it has been held that such contracts are not controlled by the lex loci contractus. Hughes v. Penn. R. Co., 202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990, 63 L. R. A. 513, 97 Am. St. Rep. 713; Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Sheppard, 56 Ohio St. 68, 46 N. E. 61, 60 Am. St. Rep. 732; Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 194 Fcd. 79, 114 C. C. A. 157; Weir v. Rountree, 173 Fed. 776, 97 C. C. A. 500. Of these cases we shall say no more than that we think they are not consistent with sound reason or wise public policy. The fact that this contract was to be performed by a series of connecting carriers does not, in our judgment, alter the rule. By its terms the contract was entire and indivisible. The answer asserts that the carriage was to be over a joint route established by all the carriers concerned. The part of the contract providing for exemption from liability for personal injuries was by its terms made for the benefit of all the carriers, and the release was to the same effect. The contract made in Michigan was for a continuous carriage to the destination. Each carrier was in effect made a party to the contract, and by the plainest implications from its terms each was to be governed by the same rules of law. If one was liable by the law of Michigan, they all were. The stipulations concerning the shipment of the plaintiff's goods, and his agreement of indemnity and release, are parts of one indivisible contract, the whole of which must be governed by the same law, which is alike applicable to every one of the carriers. They cannot logically be separated, as it was plainly the intention that each carrier was to be in part a recipient of the contractual benefits, and equally a sharer in the contractual obligations. The order and judgment of the courts below should be reversed, the questions certified answered in the affirmative, the demurrer to the "2d" separate defense sustained, with leave to plead over so far as any federal question is concerned, and the demurrer to the "3d" defense sustained, with costs in all the courts. Order and judgment reversed, etc.99 99 See note, 23 Col. Law Rev. 576 (1923). CONTINENTAL LAW.-The rule governing the liability of carriers for injury to passengers is not clearly defined. The decisions of the courts of some countries (e. g., Italy) support the contractual theory in cases not involving the Conflict of Laws. Others (e. g., France, by prevailing view) accept the delictual theory. The law of still others (e. g., Germany) follows the "theory of risk," regarding the liability as neither contractual nor delictual, but as legal. See Josserand, Les Transports, § 865 et seq. (1910). WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. BROWN. (Supreme Court of the United States, 1914. 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457.) For a report of this case see supra, p. 270.1 SECTION 6.-PENAL AND FISCAL LAWS HUNTINGTON v. ATTRILL. (Supreme Court of the United States, 1892. 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123.) [Collis P. Huntington, a resident of New York, lent to the Rockaway Beach Improvement Company, Limited, a New York corporation, $100,000 on June 15, 1880, repayable on demand. Henry Y. Attrill was a director of this company and continued to act as such until after January 29, 1881. On June 30, 1880, Attrill, as director of the company, signed and made oath to and caused to be recorded, as required by the law of New York, a certificate, which he knew to be false, stating that the whole of the capital stock of the corporation had been paid in, whereas in truth no part had been paid in. By making such false certificate he became liable, by the law of New York, for all the debts of the company contracted before Jan. 29, 1881. Under this statute Huntington obtained a judgment against Attrill in the Supreme Court of New York for the county of Kings for nearly $100,000; only $932 of the sum borrowed having been repaid. [On March 21, 1888, Huntington filed a bill in the circuit court of Baltimore city against the Equitable Gaslight Company of Baltimore, a Maryland corporation, and against Attrill, his wife and three daughters to set aside a transfer of stock in that company made by Attrill for their benefit and in fraud of his creditors, and to charge under federal con(U. S. Comp. St. § Where the action 1 Telegraph companies doing interstate business are now trol. Act Cong. June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 8563). Formerly there was much conflict in the decisions. was for breach of contract, most courts applied the rule governing the liability of carriers in general. See notes, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 648. A distinction has been made, also, between the carrying of goods and the transmission of intelligence. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lacer, 93 S. W. 34, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 379, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 751 (1906). Where the action was in tort for mental suffering, some courts applied the law of the place of delivery. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, 196 Ala. 4, 71 South. 183 (1916). Others, the law of the place of contracting, on the ground that the action was in fact founded upon and limited by the contract, Markley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 151 Iowa, 612, 132 N. W. 37 (1911). LOB.C.L. (2D ED.)-30 that stock with the payment of the above judgment. One of the daughters demurred to the bill, because it showed that plaintiff's claim was for the recovery of a penalty against Attrill and because it did not state a case which entitled the plaintiff to any relief in a court of equity in the state of Maryland. The circuit court of Baltimore city overruled the demurrer. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the state of Maryland, the order was reversed, and the bill dismissed. Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md. 191, 16 Atl. 651, 2 L. R. A. 779, 14 Am. St. Rep. 344. A writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States was sued out by Huntington under the "full faith and credit" clause of the federal Constitution.] * * GRAY, J. * The question whether due faith and credit were thereby denied to the judgment rendered in another state is a federal question, of which this court has jurisdiction on this writ of error. