SECTION 4.-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS

In re GOULD.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1913. 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372.)

RUGG, C. J.91

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Com1911, c. 751, and St. 1912, cc. 571 and 666.

pensation Act, St. The facts are that the employé, a citizen and resident of this commonwealth, made a contract here with the employer, a Massachusetts corporation, for rendering to it his personal services, and accepted the benefits of the act. In the course of his employment he received the injury for which this claim arises, in the state of New York. He was principally employed in Massachusetts, but at times incidentally worked in New York and other states. The Industrial Accident Board found that the insurer had been paid by the employer for insuring all injuries received by its employés in the course of their employment, whether within or without the commonwealth. This factor is not of much significance because the obligation of the policy does not refer to anything occurring outside the state, and provides only for performance of the requirements and payment of the compensation designated in the act. If the act enjoins the payment of compensation for injuries received outside the state the insurer has contracted therefor, otherwise it has not.

The question is whether the act governs the rights of parties touching injuries received outside the state. It may be assumed for the purposes of this judgment that it is within the power of the Legislature to give to the act the effect claimed for it by the employé. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 54 L. R. A. 934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309.

The point to be decided is whether the language used in the act indicates a purpose to make its terms applicable to injuries received outside the state. This must be determined by a critical examination of the words of the statute in the light of its humane purpose. There is nothing which expressly states that the act governs the rights of the parties touching such injuries. This is significant. In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, it is not to be presumed that statutes respecting this matter are designed to control conduct or fix the rights of parties beyond the territorial limits of the state. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229, 23 N. E. 829; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 572, 56 N. E. 888, 49 L. R. A. 301; Young v. Boston & Maine R. R., 168 Mass. 219, 46 N. E. 624; Stone v. Old

1 Part of the opinion is omitted.

Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 459-464, 99 N. E. 218; Merrill v. Boston & Lowell, 63 N. H. 259, 260. Part 1 of the act, which is entitled "Modification of Remedies" and which abolishes certain common-law rights of action and defenses for "subscribers" and their employés who do not claim such rights in writing, can relate only to injuries received. within the commonwealth. The correlative provisions which follow and which are substitutional in their nature for the common law remedies and defenses, naturally would be expected to cover the same field in the absence of clear words indicating a larger scope.

A consideration of the act in detail fails to disclose any plain intent to that end. On the contrary, several provisions indicate solely intrastate operation. Part 2, § 19, provides that the employé who has received an injury shall submit himself on request to an examination "by a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the commonwealth." It hardly can be inferred from this language that the Legislature intended that physicians or surgeons from Massachusetts should journey to the place of injury, or that those authorized to practice under the laws of other states should make the examination. Part 3 of the act, which relates to procedure, and which as has been pointed out creates a wholly new method of procedure, deals only with boards and courts within this commonwealth. No provision is made for enforcing rights as to injuries occurring outside the state. Part 3, § 7, requires that the hearings of the committee on arbitration "be held in the city or town where an injury occurred." Obviously, this cannot relate to injuries received outside this commonwealth. Section 11 as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, provides that in the event of resort to the courts copies of the papers shall be presented "to the superior court for the county in which the injury occurred or for the county of Suffolk." The words "for the county of Suffolk" may be presumed to be inserted for convenience, as the officers of the Industrial Accident Board are in Suffolk and courts are continually in session in that county, and not for injuries occurring outside the state. Section 18 requires the employer, within forty-eight hours, not counting Sundays and legal holidays, after the accident resulting in personal injury, "to make a report in writing to the Industrial Accident Board." Part 4, § 18, authorizes the directors of the Massachusetts Employés' Insurance Association, created by the act, to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the prevention of injuries on the premises of the subscribers, "and to this end its inspectors shall have free access to such premises during working hours." This section is in furtherance of that part of the purpose of the act as set forth in its title for the prevention of industrial injuries. But it cannot be operative outside of Massachusetts.

Moreover, our act discloses no purpose to exempt from its operation nonresident employés of alien employers who while working within

this commonwealth may receive personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. If our act is to be interpreted as having extraterritorial force, similar effect must be accorded to like laws of other states. There would be difficulty in reading such an exception into the phrase of our statute. By part 2, § 20, of the act agreements by employés to waive the provisions of the act are made invalid. This section does not easily permit the inference that contracts under the statutes of other states to abide exclusively by the terms of such statutes were thought of and intended to be excepted by the Legislature. The definitions of our act evidently were not framed with the end of covering the matter now under discussion. Employé is defined as including "every person in the service of another under any contract of hire," with certain exceptions. Part 5, § 2, par. 3. See St. 1913, c. 448. The natural significance of this is that it includes a service being performed in this commonwealth. Section 21, to the effect that no payment under the act shall be liable in any way for debts of the employé, does not readily lend itself to the idea that the Legislature intended the act to have extraterritorial force. Great difficulties might arise in establishing such an exemption elsewhere.

These provisions collectively disclose a purpose to confine the operation of the act to the territory of this commonwealth. They fall far short of manifesting a plain legislative intent to control the relations of parties as to injuries received outside of Massachusetts.

This conclusion is confirmed by other considerations which point to the improbability that the Legislature would have expressed such an intention (if it existed) in any but the plainest words.

