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had jurisdiction of the subject matters and the parties tried before it.
If jurisdiction is denied, no step can be taken until jurisdiction is
shown. If the recitals in the record show jurisdiction and their cor
rectness is adınitted, that is sufficient; otherwise proof outside the
record must be adduced to establish jurisdiction. Smith v. Clausmeier,

311.
Seo ADMIRALTY; INSOLVENCY; JUDGMENTS, 14, 17; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE

JURORS.
See New TRIALS, 1, 2.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.
1. JUDGMENT.—The statute requiring a justice of the peace to "forthwith

render judgment,” simply means that it shall be rendered within a
reasonable time after the verdict is received, in view of the circum.

stances surrounding the particular case. Sorenson v. Swensen, 472.
2. JUDGMENT-REASONABLE TIME. -A judgment rendered by a justice of

the peace on Monday, upou a verdict returned on the preceding Satur.
day, is within a reasonable time after verdict if he was then busy with
other cases.

Sorenson v. Swensen, 472.
& JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR COURTS IN CRIMINAL CASES. — To give a justice

of the peace jurisdiction over the person of one charged with a viola-
tion of criminal law the first step necessary is the filing of an affidavit
Daming the offense and the person charged with its commission, and
without such affidavit there is no jurisdiction, and all the proceedings
are void. An affidavit filed afterward comes too late, and cannot be
made to relate back so as to confer jurisdiction at the time of the trial.
Smith v. Clausmeier, 311.

See HABEAS CORPUS.

LACHES.
See CONTRACTS, 4; JUDGMENTS, 24; LIS PENDENS, 9.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. IMPROVEMENTS.— A tenant cannot recover for improvements erected by

him on the leased premises, without the consent and against the pro.

test of the landlord. Jones v. Hoaril, 17.
2 COVENANTS—Rigers Of TENANT- EVICTION. - Under a sublease of a

cigar and news room in a hotel, with the appurtenances thereto, and
the right of entrance to and from the hotel rooms, together with the
entire cigar privilege of the hotel, the tenant is entitled to have the
hotel kept open without reference to an implied covenant for quiet
enjoyinent. The abandonment of the lower floor of the hotel and
the use of a portion only of the upper floors for sleeping-rooms in con.
nection with a hotel across the street constitutes an eviction of such

tenant. Coulter v. Norton, 458.
& ASSIGNMENT or LEASE–Eviction—LIABILITY OF ASSIGNEE.-An assig.

nee of a lease, to whom a subtenant attorus, is liable for the eviction of
Buch tenant, accomplished by such assignee's acts. Coulter v. Norton, 458.
Eviction.-MEASURE OF DAMAGES for the eviction of a tenant is the
actual value of the unexpired term, less the rent reserved. Coulter v.
Norton, 458.

See SURETYSHIP, 6, 7.

LEASE 800 ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS; CONTRACTS, B; CORPORATIONS, 12; Lan

LORD AND TENANT.

LEWDNESS.
See INDECENCY.

LEGISLATURE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - GIFTS, PROHIBITION OP- PREVENTS LEGISLATUR

FROM CREATING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE. – Under a constitu. tional provision forbidding the legislature from making any gift of public money, it has no power to create a liability against the state for any past act of negligence on the part of its officers. Chapman v, State, 158.

LIENS. Soo ADMIRALTY; MECHANIO's LIEN; PARTNERSHIP, 8; SURETYSHM, L

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A PURCHASER PEN.

DENTE LITE. He will not be regarded as holding adversely to the par.

ties to a suit during the litigation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 2. Nor UNTIL THE PURCHASER AT A FORECLOSURE SALE IS ENTITLED TO A

DEED can the mortgagor or his grantee assert an adverse possession.

Norris v. lle, 233. & DoWER. —The statute of limitations does not begin to ran against the

inchoate dower interest of the wife in lands until the death of her

husband. Thompson v. McCorkle, 334, 4. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MISTAKE IN AN ABSTRACT WHEN ARISES.

