7. OFFICIAL BONDS - LIABILITY OF SURETIES. — Sureties on an official
bond are presumed to take notice of the fact that changes may be
made concerning the duties of their principal, and when these changes
are made in matters of minor importance, which as a whole do not sub-
stantially increase their liabilities, they are not exonerated nor released
by such changes. County of Spokane v. Allen, 830.
8. OFFICIAL BONDS - LIABILITY OF SURETIES.—If an entirely new and
distinct class of duties, not germane to the office, are imposed upon
a public officer, his sureties are not liable to answer for the faithful
performance of the added responsibilities. County of Spokane v. Allen,
830.
9. OFFICIAL BONDS-LIABILITY OF SURETIES FOR ADDITIONAL DUTIES
IMPOSED ON OFFICER.-If, after a county attorney has been elected,
given an official hond, and has assumed the duties of the office,
a statute is enacted imposing upon him the new and additional duties of
collecting and accounting for delinquent taxes, such duties are not ger-
mane to his original office, and the sureties on his official bond are not
liable for the nonperformance by him of the new and additional duties
thus imposed. County of Spokane v. Allen, 830.
See EQUITY, 3; Legislature; States, 1-4; Suretyship, 1–3; Trespass, 1.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 10.
1. RIGHT TO CUSTODY.-A charitable corporation having no legal right to
the custody of a minor child cannot retain such custody as against its
parents, no matter whether they are proper custodians or not. Lovell
v. House of the Good Shepherd, 839.
2 RIGHT OF PARENT TO CUSTODY.-Before parents can be deprived of the
custody or comfort of their minor child a case must be made which is
sufficiently extravagant, singular, and wrong to meet the condemnation
of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief
or social standing. Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 839.
8. RIGHT OF PARENT TO CUSTODY.-The fact that the mother of a minor
child is a passionate, coarse, vulgar, and pugnacious woman, and that
the father is addicted to the excessive use of intoxicants, and has other
debasing habits, is not sufficient to deprive them of the custody of the
child. Lovell v. House af the Good Shepherd, 839.
4. RIGHT TO CUSTODY-ESTOPPEL.-If a charitable corporation has no legal
right to the custody of children placed in its charge a mother who
has placed her minor child in charge of such institution, under a prom-
ise that the child should remain there until eighteen years of age, is
not estopped to assert her right to the custody and control of the child
at any time before it arrives at such age. Lovell v. House of the Good
Shepherd, 839.
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, &
ESTATES BY ENTIRETY ARE DISSOLVED BY DIVORCE; they then become ten-
ancies in common, and may be partitioned. Russell v. Russell, 581.
1. WHAT CONSTITUTES.-Parties having a community of interest in the cap-
ital employed in, and in the profits derived from, a business are part-
ners as to third persons. Webster v. Clark, 217.
2 AGREEMENT FOR-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-A written agreement disclos
ing a transaction in which the parties thereto have a community of in.
terest in the capital employed, as well as a community of interest in
the profits arising therefrom, constitutes them partners as to third
persons, and liable as such, notwithstanding the fact that the transac
tion is sought to be concealed under the guise of a lease. Webster ▼.
Clark, 217.
3. WHAT CONSTITUTES.-A trade arrangement entered into upon such a
basis that the parties thereto have a community of interest in the cap.
ital stock engaged therein, and a community of interest in the profits
resulting therefrom, constitutes a partnership and the parties thereto
partners. Webster v. Clark, 217.
▲ AGREEMENT FOR.—If an agreement under which a business arrange-
ment is carried on, and which is claimed to be a partnership, is in
writing, free from ambiguity or doubt, its legal effect must be de
termined, as a matter of law, and the intention of the parties gathered
therefrom; but, if the language employed leaves the true meaning in
doubt, the construction put upon the contract by the parties thereto
may be looked to in determining its legal effect. Webster v. Clark,
5. LIABILITY OF ONE HELD OUT AS PARTNER.-One who is not actually a
partner, and who has no interest in a partnership, cannot by reason
of having held himself out to the world as a partner be held liable as
such on a contract made by the partnership with one who has no
knowledge of the holding out. Webster v. Clark, 217.
LIABILITY OF ONE HELD OUT AS PARTNER.-Except when one allows
the public or individual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of
partnership when none exists he is never to be charged as a partner,
unless, by contract and with intent, he has formed a relation in which
the elements of a partnership are to be found. Webster v. Clark. 217.
7. A MORTGAge Made by THE MEMBERS OF A PARTNERSHIP on the firm
property to secure the individual debt of one of its members is not
fraudulent as against creditors of the firm, and they are not entitled
to have it vacated because its enforcement will prevent the firm prop-
erty from being applied to the satisfaction of the firm obligations
Smith v. Smith, 359.
& THE RIGHT OF FIRM CREDITORS TO PAYMENT OUT OF FIRM ASSETS. ——
The creditors of a firm have no lien on, or equity in, the partnership
property. Therefore, with the consent of the partners, it may be ap
plied to the payment of their individual debts, though the firm is then
insolvent. The partnership creditors are not entitled to set aside such
payment as fraudulent as against them. Smith v. Smith, 359.
JUDGMENTS AGAINST PARTNERS-DESIGNATION OF PARTIES.
A judg.
ment describing the parties against whom it is rendered by their part-
nership name is valid, although in the action in which the judgment is
rendered they are sued as individuals composing a partnership and as
joint debtors, and designated by their individual names in the plead-
ings, including the caption to the judgment entry itself. Olson v.
Veazie, 855.
