7. WIFE IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM a homestead for herself and children out
of the property of her husband after he has become a fugitive from
justice, if she and her children continue to remain on and occupy the
land. Hollis v. State, 28.
& HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT DOES NOT TRANSFER HIS RIGHT BY ASSIGNING
HIS CONTRACT OF PURCHASE. -If a husband in possession of land, after
filing a declaration of homestead thereon, enters into a contract for its
purchase from the owner, his assignment of the contract to secure bor-
rowed purchase money does not create a lien upon the land, or convey
to the lender either the contract right or the equitable title, although
the declaration is filed before the purchase is made. Perry v. Ross, 66.
2. LIABILITY FOR COSTS.-Homesteads are not subject to sale under exe-
cution to satisfy a judgment for a fine or costs in a criminal prosecu-
tion. Hollis v. State, 28.
1. INDICTMENT FOR MURDER need not state the dimensions of the incised
wound which caused the death. Walker v. State, 186.
2. INDICTMENT FOR MURDER need not state upon what partiular part of
the human body the mortal wound was inflicted.
& INDICTMENT FOR MURDER charging that a mortal wound was inflicted
Walker v. State, 186.
upon the "body" of the deceased is sufficient in law without stating
upon what particular part of the body the wound was inflicted, and the
word "body," as thus used, means the trunk of a human being as dis-
tinguished from the head and limbs; that part between the upper part
of the thighs or hips, and the neck, excluding the arms.
State, 186.
Walker ▼.
4 EVIDENCE-RES GESTE.-An occurrence happening so short a time before
a homicide as to be practically a part of the difficulty which ended with
the killing is part of the res gesta and admissible in evidence as such.
Walker v.
State, 186.
5. ARREST FOR MISDEMEANOR-HOMICIDE TO PREVENT ESCAPE.-A peace-
officer may arrest one committing a misdemeanor in his presence with.
out a warrant, and, if necessary, orally summon as many persons as he
deems necessary to aid him in making the arrest. In making the
arrest, or in preventing an escape after the arrest, the officer or person
assisting him in obedience to a summons, when resisted by the offender,
is not bound to retreat, but may use such physicial force as is appa-
rently necessary, on the one hand to effect the arrest by overcoming the
resistence he encounters, or, on the other hand, to subdue the efforts
of the prisoner to escape, but he cannot in either case take the life of
the accused, or even inflict upon him a great bodily harm, except to
save his own life, or to prevent a like harm to himself. Smith v. State,
6. TO CONSTITUTE SELF-DEFENSE it need not to be made to appear that the
killing was actually necessary; but to justify the killing, however, the
accused, in acting upon the facts as they appear to him, must honestly
believe, without fault or carelessness on his part, that the danger is so
argent and pressing that it is necessary to kill his assailant in order to
save his own life, or to prevent his receiving a great bodily injury. If
there is no danger, and his belief of the existence thereof is imputable
to negligence, he is not excused, however honest his belief may be.
Smith v. State, 20.
1 MARRIED WOMAN'S NOTE - RIGHTS OF HUSBAND'S CREDITORS.—A stat-
ute authorizing married women to acquire property by purchase free
from their husbands' debts and to give notes therefor, but only when
their husbands join in their execution, cannot be construed, as matter
of law, as clothing the husband with the title to property purchased
solely on the credit of the wife, so as to render it liable for his sole debts,
when the purchase price of the property is secured by a note signed by
the wife, her husband and her sureties and paid by the wife and her
sureties alone. Bollinger v. Gallagher, 791.
1 HUSBAND MAY ACT AS AGENT FOR HIS WIFE.-It is entirely competent
for a husband to act as his wife's agent in the transaction of his wife's
separate business, and his doing so will not be allowed to prejudice
the wife's rights. Wood v. Armour, 918.
HUSBAND'S Right in Wife's ESTATE—ASSIGNAbility—DescenT—ADMIN.
ISTRATION.-The husband, as an heir of his wife, has an interest in her
estate, which he may sell or assign, subject to the claims of adminis
tration thereon, or dispose of by will. If not so disposed of it passes
to his heirs subject to administration. In re estate of Dobbel, 123.
ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER TAX TITLE ACQUIRED BY MARRIED WOMAN.
