« AnteriorContinuar »
had jurisdiction of the subject matters and the parties tried before it.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.
render judgment,” simply means that it shall be rendered within a
stances surrounding the particular case. Sorenson v. Swensen, 472.
the peace on Monday, upou a verdict returned on the preceding Satur.
Sorenson v. Swensen, 472.
of the peace jurisdiction over the person of one charged with a viola-
See HABEAS CORPUS.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
him on the leased premises, without the consent and against the pro.
test of the landlord. Jones v. Hoaril, 17.
cigar and news room in a hotel, with the appurtenances thereto, and
tenant. Coulter v. Norton, 458.
nee of a lease, to whom a subtenant attorus, is liable for the eviction of
See SURETYSHIP, 6, 7.
LEASE 800 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS; CONTRACTS, B; CORPORATIONS, 12; Lan
LORD AND TENANT.
LEGISLATURE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - GIFTS, PROHIBITION OP- PREVENTS LEGISLATUR
FROM CREATING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE. – Under a constitu. tional provision forbidding the legislature from making any gift of public money, it has no power to create a liability against the state for any past act of negligence on the part of its officers. Chapman v, State, 158.
LIENS. Soo ADMIRALTY; MECHANIO's LIEN; PARTNERSHIP, 8; SURETYSHM, L
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A PURCHASER PEN.
DENTE LITE. He will not be regarded as holding adversely to the par.
ties to a suit during the litigation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 2. Nor UNTIL THE PURCHASER AT A FORECLOSURE SALE IS ENTITLED TO A
DEED can the mortgagor or his grantee assert an adverse possession.
Norris v. lle, 233. & DoWER. —The statute of limitations does not begin to ran against the
inchoate dower interest of the wife in lands until the death of her
husband. Thompson v. McCorkle, 334, 4. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MISTAKE IN AN ABSTRACT WHEN ARISES.
If a searcher of records employed to make a correct abstract of public records affecting the title to real property, through his negligence or mistake omits an instrument from such abstract, a cause of action against him is at once created, and the statute of limitations commences to run in his favor, and cannot be made to comience at a later day by proving that the mistake was not discovered until such later day. That the party for whom it was made, subsequently acting in reliance on its correctness, paid out money which he would not havo paid had it been correct does not constitute any new cause of action,
Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. B. Tort, ACTION FOR, What is not. — The fact that a person negligently
performed a duty which he imposed upon himself by contract cannot entitle another contracting party to sustain an action of tort for such negligence, and therefore any action commenced to recover damages for the failure to perform such duty is an action upon a contract, and the statute of limitations applicable thereto is not that designating the time within which actions may be brought for torts, but is that declar. ing the time within which actions may be prosecuted upon contracta
Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. & DISABILITY-REMOVAL OF.—The statute of limitations begins to run as to
persons under legal disability, when the action accrues, but, if it has fally run before the disability expires, an action may be brought within the time limited by statute after the disability is removed. The phrase “ legal disability” includes infancy. King v. Carmichael, 303
7. New PROMISK. — A letter from an alleged debtor stating that if he doos
not hear from the creditor soon he will tender the amount due, and that whatever is due is ready whenever he can safely pay either to the person to whom the letter is directed, or to another person named therein, does not constitute a new promise sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, because it shows that there was a dispute as to what was due and to whom it was payable, and that the alleged debtor was not willing to pay until these two questions were settled. Braithroaite v. Harvey, 625. 800 ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2, 3; COTENANCY, 1, 2; MORTGAGES, Lo
LIS PENDENS. 1. TO THE EXISTENCE OF A Valid Lis PÆNDENS three things are neces.
sary: 1. The property must be of such a character as to be subject to the rule; 2 The court must have jurisdiction both of the person and of the res; 3. The res or property involved must be sufficiently
described in the pleadings. Norris v. Ne, 233. 2. Lis Pendens Begins FROM THE SERVICE OF THE SUBPENA after the filing
of the bill. A purchaser from the defendant while the suit is pending acquires his interest subject to such decree as may be rendered on the
hearing. Norris v. lle, 2:3, 3. Lis PENDENS IS NO MORE THAN THE ADOPTION OF THE RULE IN REAL
Actions at common law, where, if the defendant aliens after the pen. dency of the writ, the judgment in the real action overreaches such
alienation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 4. A purchaser of lands pendente lite takes his title therein subject to the
final decree in the pending suit. Norris v. lle, 233. 5. The DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE PLEADINGS is sufficient if
any one reading them must be able to learn thereby what property is intended to be made the subject of the litigation. The legal maxim that that is cortain which can be made certain applies to the ques. tion whether property is sufficiently described to create lis pendens.