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 311, 18 L. Ed. 599; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610, 619, 21 L. Ed. 430; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130, 134, 22 L. Ed. 588; Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter House Co., 120 U. S. 141, 146, 147, 7 Sup. Ct. 472, 30 L. Ed. 614; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 103, 11 Sup. Ct. 960, 35 L. Ed. 640. In order to determine this question, it will be necessary, in the first place, to consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental maxim of international law, stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the fewest possible words: "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, 6 L. Ed. 268. In interpreting this maxim, there is danger of being misled by the different shades of meaning allowed to the word "penal" in our language. In the municipal law of England and America, the words "penal" and "penalty" have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its laws. United States v. Reisinger, 128 U. S. 398, 402, 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 32 L. Ed. 480; United States v. Chouteau, 102 U. S. 603, 611, 26 L. Ed. 246. But they are also commonly used as including any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the damages suffered. They are so elastic in meaning as even to be familiarly applied to cases of private contracts, wholly independent of statutes, as when we speak of the "penal sum” or "penalty" of a bond. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: "In general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for the nonperformance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty, the legal operation of which is to cover the damages which the party in whose favor the 2 Part of the opinion is omitted. stipulation is made may have sustained from the breach of contract by the opposite party." Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 17, 5 L. Ed. 384. Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which, by the English and American Constitutions, the executive of the state has the power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action against the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal. The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover damages caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to be "penal against the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer." Hyde v. Cogan, 2 Doug. 699, 705, 706. A statute giving the right to recover back money lost at gaming, and, if the loser does not sue within a certain time, authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other person for threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though penal as regards the suit by a common informer. Bones v. Booth, 2 W. Bl. 1226; Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. Bl. 308; Grace v. McElroy, 1 Allen (Mass.) 563; Read v. Stewart, 129 Mass. 407, 410; Cole v. Groves, 134 Mass. 471. As said by Mr. Justice Ashhurst in the King's Bench, and repeated by Mr. Justice Wilde in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "it has been held in many instances that, where a statute gives accumulative damages to the party grieved, it is not a penal action." Woodgate v. Knatchbull, 2 Term R. 148, 154; Read v. Chelmsford, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 128, 132. Thus a statute giving to a tenant, ousted without notice, double the yearly value of the premises against the landlord, has been held to be "not like a penal law, where a punishment is imposed for a crime," but "rather as a remedial than a penal law," because "the act indeed does give a penalty, but it is to the party grieved." Lake v. Smith, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 174, 179, 180, 181; Wilkinson v. Colley, 5 Burrows, 2694, 2698. So in an action given by statute to a traveler injured through a defect in a highway, for double damages against the town, it was held unnecessary to aver that the facts constituted an offense, or to conclude against the form of the statute, because, as Chief Justice Shaw said: "The action is purely remedial, and has none of the characteristics of a penal prosecution. All damages for neglect or breach of duty operate to a certain extent as punishment; but the distinction is that it is prosecuted for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner. Here the plaintiff sets out the liability of the town to repair, and an injury to himself from a failure to perform that duty. The law gives him enhanced damages; but still they are recoverable to his own use, and in form and substance the suit calls for indemnity." Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94, 100, 101, 23 Am. Dec. 662. The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to the individual, according to the familiar classification of Blackstone: "Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and are thereupon frequently termed 'civil injuries'; the latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community, and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of 'crimes and misdemeanors.'" 3 Bl. Comm. 2. Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them, and can have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states. The general rules of international comity upon this subject were well summed up, before the American Revolution, by Chief Justice De Grey, as reported by Sir William Blackstone: "Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local. And so as to the rights of real property, the subject being fixed and immovable. But personal injuries are of a transitory nature, and sequuntur forum rei." Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Bl. 1055, 1058. Crimes and offenses against the laws of any state can only be defined, prosecuted, and pardoned by the sovereign authority of that state; and the authorities, legislative, executive, or judicial, of other states take no action with regard to them, except by way of extradition, to surrender offenders to the state whose laws they have violated, and whose peace they have broken. * * * Upon the question what are to be considered penal laws of one country, within the international rule which forbids such laws to be enforced in any other country, so much reliance was placed by each party in argument upon the opinion of this court in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239, that it will be convenient to quote from that opinion the principal proposions there affirmed: "The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies, not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties." Page 290, 127 U. S., and page 1374, 8 Sup. Ct. (32 L. Ed. 239). "The application of the rule to the courts of the several states and of the United States is not affected by the provisions of the Constitution and of the act of Congress, by which the judgments of the courts of any state are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the |