ABANDONMENT. See WATERS, 11.
See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 4
ACCIDENTS.
See INSURANCE, 15.
ACCOUNT BOOKS.
See EVIDENCE, 3, 12
ACCRETION.
See WATERS, 7, 8
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, &
1. MARITIME CONTRACTS-STATE JURISDICTION.-Contracts for the con- struction of vessels and water craft, and for the furnishing of materiale therefor, before they are launched, are non-maritime. Liens and pro- ceedings to enforce them are under state control, and may be enforced in state courts. Globe Iron Works Co. v. Steamer "John B. Ketcham 2nd," 464.
2 STATE JURISDICTION-CONFLICT OF LAWS.-A state law providing a lien and method for its enforcement in the state courts, for building vessels or water craft, and furnishing materials and machinery therefor before the vessel is launched, is not in conflict with the United States admiralty law. Globe Iron Works v. Steamer "John B. Ketcham, 2nd," 464.
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 13.
1. MISTAKE AS TO BOUNDARY.-An adjoining owner who, by mistake, 1- closes or builds upon the land of his neighbor, intending to claim að-- versely to the real or true boundary only, does not thereby acquire possession adverse or hostile to the true owner; but if he takes posses- sion of the land under the belief and claim that it is his, he acquires am
adverse possession, even though the claim of title is the result of mistake as to the boundary line. Wilson v. Hunter, 63.
2 MISTAKE AS TO BOUNDARY-INTENT.-The nature of the possession of an adjoining owner who incloses or builds upon the land of his neigh- bor depends upon the intent with which such possession is taken and held. To bar an action for the recovery of the land so held the pos- session must be actual, open, continuous, hostile, exclusive, and accom- panied by an intent to hold adversely to, and not in conformity with, the rights of the true owner, and must continue for the full period pre- scribed by the statute of limitations. Wilson v. Hunter, 63.
& NOTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Undisturbed adverse possession of land under color of title raises a presumption of notice thereof, and constitutes a complete bar to an attack upon the title of the party in pos- session after the period prescribed by the statute of limitations has elapsed. King v. Carmichael, 303.
See COTENANCY, 1; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4.
AFFIDAVIT.
See BAIL; NEW TRIAL, 2.
1. POWERS OF ATTORNEY ARE STRICTLY INTERPRETED, and the authority is never extended beyond that which is given in terms, or which is neces sary and proper for carrying the authority so given into full effect. Campbell v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
2 POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL-AUTHORITY TO MORTGAGE.-A letter of attorney with naked authority to sell and convey, uncoupled with any interest in the land or fund, does not authorize the attorney in fact to execute a bond and mortgage in the name of the principal. Campbell v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
& POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL-AUTHORITY TO MORTGAGE.-A power of attorney to sell and convey real estate, not coupled with an interest, does not confer power to mortgage, and a mortgage executed under such a power is void. Campbell v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
4 AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO EMPLOY ATTORNEY.-A general agent, with authority to make collections of cash and notes for his principal, has power to direct an attorney at law to bring suit, and to give a bond of indemnity in the name of such principal. Swartz v. Morgan, 786. Bee BROKERS; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2
See MARRIAGE and Divorce, 8-11.
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
CONTRACT EXECUTED IN DUPLICATE.-If a lease is executed in duplicate, both the landlord and tenant retaining a copy, both copies are origin- als, and the fraudulent alteration by the tenant of the copy retained by him does not annul the lease, because the remaining copy is suffi cient to sustain the contract between the parties. Jones v. Hoard, 17.
See APPEAL, 3; LES PENDENS, 7, 8
1. QUESTIONS OF LAW NOT ARgued in the SUPREME COURT ARE DEEMED TO BE WAIVED. Gulick v. Webb, 720.
2 OBJECTION FIRST RAISED ON APPEAL. An objection that plaintiff should have sued as administrator, instead of merely denominating himself the administrator of deceased, and also that he failed to show his official character by a proper profert of his letters of administra tion, cannot be raised for the first time in the appellate court, but should be taken advantage of by way of motion in the lower court. Texarkana Gas etc. Co. v. Orr, 30.
♣ AMENDMENT to Conform TO PROOF.-If an action by an administrator for the death of his intestate, caused by negligence, is erroneously brought for the benefit of the estate, instead of for the widow and next of kin, the appellate court must, in the absence of demurrer, treat the case as it was treated by the parties in the court below, as being a claim by the administrator for injury to the deceased in his lifetime, and consider the complaint as amended to correspond with the proof. Texarkana Gas etc. Co. v. Orr, 30.
4. JURY TRIAL-ERRONEOUS CONDUCT OF COUNSEL IN ARGUMENT.-Lan- guage used by counsel which evinces a studied purpose to arouse the prejudice of the jury, based upon facts not in the case, is ground for the reversal of the verdict and judgment. Cluett v. Rosenthal, 446.
& JURY TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS.-It is not error for the court to refuse to give an instruction fully covered in the general charge. Gibson v. Minneopolis etc. Ry. Co., 482.
6. A VERDICT will not be Disturbed on APPEAL if there is any evidence to support it. Gibson v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. Co., 482.
7. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT MODIFIED ON APPEAL.-An order of the trial court modifying a judgment in accordance with the directions of the supreme court made on a prior appeal, and the judgment as modified, are both appealable, and appeals taken therefrom will not be dismissed on the ground that they are frivolous. Randall v. Duff, 79.
See BILLS OF REVIEW; CERTIORARI; HABEAS Corpus, 1.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3.
APPROPRIATION.
See WATERS, 10, 11.
