a crusader, was driven into Palermo by a storm. One of the envoys, hearing of the difficulty, boldly entered the Parliament, and advised the deputies to offer the throne to his master, at once ready at hand to assist them, as well as being their most natural leader. The scene' was doubtless

not improvised, and, Mr. Amari justly remarks, is probably the only circumstance in the whole of the history which bears the slightest semblance of design. Be this as it may, the proposition was adopted with acclamation by an assembly in which were many accomplices: and Peter arrived in Sicily, having attained the object of his ambition by a simpler and more straightforward path than his own policy unassisted by circumstances had pointed out to him.

Such appear to be the true characters in which the history of this momentous revolution is written, when the veil of falsehood and ignorance has been rent from before it. We hail the restoration with feelings of unmixed delight. We have no time-hallowed legends to mourn for like those which faded before the wand of the ruthless German in

Roman story. We even doubt

whether the result obtained be not every whit as romantic (to all save an Italian imagination) as aught which Mr. Amari's criticism has destroyed. There is, at any rate, an act of tardy justice rendered to the reputation of the Sicilian nation.

For, hitherto, we have regarded (as we could not help doing), 'the Vespers' as glorious to all save those immediately concerned in it. The results of the outbreak we could not but admire, as, indeed, we could hardly resist acknowledging its necessity. But it was impossible thoroughly to sympathize with what appeared to be a simple repetition of scenes of treachery and outrage, with which we were familiar in the history of Greek and Italian faction. Here were a people who, after submitting without resistance, almost insensibly to every indignity, national and individual, which tyranny could devise, suddenly emerge from their degradation to redeem their character by the deeds of bravoswith this further reproach, that foreign gold or intrigue appeared to have prompted a revenge which patriotism had shrunk from. And with the bloodshed all enthusiasm (if such it could be called) seemed to cease. The people freed themselves from one tyrant to pass as dupes and slaves under the yoke of another.

In what a different light do we

now regard the Sicilians! Patient under insult and oppression, because, as good sons of the Church, they were loath to believe that she was indeed allied with their enemies, but hoping, almost against hope, that her arm would, though late, be raised in their defence, an unforeseen accident placed in their own hands the opportunity of an immediate remedy. The sight of blood roused the savage nature of men smarting under insult and tyranny, and a thousand wrongs were in one hour revenged. Without design, even without concert, save that which a momentary sympathy inspires, they hurried to take every man his share in the shame or glory of that day.

But, as the slaughter had been neither premeditated nor unprovoked, so was it neither the be-all nor the end-all' of the outbreak. To secure their freedom-the people's sole object-it was as necessary to avoid a domestic tyranny as to break off a foreign yoke. We can hardly exaggerate the difficulties of the first months of Sicily's new-born liberty, when we remember the dangers of her isolated position, the power of her foes, and the inexperience, nay, even ignorance of her people, as well of their wants as of the means of satisfaction. Yet we see them, neither betrayed by success, nor debauched by anarchy, without a leader or an ally, trusting only in themselves, fearlessly erect a constitution, and prepare firmly to defend themselves against the most powerful sovereign in Europe. Accident favoured their self-dependent efforts, and was the means of restoring, under a king of their own choice, the beloved constitution of their ancestors. We, whose forefathers, about the same time, had been vainly contending for the observance of an imperfect Charter, under which pretence they had rent the kingdom in pieces with civil war, should be able to appreciate an equally early, but more successful, establishment of national independence.

Were confirmatory evidence wanted, the history of the next twenty years of Sicily's career would afford a complete illustration of the truth of Mr. Amari's version. It would be vain here to attempt

1853.1

Sicily, after her deed of successful daring (remarks our author), was conscious of her powers: amongst her people were many lofty spirits owing to the civil franchises she had obtained, to her unwonted material prosperity, to the force of her arms, of which so many proofs had been given, and to the various talents and powers called into exercise in state affairs, when they became the common property of all. (Vol. ii. p. 309.)

The same qualities survived in all their freshness after more than two centuries of anarchy; and when the rest of the monarchy groaned under the weight of overgrown Spanish rule, the Sicilian parliament firmly and fearlessly withstood the extortions of Charles the Fifth and his son Philip.

Never was contest more thoroughly national, but it was for scrupulously national objects. Never were monarchs followed to the field by a more devoted and patient people, so long as their interests remained unmerged in those of other nations. Six armaments landed in

succession on the shores of Sicily. Many of the leaders changed sides, -neither Peter nor James, their two first kings, were true-but the Sicilians remained the same; in defeat unconquered, amidst treasons unshaken, gathering courage and confidence even from misfortunes. They were, as one of their orators declared, ready for any emergency rather than lower their eagles to the detested lilies. (Vol. iii. p. 5.)