See INSURANCE, 5; TRADEMARKS, 6.
1. AS EVIDENCE.-In an action of ejectment based upon a government
patent to land regular upon its face, the patent is at least prima facie
evidence of a good conveyance, and, in the absence of any thing to
impeach it, should be admitted in evidence. Johnson v. Drew, 172.
2. VALIDITY EJECTMENT.-A patent to land not under the control of,
nor subject to disposition by, the general-land office is void. Its in.
validity may be shown in an action of ejectment to recover the land.
In such a case plea setting up equitable grounds of defense cannot be
filed. Johnson v. Drew, 172.
& VALIDITY-PRESUMPTION.-A patent in due form of law, sufficient on
its face to convey the title to the land therein described, and purport-
ing to have been issued by the proper officers of the government, is prima
facie valid in an action at law. Johnson v. Drew, 172.
4. MERE OCCUPANT OF LAND CANNOT QUESTION.-A mere occupier of pub
lic land without any paper title, or any right of entry, or any authority
of law, is a trespasser, and has no right to question the legality of a
patent to the land issued by the general land-office. Johnson v. Drew,
172.
5. ATTACK UPON VALIDITY OF.-A patent to public land issued by the
general land-office, and not void upon its face, cannot be questioned,
either directly or collaterally, by persons who do not show themselves
to be in privity with a common or paramount source of title. Johnson
v. Drew, 172.
6. VALIDITY · COLLATERAL ATTACK. The action of the general land.
office in issuing a patent for any of the public land subject to sale is
conclusive at law of the legal title, until set aside by proper direct pro-
ceedings, and cannot be collaterally attacked. Such patent is also con-
clusive in equity until set aside in a proper proceeding on the ground
that the land officers have misconstrued the law, or that their judg
ment has been so affected by misrepresentation or fraud as to deprive
a party of his just rights. Johnson v. Drew, 172.
7. VALIDITY-ATTACK UPON.-Patents to land purporting to have been
issued under authority of the general government, but shown to have
been issued without authority of law, as when the land undertaken
to be conveyed has never been subject to the control and disposition
of the government, or, if so, was withdrawn from sale when the patent
issued, or in fact never belonged to the government, are void, and
their invalidity may be shown as a defense in an action at law for the
possession of the land. Johnson v. Drew, 172.
PAYMENT.
See INSURANCE, 1.
See CORPORATIONS, 18, 19, DAMAGES, 6-8.
1. FIXTURES-BUILDINGS ON ANOTHER'S LAND.-It is entirely competent
for parties to agree that buildings shall remain the personal property of
him who erects them, and such an agreement may be either express or
implied from the circumstances under which the buildings are erected.
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Stanton, 491.
2. FIXTURES - BUILDINGS ON ANOTHER'S LAND.- If buildings are con-
structed on land by one having no estate therein, and hence no interest
in enhancing its value, by the permission or license of the owner, an
agreement that the structures shall remain the property of the person
orecting them will be implied, in the absence of any facts or circum-
stances tending to show a different intention. Merchants' Nat. Bank v.
Stanton, 491.
MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION-Demurrer.—If a complaint contains
a statement of one good cause of action, and an attempted statement
of another calling for a species of relief which cannot be granted un-
der any state of the pleadings, a demurrer for misjoinder of causes of
action does not lie, provided the complaint contains a continuous state-
ment of facts and is not divided into separate counts or causes of ac-
tion. Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 865.
See CARRIERS, 2; EJECTMENT, 1; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 5; MUNI-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 1.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
See AGENCY, 1, 3.
POLLUTION.
See NUISANCE; WATERS, 12
See ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 3-7; CORPORATIONS, 14-
16; FrauduleNT CONVEYANCES, 3.
PRESENTMENT.
See CHECKS, 2-5.
See EVIDENCE, 8; PATENTS, 3; STATUTES, 6; WILLS, &.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
See AGENCY.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
See SURETYSHIP.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
800 ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 3, 4; SLANDER, 1, 2
PROBABLE CAUSE
See ARREST, 1-3.
JUDGMENTS-SERVICE BY PUBLICATION. - Constructive service of process
McCorkle, his
by publication addressed to "John McCorkle and
wife," he being then dead, is no notice as to her of the pendency of the
action; and a judgment based on such constructive service of process
alone is void as to her, and she is entitled to have it set aside. Thomp
son v. McCorkle, 334.
1. GRANT OF PUBLIC LANDS-COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON.-A grant of pub-
lic lands cannot be impeached collaterally unless it is void upon its
face. It must be assailed, if at all, by a direct proceeding to review
the determination of the commissioners of the land-office, or by an ac-
tion in equity to set it aside, and the recitals in it are prima facie evidence
of its regularity and of compliance with the preliminary requisites of
the statute. Saunders v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 729.
2 LANDS UNDer Navigable WATERS, State Title to and POWER OVER. —
While the state holds the title to lands under navigable waters in
a certain sense as trustee for the public, it is competent for the su
preme legislative power to authorize and regulate grants of the same
for the public and such other purposes as it may determine to be for
the best interest of the state; and the legislature may authorize the
commissioners of the land-office to grant to a railroad company such
lands covered by navigable waters as may be required for the purposes
of the road. Saunders v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 729,
See PATENTS.
Bee CONTRACTS, 11-13; Corporations, 10, 11.
PURITY OF ELECTIONS.
See CONTEMPT; WITNESSES, 5-7.
QUIETING TITLE.
See CLOUD ON TITLE
QUITCLAIM.
See DEEDS, 5, 6.
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