If a searcher of records employed to make a correct abstract of public records affecting the title to real property, through his negligence or mistake omits an instrument from such abstract, a cause of action against him is at once created, and the statute of limitations commences to run in his favor, and cannot be made to comience at a later day by proving that the mistake was not discovered until such later day. That the party for whom it was made, subsequently acting in reliance on its correctness, paid out money which he would not havo paid had it been correct does not constitute any new cause of action,

Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. B. Tort, ACTION FOR, What is not. — The fact that a person negligently

performed a duty which he imposed upon himself by contract cannot entitle another contracting party to sustain an action of tort for such negligence, and therefore any action commenced to recover damages for the failure to perform such duty is an action upon a contract, and the statute of limitations applicable thereto is not that designating the time within which actions may be brought for torts, but is that declar. ing the time within which actions may be prosecuted upon contracta

Russell v. Polk County Abstract Co., 381. & DISABILITY-REMOVAL OF.—The statute of limitations begins to run as to

persons under legal disability, when the action accrues, but, if it has fally run before the disability expires, an action may be brought within the time limited by statute after the disability is removed. The phrase “ legal disability” includes infancy. King v. Carmichael, 303

7. New PROMISK. — A letter from an alleged debtor stating that if he doos

not hear from the creditor soon he will tender the amount due, and that whatever is due is ready whenever he can safely pay either to the person to whom the letter is directed, or to another person named therein, does not constitute a new promise sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, because it shows that there was a dispute as to what was due and to whom it was payable, and that the alleged debtor was not willing to pay until these two questions were settled. Braithroaite v. Harvey, 625. 800 ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2, 3; COTENANCY, 1, 2; MORTGAGES, Lo

LIQUORS.
See INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

LIS PENDENS. 1. TO THE EXISTENCE OF A Valid Lis PÆNDENS three things are neces.

sary: 1. The property must be of such a character as to be subject to the rule; 2 The court must have jurisdiction both of the person and of the res; 3. The res or property involved must be sufficiently

described in the pleadings. Norris v. Ne, 233. 2. Lis Pendens Begins FROM THE SERVICE OF THE SUBPENA after the filing

of the bill. A purchaser from the defendant while the suit is pending acquires his interest subject to such decree as may be rendered on the

hearing. Norris v. lle, 2:3, 3. Lis PENDENS IS NO MORE THAN THE ADOPTION OF THE RULE IN REAL

Actions at common law, where, if the defendant aliens after the pen. dency of the writ, the judgment in the real action overreaches such

alienation. Norris v. Ile, 233. 4. A purchaser of lands pendente lite takes his title therein subject to the

final decree in the pending suit. Norris v. lle, 233. 5. The DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE PLEADINGS is sufficient if

any one reading them must be able to learn thereby what property is intended to be made the subject of the litigation. The legal maxim that that is cortain which can be made certain applies to the ques. tion whether property is sufficiently described to create lis pendens.

Norris v. Ile, .233. 6. A PURCHASER PENDENTE LITE NEED NOT BE MADE A Party to the

suit nor otherwise noticed by the litigating parties. Norris v. Ik, 233. 7. AMENDMENTS.-If a bill originally so detective in its description of prop

erty, or, in the language of the prayer, as not to create lis pendens, is afterward cured by amendment in these particulars tho lis pendens will commence at the time of filing the amendment, if the defendant has

been served with process. Norris v. lle, 233. 8. THE FILING OF AN AMENDMENT does not prevent lis pendens operating

as under the original bill if such amendment does not set up any new equity, nor bring forward a new claim or distinct ground of

relief. Norris v. Ile, 233. 9. DELAY OR LAPSE OF TIME IN THE PROSECUTION OF A Sort will not

create any estoppel against the right to enforce the rules of lis pendens, unless the complainant has been so negligent in its prosecution as to induce the belief that such prosecution had been abandoned. Norris v. Ne, 233.

See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, L.

LIVESTOCK.
See CARRIERS, 2; RAILROADS, 6, 7.

MACHINERY.
Seo MASTER AND SERVANT, the

MALICE.
See SLANDER, 6.

MANDAMUS.
MANDAMUS AGAINST MONIOIPAL CORPORATIONS.- Mandamus does not lie

to compel a municipal corporation to enter into a contract with ono
who shows himself to have been the lowest bidder in response to calls
for bids to do city work. Times Publishing Co. v. City of Everett, 865.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
1. DIVORCE ON AMENDED COMPLAINT. -REVIEW OF DECREE. — If a plaintiff

in an action for divorce, who has not acquired the statutory residence
within the state before bringing suit, acquires such residence before
filing an amended complaint setting up a distinct and separate cause
for divorce, the amended complaint is equivalent to bringing a new
action, and a decree of divorce rendered therein is regular so far as the
question of residence is concerned, and cannot be set aside as erroneous