But perhaps the most striking feature which these volumes reveal in the conduct of Sicily at this time is in her relations with Rome. Long before the Vespers,' she had enjoyed comparative emancipation from ecclesiastical interference. Her Norman monarchs (though feudal subjects) had, as is well known, extorted

687

from the Popes legantine authority in their own dominions. Yet Sicily had never flagged in her spiritual fidelity, not unwillingly persuading herself that Rome would cherish such unstrained allegiance. But her eyes were opened when, on making her submission after the revolution, and entreating the Pope to confirm her act, the only answer vouchsafed was a command to return unconditionally to her former servitude, with a threat of the usual ecclesiastical thunders in case of disobedience. This, added to the cold and insulting indifference with which her appeals for redress, while it might have been peacefully obtained, had been rejected, discovered the moral weakness of that power to which she had hitherto trusted; while it proved how dangerous the sacred influence would become when wielded as an instrument of warfare in the hands of her ruthless enemies. The discovery

thus early was of an infinite value. Sicily at once renounced all ties between herself and the Vatican, and nothing tended more to the development of the bold sentiments and uncompromising behaviour which mark her career. 'God had

raised up another Peter for their defence, her citizens somewhat pedantically answered to the remonstrances of the Roman envoys. They even ventured to arraign the conduct of the See in somewhat striking language for those times. A common citizen of Agosta, to the fair speeches of the legate, when he found that force had failed to produce obedience, said

We regard the Church as our mother, but he (sic) who now rules her as our enemy, since he sends weapons and combatants to fight against us. Inquire now of the legate whether God ever commanded Christian blood to be shed in order to reduce Christians to servitude. If he tells you that He has so enjoined it, he misbelieves the Gospel; and let him learn from us that the only weapons given to the Church by the Christian faith are humility, the cross, and works of meekness. (Vol. ii. p. 249.)

Afterwards Boniface, having failed to detach Frederick, son of Peter, from the cause of Sicily by the lure of a foreign marriage, sent a monk to the island to preach peace and forgiveness of all past offences, if the people would but turn and repent. As an earnest of the Pope's

intentions, the churchman produced sealed parchments in blank, and bade his hearers consult with what pardons and privileges-with what terms, in short-those blanks should be filled up. They mocked at his deceit, and defied its author. 'Know,' said they, that the Sicilians will no more endure a foreign yoke nor any king but of their own choice. And see here,' continued one of them, unsheathing his sword, it is from this that the Sicilians look for peace, and not from your lying parchments.' (Vol. iii. p. 37.)

These bold words prove more clearly than mere feats of arms the spirit of resistance which had awakened in Sicily. We should remember that the century in which Innocent the Third had wielded the Roman sceptre had not yet expired; and though her Angevin partisanship had somewhat lowered her in Italy, the Holy See still maintained her moral influence unimpaired in the eyes of Europe. And as the war proceeded, a sort of reaction was produced, which was unfavourable to Sicily. The origin and merits of the contest were forgotten, and all sense of right and wrong paled before the irresistible fact that one of the contending parties was in fact, though not in name, the Church.

The recollection of this staggered many of the Sicilians themselves, who, the instant they recognised a divided duty, seemed to think that religion might justify even treason. For towards the close of the war we find many men of hitherto unblemished honour putting this sort of pious compromise upon themselves, and betraying the strongholds of their country to the invader. Patuno and Catania, places of the utmost importance, were thus lost after successful defences; and in many more the treason was prevented by discovery.

For these effects, it is true, our author endeavours to find a far different cause, by pointing to the abundant means of corruption which the mutability of feudal tenure placed in the hands of the invading leaders. But they could deal only in promises contingent upon success, a condition in which the Sicilian government de facto was at least their equal. The lands of the renegade Lorias and Procidas would con

stitute a prize sufficiently seductive to such mercenary patriotism as could be roused by no other means. We believe, with all submission to Mr. Amari, that the religious sentiments we have mentioned had more to do with such a state of things. The superstition which was shocked at remembering that Sicily had been for sixteen years in arms against the declared allies of the Roman See, might think any means justifiable that would put an end to the contest. We read with what joy the Aragonese hailed the (not otherwise advantageous) treaty of 1292, and the marriage of their king with an Angevin princess-the bride of peace'-because they thereby were reconciled to the Church, though the only difference between them had been an absurd claim of Pope Martin upon Aragon as a forfeited fief. Even Queen Constance, Sicilian as she was, shuddered at the protracted schism in Christendom, which the cause of her beloved country seemed to render inevitable, and retired to Spain, as well to escape the unholy strife as to atone, by the devotion of her remaining days, for the part which she had unwittingly taken in its origin.

It is not then to be wondered at that some of the Sicilians should have shared these feelings; but while we acknowledge their force with the few, we thereby throw into bolder relief the firmer and more far-sighted patriotism of that greater number who steadily held on their course, unswayed by even such a powerful momentum. And the existence of such a spirit, in our opinion, adds one more crown to the monument of 'the Vespers.'

We need only add that there is no longer any reason for our ignorance of the minutest trifle in this all-important epoch in the history of modern Europe. We can with all confidence and sincerity recommend Amari's volumes as, so far as feasible, exhausting the question as well as opening abundant sources of information, which, though not hitherto inaccessible, have still been unknown. And, apart from an occasional memento that we are reading a translation, Lord Ellesmere's edition possesses attractions of style which, if it were possible, add a new interest to a most interesting subject.