Norris v. Ile, .233. 6. A PURCHASER PENDENTE LITE NEED NOT BE MADE A Party to the
suit nor otherwise noticed by the litigating parties. Norris v. Ik, 233. 7. AMENDMENTS.-If a bill originally so detective in its description of prop
erty, or, in the language of the prayer, as not to create lis pendens, is afterward cured by amendment in these particulars tho lis pendens will commence at the time of filing the amendment, if the defendant has
been served with process. Norris v. lle, 233. 8. THE FILING OF AN AMENDMENT does not prevent lis pendens operating
as under the original bill if such amendment does not set up any new equity, nor bring forward a new claim or distinct ground of
relief. Norris v. Ile, 233. 9. DELAY OR LAPSE OF TIME IN THE PROSECUTION OF A Sort will not
create any estoppel against the right to enforce the rules of lis pendens, unless the complainant has been so negligent in its prosecution as to induce the belief that such prosecution had been abandoned. Norris v. Ne, 233.
See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, L.
to compel a municipal corporation to enter into a contract with ono
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
in an action for divorce, who has not acquired the statutory residence
on a bill of review. Wood v. Wood, 42.
an action for divorce in a county other than that declared by statute to
as our own on this point. In re Ellis' Estate, 514.
a court of a sister state, granting a divorce on the complaint of a wife,
COLLATERAL ATTACK.-If residents of this state go to another state for
re Ellis' Estate, 514.
plaintiff does not impose any obstacle to the vacation of the decree of
dvorce it it was procared through the excusablo neglect of the defend. ant, where such motion is made promptly and within the timo allowed
by the statute. Simpkins v. Simpkins, 641. 3. MARRIED WOMEN— LIABILITY FOR EXPENSES OF DIVORCE PROOEEDING.
A statute providing that in divorce proceedings "the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay any sums necessary to enablo the wife to carry on or defend the suit,” including costs, and may award execution therefor or direct such sums “ to be paid out of any proporty sequestered, or in the power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver,” clearly indicates that snch proceedings are to be maintained at the cost of the wife, unless the court shall relieve her therefrom by an order for
expense money to be paid by her husband. Wolcott v. Patterson, 456. I DIVORCE_JUDGMENT WITHOUT AWARD OF ALIMONY-EFFECT OF.-A
judgment in a divorce suit settling the property rights of the parties, without an award of alimony, is, after the time of appaal has elapsod, u final as any other kind of a judgment, except so far as the power to modify it may be reserved to the court itself, or is given by statatory provisions. In such a case, in the absence of any such reservation or power, the court has no jurisdiction to make an order or supplemental decree granting aliinony for the support of the wife and children.
Howell v. Howell, 70. h DIVORCE-ALIMONY – MODIFICATION OF ORDER.—The statutory provi.
ion authorizing the court, from time to time, to modify its orders for the maintenance and support of the wife and children, contemplates that the right to alimony, as well as other property rights, shall have been presented and litigated in the action for divorce, and established by the judgment. If the right to alimony has been thus establishedo the amount may be changed by a modification of the order; otherwise there can be no modification, for there is nothing to modify. Howell
V. Howcll, 70. 10. ALIMONY-CONCLUSIVEN KSS OF DECREE. -A wife who, in her action for
divorce, fails to show by her complaint in what her husband's estate consists, or that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, cannot, after obtaining a decree of absolute divorce, with a large sum as alimony, have the decree vacated or amended on a bill of review, on the ground that the court failed to set apart to her one-third of her husband's os.
tate as by statute provided. Wood v. Wood, 42. II. ALIMONY IN Gross.-An allowance of alimony in gross by consent of
the parties at the time the decree of divorce is rendered is not error. Wood v. Wood, 42.
See DOWER, 1.
See MORTGAGES, 6, 6.
MASTER AND SERVANT. L LIDKENDENT CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY FOR NEQLIQENOR.—The owner,
and not the independent contractor, is liable for injury arising from noge ligont construction of the work if the owner rotains and exercises AL. ST. RR, VOL XLIIL - 83