on a bill of review. Wood v. Wood, 42.
2. DIVORCE-PLACE OF TRIAL IN ACTION FOR_JURISDICTION.—The trial of

an action for divorce in a county other than that declared by statute to
be the proper county for its trial does not go to the question of juris-
diction; and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the law of a sister
state in which the divorce was granted will be presumed to be the samo

as our own on this point. In re Ellis' Estate, 514.
& DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE-COLLATERAL ATTACK. -If the judgment of

a court of a sister state, granting a divorce on the complaint of a wife,
is collaterally attacked in this state, its validity cannot be affected by
the fact that she was induced to bring the action by persuasion, ill.
treatment, and threats by the husband that unless she did bring it ho
would continue his ill-treatment. In re Ellis' Estate, 514.
DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE – VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE-COLLATERAL
ATTACK—JURISDICTION-JUDGMENT.-If both parties voluntarily ap-
pear in an actiou for divorce in the court of another state, and submit
to its jurisdiction, they are bound by the judgment, and cannot avoid
it in a collateral proceeding in this state by proof that, when the action
was brought and judgment rendered, neither of them was a resident of
that state, but that both were residents of this state. In re Ellis' Bs.

tate, 514.
6. DIVORCE IN ANOTHER STATE-COLLUSION_JURISDICTION-JUDGMENT-

COLLATERAL ATTACK.-If residents of this state go to another state for
a divorce, collusion between them as to the judgment to be rendered in
the action does not affect the jurisdiction of the court of that state, or
render its judgment void when collaterally attacked in this state. In

re Ellis' Estate, 514.
& JUDGMENT FOR Divorce, VACATING.—THE SUBSEQUENT marriage of the

plaintiff does not impose any obstacle to the vacation of the decree of

a

dvorce it it was procared through the excusablo neglect of the defend. ant, where such motion is made promptly and within the timo allowed

by the statute. Simpkins v. Simpkins, 641. 3. MARRIED WOMEN— LIABILITY FOR EXPENSES OF DIVORCE PROOEEDING.

A statute providing that in divorce proceedings "the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay any sums necessary to enablo the wife to carry on or defend the suit,” including costs, and may award execution therefor or direct such sums “ to be paid out of any proporty sequestered, or in the power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver,” clearly indicates that snch proceedings are to be maintained at the cost of the wife, unless the court shall relieve her therefrom by an order for

expense money to be paid by her husband. Wolcott v. Patterson, 456. I DIVORCE_JUDGMENT WITHOUT AWARD OF ALIMONY-EFFECT OF.-A

judgment in a divorce suit settling the property rights of the parties, without an award of alimony, is, after the time of appaal has elapsod, u final as any other kind of a judgment, except so far as the power to modify it may be reserved to the court itself, or is given by statatory provisions. In such a case, in the absence of any such reservation or power, the court has no jurisdiction to make an order or supplemental decree granting aliinony for the support of the wife and children.

Howell v. Howell, 70. h DIVORCE-ALIMONY – MODIFICATION OF ORDER.—The statutory provi.

ion authorizing the court, from time to time, to modify its orders for the maintenance and support of the wife and children, contemplates that the right to alimony, as well as other property rights, shall have been presented and litigated in the action for divorce, and established by the judgment. If the right to alimony has been thus establishedo the amount may be changed by a modification of the order; otherwise there can be no modification, for there is nothing to modify. Howell

V. Howcll, 70. 10. ALIMONY-CONCLUSIVEN KSS OF DECREE. -A wife who, in her action for

divorce, fails to show by her complaint in what her husband's estate consists, or that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, cannot, after obtaining a decree of absolute divorce, with a large sum as alimony, have the decree vacated or amended on a bill of review, on the ground that the court failed to set apart to her one-third of her husband's os.

tate as by statute provided. Wood v. Wood, 42. II. ALIMONY IN Gross.-An allowance of alimony in gross by consent of

the parties at the time the decree of divorce is rendered is not error. Wood v. Wood, 42.

See DOWER, 1.

MARRIED WOMEN.
See HOSBAND AND Wire; Taxis, 2

MARSHALING SECURITIES.

See MORTGAGES, 6, 6.

MASTER AND SERVANT. L LIDKENDENT CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY FOR NEQLIQENOR.—The owner,

and not the independent contractor, is liable for injury arising from noge ligont construction of the work if the owner rotains and exercises AL. ST. RR, VOL XLIIL - 83

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