ARCHITECT.
See BUILDING Contracts.
1. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR EXISTS if there is such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person about to be arrested is guilty of the offense charged. People v. Kilvington, 73.
2. PROBABLE Cause for-SuBMISSION OF FActs to Jury.-In the event of conflicting evidence as to the facts of an arrest, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury what facts, if established, will constitute probable cause, and submit to them only the question as to such facts. People v. Kilvington, 73.
& PROBABLE CAUSE-QUESTION OF LAW.-If a police officer, intending to arrest a person, kills him the question whether he had probable cause to believe, or reasonable grounds for suspicion, that the deceased had committed a felony, is one of law for the court, where the facts are undisputed. People v. Kelvington, 73.
4. A PEACE OFFICER HAS THE RIGHT, without a warrant, to arrest any per- son in the night, when he has reasonable ground to believe that such person has committed a felony. People v. Kilvington, 73.
6. ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON-EVIDENCE-If a police officer not recog. nizing a fleeing person, and not knowing any thing about his business, shoots him while attempting to effect an arrest, evidence tending to show that the deceased went on the particular night to the place near where he was shot on lawful business is irrelevant and inadmissible. People v. Kilvington, 73.
ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON CHARGED WITH THEFT.-The circumstance that a person is fleeing at night from one who is shouting "stop thief "t affords a police officer as much reason to suspect or believe that he may have committed robbery, or burglary, or grand larceny, as that he may have merely committed petit larceny, and justifies an attempt to ar- rest. People v. Kilvington, 73.
7. ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON-SHOOTING CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.- Whether the act of a police afficer in shooting a fleeing person at night in attempting to effect his arrest is or is not an act of criminal negli gence is a question for the jury, who must give the officer, upon the trial of an information for murder, the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising upon the evidence. People v. Kilvington, 73. See HOMICIDE, 5.
1. ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM, DEMAND, OR OBLIGATION may be made, and the courts will recognize and protect the equitable interest of the assignee. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
2. NOTICE OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF A DEMAND OR OBLIGATION, or a part thereof, given to the debtor, fixes the rights of the parties, and pro- tects the assignee. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
3. GARNISHMENT.-AN ASSIGNMENT OF A DEMAND IS GOOD and sufficient as against a subsequent garnishment, if such assignment was binding upon the assignor. Metcalf v. Kincaid, 391.
4 ASSIGNMENt of Part of DEMAND-NOTICE-PAYMENT.-A debtor mak. ing payment in full to his creditor after notice that a part of the obli gation has been assigned is still liable to the assignee for his share of the claim. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
5. ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM-ACTION.-If part of an obligation or de- mand has been assigned the assignee can maintain an action to recover his share by joining the assignor and assignee as plaintiffs; or, if the former does not join, by making him a defendant, so that the whole controversy may be settled in one suit. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
ASSIGNMENT OF WAGES-WHAT SUFFICIENT.-A letter or order directed to the auditor of a railway corporation requesting him to pay to a person named therein the salary of the writer during the ensuing six months, accepted and partly acted upon by the corporation, is a sufficient as. signment of such wages, if they thereafter accrue. All that is neces- sary to accomplish an assignment is that the intent to assign appear from the writing or otherwise. The form is of little moment. Metcalf
7. AN ASSIGNMENT OF FUTURE EARNINGS is sufficient to vest them in the assignee as against attaching creditors, though there was no contract of employment for any definite length of time, if the assignor was actually at work at the time, under an engagement then existing at a fixed price, under which he might reasonably expect to earn wages in the future. Metcalf v. Kincaid, 391.
See HOMESTEAD, 8; Landlord and Tenant, 3.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. BY CORPORATION.-An insolvent corporation has a right to make an assignment in trust for the benefit of its creditors, and may exercise such right to the same extent and in the same manner as a natural person, unless restricted by its charter or some statutory provision. Worthen v. Griffith, 50.
2 WITHHOLDING ASSETS.—The withdrawal by a director of a corporation of a portion of its assets for his own use at a time when the corporation is hopelessly insolvent, and in contemplation of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, does not of itself render a subsequent partial as- signment void, if the assignment does not tend in any way to promote or cover up the acts of such director in reference to the withdrawal of such assets. Worthen v. Griffith, 50.
8 BY CORPORATION - ASSETS AS TRUST FUND.-In those states where an insolvent corporation may make preferences among its creditors by as- signment the rule that the property of the corporation is a trust fund in the hands of its directors as a specific lien or direct trust does not prevail, and it is only when a court of equity, at the instance of a proper party, and in a proper proceeding, has taken possession of the assets of the corporation, that such assets constitute a trust fund for its creditors. Worthen v. Griffith, 50.
4 PREFERENCES. —An assignment by an insolvent corporation for the bene fit of creditors is not rendered void from the fact that on the day the assignment was instituted the corporation confessed judgment in favor of bona fide creditors preferred in the assignment, and then entered its appearance in an action by the assignee and such creditors, with con- sent that the assignee should be appointed receiver of the assigned property, so that it might be sold under order of court on terms pro- hibited by the statute regulating asssignments. Worthen v. Griffith, 50. B. PREFERENCES.-A corporation having the right to prefer one or more of its creditors may do so by assignment, mortgage, or judgment, or by a combination of these methods, so long as no fraud is perpetrated under the pretense of securing the debt. Worthen v. Griffith, 50. &BY CORPORATION-PREFERENCE TO DIRECTOR.-A corporation having the -right to prefer its creditor by assignment may thus prefer a just debt due from it to one of its directors. Worthen v. Griffith, 50.
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