After a married woman has acquired a tax title to land in the posses.
sion of her husband, and put it on record, her possession of the land
through tenants is none the less adverse to the original owner by rea
son of the fact that her husband acts as her agent in the management
of the property. Wood v. Armour, 918.
AMARRIED WOMEN-POWER TO CONTRACT—AttorneY'S SERVICES IN DI-
VORCE SUIT.—A married woman may, by contract, make herself charge-
able with the value of services rendered by an attorney upon her
employment to secure a divorce from her husband, and the husband is
not liable for such services unless made so by order of court. Wolcott
▼. Patterson, 456.
TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES CONTINUES TO EXIST IN NEW YORK when a
conveyance has been made to a husband and wife, notwithstanding the
separate property acts relating to the rights of married women. Hiles
▼. Fisher, 762,
1. TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES.-THE GREAT CHARACTERISTIC which distin
guishes a tenancy by entire ties from a joint tenancy is its inseverability,
whereby neither the husband nor the wife, without the consent of the
other, can dispose of any part of the estate, so as to affect the right of
survivorship of the other. Hiles v. Fisher, 762.
TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-POWER AND CONTROL OF HUSBAND. — At the
common law a husband was held to be entitled to the full control, and
to take all rents and profits of the land during the joint lives to the
exclusion of the wife, and he had power to sell, mortgage, or lease for
the same period, and this life interest was, according to the weight of
authority, subject to the claims of his creditors. Hiles v. Fisher, 762.
8. TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-CONTROL OF HUSBAND.-UNDER THE STATUTES
RESPECTING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN by which
a husband is deprived of his control over the property of his wife, and
of his right to exclude her from its enjoyment, he has no greater inter-
est in, or control over, the property held by him and his wife as ten-
ants by the entire ties than she has, and therefore a mortgage made by
him and a sale thereunder do not confer upon the purchaser any right
to exclude the wife from the property, or from the rents or profits
thereof. Such purchaser becomes in effect a tenant in common with
the wife, subject to her paramount rights of survivorship. Hiles
Fisher, 762.
Bee DESCENT; DURESS; ESTOPPEL, 2; FraudulENT CONVEYANCES, 1, 5, 6
HOMESTEAD, 7, 8; INSURANCE, 2-4; MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; WIE-
NESSES, 2, 3.
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.
See WITNESSES, 9.
IMPEACHMENT.
See JUDGMENTS, 12–14.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 9, 10.
INCEST AND RAPE.-One accused of incest cannot escape conviction on the
ground that the female upon whom the crime was committed did not
consent thereto, or was of such an age that she was not at the time
capable of giving her consent. That the act so committed also consti-
tutes the crime of rape does not prevent it from constituting the crime
of incest. State v. Chambers, 349.
1. GROSS LEWDNESS, ACT OF, is “Open,” When.—Under a statute providing
for the punishment of "open and gross lewdness," an act of gross lewd-
ness is "open" though committed in a private place, and in the pres-
ence of but one person. Hence, such an act is "open" if committed
in the presence of a child of tender years. State v. Juneau, 877.
2 CRIMINAL LAW-"OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS"-EVIDENCE-A person
may be convicted of the offense of "open and gross lewdness," upon
the testimony of a child five years and five months old, who was less
than five years old when the offense was committed, if there is some
corroboration of its testimony. State v. Juneau, 877.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 1.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.
See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1-3.
INDICTMENT.
See HOMICIDE, 1-3.
INDORSEMENT.
See BANKS, 3-6; CHECKS, 2-5.
AN INJUNCTION WILL ISSUE TO RESTRAIN THE PIRACY OF PLAINTIFF'S TRADE-
MARK, the distinguishing feature of which is used, in combination with
others, to constitute a trademark or brand so similar in appearance as
probably to deceive customers or patrons of plaintiff's trade or busi-
ness, although it is not shown that any one has in fact been deceived,
or that there has been intentional fraud, Listman Mill Co. v. William
Listman Milling Co., 907.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2-4.
INNUENDO.
See SLANDER, 8-10.
COMMITMENT OF Insane-"Due PROCESS OF LAW."—A valid proceeding
to commit one as insane requires notice, and an opportunity to be heard
before judgment. There must be a trial before a determination as to his
sanity, and an opportunity to produce witnesses and evidence. Hence,
a statute authorizing such a commitment, but not so framed as to com-
pel a hearing before judgment, and which does not guarantee to the
person charged an opportunity to be heard in defense, is invalid, be-
cause it conflicts with those provisions of the state and federal consti-
tutions which forbid that any person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. State v. Billings, 525.