It is apparent, from a comparison of the two acts, that our own follows in important particulars the provisions of the English act. That act (although it has been held generally to be inoperative outside the United Kingdom) in express terms applies to masters, seamen apprentices in the sea service under certain conditions, and definitely points out the manner of proving and enforcing claims for injuries occurring therein with reference plainly to those outside the United Kingdom. See 6 Edward VII (1906) c. 58, § 7. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to include such injuries within the purview of the act, definite language in the English act to this end hardly would have been overlooked. Workmen's Compensation Acts had been enacted in many foreign countries before 1911, and the texts of these had been printed in a report of the United States Commissioner of Labor and (as shown by the report of the Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents) were known to the framers of our act. Several of these foreign acts made definite and careful provision respecting accidents outside their territory.92 It is a violent as

92 France-Acts of 1898, 1902, 1905 and 1906, title 3, 24 Annual Report of U. S. Com. of Labor, vol. 2 (1909) p. 2501. Austria.-Law of 1894, art. 2;

sumption, under these circumstances, that the Legislature intended its similar law to apply to injuries received in foreign jurisdictions without express words to that effect.

The subject of personal injuries received by a workman in the course of his employment is within the control of the sovereign power where the injury occurs. "It must certainly be the right of each state to determine by its laws under what circumstances an injury to the person will afford a cause of action." Davis v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. 815, 58 Am. Rep. 138. See Cormo v. Boston Bridge Works, 205 Mass. 366, 91 N. E. 313. Most of the compensation acts of the states of the Union contain no provision respecting injuries received in a foreign jurisdiction, although several exempt persons engaged in interstate commerce where federal laws shall be construed to furnish exclusive remedies (Ill. Sts. of 1911, pp. 314–326, § 2; Kansas St. of 1911, c. 218, § 7; Michigan Laws of 1912, No. 3, pt. 6, § 4; Washington Laws of 1911, c. 74, § 18), while some expressly limit the operation to employment within the state. Nev. Laws of 1911, c. 183, § 3; Washington Laws of 1911, c. 74, § 2; Wisconsin Laws of 1911, c. 50, § 1.

Workmen's Compensation Acts have been discussed generally throughout this country. It is said in Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents made in accordance with Resolves of 1911, cc. 66 and 110, pp. 77 and 93, that in thirteen states besides Massachusetts laws of this general character have been enacted, while in eleven others commissions have been appointed to investigate the subject and to draft laws. These various acts, although having certain features in common, nevertheless differ widely in many essential aspects. Some are compulsory. Some prohibit contracts for a different form of compensation, and make criminal under severe penalties failure to comply with their terms. Some provide for strict state insurance, while others do not. The amount of compensation afforded and the circumstances under which it is to be awarded differ. The diversity of public policy already manifested between the several states is considerable. To say that such acts are intended to operate on injuries received outside the several states enacting them would give rise to many difficult questions of conflict of laws. It would require a large dependence upon the comity of other states in enforcing our act and in refraining from enforcing their own as to a subject which commonly is wholly under the control of the several states, and Id. pp. 2456, 2457. Belgium.—Act of 1903, art. 26; Id. p. 2464. Germany. Law of 1900 (a), art. 4; Id. p. 2517. See, also, German Ins. Code of 1911, art. 157, translated in Boyd on Workmen's Compensation; Id. p. 1252. Hungary-Act No. 19 of 1907; Id. p. 2569. Italy-Law of 1904; Id. p. 2617. Luxemburg-Law of 1902, art. 3, Id. pp. 2621, 2622. Netherlands-Law of 1901, art. 9; Id. p. 2641. New Zealand.-Act of 1908 (a), § 11; Id. p. 2664. Queensland.-Act of 1905 (a), § 2; Id. p. 2687. Transvaal.-Act of 1907, § 1; Id. p. 2720.

with which, it has been pointed out, a substantial number have already manifested a purpose to deal by a new and special legislation. No court of any sister state, so far as we are aware, has had occasion to pass upon the precise question here presented.

If employés and employers from different states carry their domiciliary personal injury law with them into other jurisdictions, confusion would ensue in the administration of the law, and at least the appearance of inequality among those working under similar conditions. If such a result had been intended by the General Court, it cannot be doubted that it would have been disclosed in unambiguous The trend of the development of the law, historically considered, has been away from a personal law, and toward a territorial law, before which all are equal. See General Survey of Continental Legal History, pp. 80-83. A reversion to such an ancient theory is not lightly to be inferred. It is of the essence of law, where the common law prevails, that it should be common to all similarly situated.

All these considerations combined forbid the inference that the Legislature, having failed to use plain and unmistakable words to that end, intended our act to govern the rights of the parties as to an injury received in another jurisdiction.

It has been held that the English Workmen's Compensation Act has no extraterritorial effect, save as to certain classes in shipping service (Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, [1909] 2 K. B. 61; Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha & Telegraph Works Co., [1912] 2 K. B. 299; Hicks v. Maxton, [1907] 124 L. T. Rep. 135), while the contrary has been held respecting the German act (Schweitzer v. Hamburg American Co., 78 Misc. Rep. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944). The character of these acts and decisions affords no light upon the present inquiry.

This proceeding has not been brought to this court without reasonable ground, and no cost is assessed under part 3, § 14. Decree should be entered to the effect that the employé has no claim against the insurer. The exceptions must be dismissed.

So ordered.

KENNERSON v. THAMES TOWBOAT CO.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1915. 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436.)

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Sophia Kennerson, administratrix, to recover compensation from the Thames Towboat Company for the death of Wallace J. Hodges, and by Marcia S. Marsdale, administratrix, to obtain compensation from the same company for the death of George Marsdale. Compensation was awarded and appeals taken to the superior court, which reserved the cases