JURISDICTION.-A COUNTY COURT IN ILLINOIS, acting in insolvency proceed-
ings, has jurisdiction to determine that a judgment rendered against
the insolvent is not a lien upon his property or the proceeds thereof in
the hands of his assignee, and to declare that such judgment, or some
part of it, shall not be paid out of such proceeds. Atlas Nat. Bank v.
More, 274.
See CORPORATIONS, 14-17; FRaudulent ConVEYANCES,
See APPEAL, 5; NEW TRIAL; TRIAL, 3.
1. PAYMENT OF PREMIUM BY PROMISSORY NOTES-CONSIDERATION.-
Though one of the conditions of an insurance policy is that it "shall
not be valid or binding until the first premium is paid," if it is silent
as to the mode of payment, promissory notes received by the com-
pany, even in the absence of any express agreement, must be deemed
to have been accepted in payment of the premium. The policy is bind-
ing, and is a valid consideration for the notes. Union etc. Ins. Co. v.
Taggart, 474.
POLICY PAYABLE TO WIFE-SEPARATE PROPERTY-GIFT.-A husband
may lawfully give to his wife a policy of insurance upon his life, and,
when made payable to her by name, it is her separate property,
although the application is made by the husband and the premiums are
paid with money of the community. In re Estate of Dobbel, 123.
& POLICY PAYABLE TO WIFE-DESCENT-HEIRSHIP.-If a wife dies intes-
tate before the death of her husband a policy of insurance in her name,
being her separate property, is payable to her heirs at the time of
her death, and her husband takes a one-third interest therein by
virtue of his heirship to her separate property. In re Estate of Dobbel,
4. POLICY PAYABLE TO WIFE-DELAY OF ADMINISTRATION HUSBAND'S
RIGHTS. If the wife's estate at the time of her dying intestate
consists of a policy of insurance on her husband's life, in her name,
delay in the administration and distribution of her estate until after
the death of her husband cannot affect his title, or that of his estate,
to a one-third interest in the policy and its proceeds when paid to her
estate. In re Estate of Dobbel, 123.
5. Forfeiture FOR CHANGE OF INTEREST.-The taking of a partner by
the assured and the transfer to him of an interest in the property
avoids a policy if it contains a provision that if the property is sold,
or transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession, the
policy shall be void, though the policy also stipulates that the insurer
will make good to the assured, his heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns all such immediate loss as shall result from the destruction of
the premises from the perils insured against. Germania etc. Ins. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 749.
6. LIFE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-ACQUIRING Right of MEMBERSHIP WITHOUT
FORMAL APPLICATION-ESTOPPEL.-The relief department of a railroad
company, in the nature of a mutual insurance association, organized for
the benefit and protection of railroad employees, in case of sickness or
death, and which places an employee's name upon the roll of its mem-
bers at his solicitation, and deducts from his wages his assessment for
benefits, on the basis of membership, with knowledge of the fact that
no formal application had been made, and no physical examination had,
as required by the by-laws, is estopped from disputing such employee's
membership, upon the suit of the widow to recover a death benefit, not.
withstanding a rule of the department, defining and limiting its liability
in cases of regular and formal applications. Burlington etc. Relief De-
partment v. White, 701.
7. LIFE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY-EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL.-The fact that the relief department of a railroad corpora
tion, organized for the benefit and protection of railroad employees, is a
mutual insurance company, does not relieve it from the operation of the
rules of equitable estoppel. Burlington etc. Relief Department v. White,
701.
4. LIFE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-AUTHORITY OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS TO
WAIVE REQUIREMENTS.-If a person desiring to become a member of
the relief department of a railroad company, organized for the benefit
and protection of railroad employees in case of sickness or death, and
placed under the general management of a superintendent, does become
such member, by the acts of the department, and in a manner differ.
ent from that prescribed by its by-laws, and where all the steps taken
toward that end are made with the knowledge of the superintendent,
there is no question of the authority of subordinate employees to
waive requirements, as their acts in such a case are the acts of the de-
partment. Burlington etc. Relief Department v. White, 701.
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