as the court in the peculiar circumstances of the case may deem just and proper.

"Otherwise than as provided in the two preceding sections, neither husband nor wife, on divorce being granted, shall have any right in the estate of the other."

The plea further alleged that the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of Rhode Island and subject to its laws and to the jurisdiction of its courts; that in the divorce action in Rhode Island, within six months after the entry of the absolute decree of divorce therein, the plaintiff claimed alimony, and on January 19, 1912, a decree was entered, which decree is more fully described hereinafter; that the proceedings under that decree are pending, and that the plaintiff, having made her claim for alimony as provided by the statute, and alimony having been decreed, all dower rights in the land of her husband have been waived and released, including the dower right referred to in the bill.

By the decree referred to it was adjudged that the plaintiff is entitled to alimony out of the property and estate of this defendant; and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of such alimony, and the property upon which the same might be established as a lien, the cause was referred to a master to ascertain and report to the court the nature, character and value of all the property of the defendant, of every nature and description. The master was specially ordered to inquire into the conveyances by the defendant of real estate in Massachusetts and other states, some of which transactions the plaintiff complains of in this bill, and to determine whether they were made in fraud of the plaintiff's rights.

To this plea the defendant demurred. The demurrer was overruled and a final decree was thereupon entered dismissing the bill. The case is here on the plaintiff's appeal from this decree.

The parties are in accord as to the well established principles of law suggested by the record, and an extended discussion of them becomes unnecessary. Upon the granting of a divorce the plaintiff's right of dower became a legal estate to the same effect as if the marriage relation had then been terminated by the death of the defendant. Being an interest in land it is governed by the law of the place where the property subject to dower is located. Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12 N. E. 354. But while the Legislature of Rhode Island has no power to regulate dower in land located in this commonwealth, its courts do have power to proceed in personam, notwithstanding that the decree incidentally affects land in another jurisdiction. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853; Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528; Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 3 L. Ed. 181; Brown v. Desmond, 100 Mass. 267. It is equally clear that the

plaintiff herself had full power to release her dower right in any and all lands of the defendant, in any lawful manner; and a waiver of those rights may be as effectual a bar as a formal instrument of release. Vincent v. Spooner, 2 Cush. 467; Freeland v. Freeland, 128 Mass. 509; Tatro v. Tatro, 18 Neb. 395, 25 N. W. 571, 53 Am. Rep. 820; Adams v. Storey, 135 Ill. 448, 26 N. E. 582, 11 L. R. A. 790, 25 Am. St. Rep. 392; Owen v. Yale, 75 Mich. 256, 42 N. W. 817.

Although the parties are not in dispute as to the validity of these principles, the real controversy in the case is as to which of them is applicable. The controlling issue involves the contruction of the Rhode Island statute and the effect of the plaintiff's application for permanent alimony.

The main purpose of the plaintiff in this bill is to obtain her dower interest in Massachusetts lands; and she is entitled to such interest unless she has waived her right to the same by her divorce proceedings in Rhode Island. The defendant contends and the plaintiff denies that she has so waived her dower rights in Massachusetts as well as those in Rhode Island. In our opinion the defendant's view is correct. The plaintiff was a citizen of the latter state and voluntarily invoked the benefit of its laws at the hands of its court. The statute under which she proceeded deprived her of dower, presumably in Rhode Island land, unless she claimed the same on pro-. ceedings begun within six months after the absolute decree of divorce. If during those six months, instead of claiming dower she made claim for alimony, it was expressly provided that "dower shall be deemed to be waived and released." If the statute contained no more, it well might be construed as limiting the waiver to real estate in Rhode Island. But it further provides that where such claim for alimony is made it shall constitute the only relief of the wife; and this is followed by the broad provision: "Otherwise than as provided in the two preceding sections, neither husband nor wife, on divorce being granted, shall have any right in the estate of the other." It seems to us that by the reasonable construction of such language the waiver applies to the plaintiff's dower rights wherever the land is situated.

Furthermore this question, whether the Rhode Island statute was framed to make such application for alimony a waiver of dower in land wherever situated, seems to us to be settled by the construction put upon the statute by the courts of that state. The superior court, Providence county, upon the present plaintiff's petition for alimony, adjudged that she was entitled thereto out of the property and estate of the defendant, and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of such alimony and the property upon which the same might be established as a lien, referred the case to a special master in chancery to ascertain and report to the court forthwith the nature, character and value of all his property, of every nature

and description. What is more significant, the master was specially ordered to make inquiry into recent conveyances of his real estate in Massachusetts and other specified states outside Rhode Island, and to determine whether they were made in fraud of the plaintiff's rights.

Even if the meaning of the statute seemed less clear, we should be largely governed by the construction of it adopted by the courts of Rhode Island and implied in the decree of the superior court, which is that the plaintiff's claim of alimony under the statute is a waiver of dower in the defendant's real estate wherever situated. Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472, 5 Am. Dec. 111; Hackett v. Potter, 135 Mass. 349; Commonwealth v. Stevens, 196 Mass. 280, 82 N. E. 33, 124 Am. St. Rep. 555.

The plaintiff was free either to apply for alimony in Rhode Island under such conditions, or to claim her dower rights in Massachusetts and elsewhere, and she voluntarily elected to pursue the former remedy.. Presumably she did so with the reasonable expectation that the court would allow her as alimony a just and proportional amount of the defendant's entire property, including his real estate, if any in in this commonwealth. If the result is to deprive her of dower rights as such, that is due solely to the fact that she has knowingly waived them by her conduct and elected to take in lieu thereof a permanent alimony that she thought equivalent. Having made her election, by the very terms of the statute she must be deemed to have waived and released dower, and cannot now enlist the aid of a court of equity to secure dower in addition.

The decree adjudging the plea to be sufficient and dismissing the bill must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.54

54 See note, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 555.

SECTION 5.-PARENT AND CHILD

I. LEGITIMACY, LEGITIMATION, AND ADOPTION

MOORE v. SAXTON.

(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, 1916. 90 Conn. 164, 96 Atl. 960, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 534.)

[Robert P. Saxton, Myra A. Watson, and Hazel E. Le Duc were the children of Charles Platt Saxton by a bigamous marriage contracted by him with one Emma Byrne. The children were born to them while the parents were domiciled in the state of California. By the law of California, where the children were still domiciled at the time of the proceedings, the issue of all marriages deemed null in law are legitimate. The superior court of Litchfield county, Conn., affirming an order of the probate court, recognized the above as Saxton's legitimate children in the settlement of the estate of one Ruth Deborah Richards.]

PRENTICE, C. J. By the law of California, in which state their parents were domiciled at the time of their birth, the children of Charles Platt Saxton and Emma Byrne were at birth legitimate. By a statute of that state enacted in 1850, and still in force, the issue of marriages null in the law are declared legitimate, and the courts of that state have determined that this provision is applicable to the issue of marriages null because bigamous. Laws Cal. 1850, p. 220, § 2; Civil Code of California 1872, § 1387; Graham v. Bennet, 2 Cal. 503. Their personal status of legitimates thus established is one which we ought to recognize unless such recognition would violate some positive law of this state, contravene our established public policy, or offend against good morals. Van Buskirk v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 14 Conn. 582, 586; Guarantee, etc., Deposit Co. v. Philadelphia R. & N. E. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 721, 38 Atl. 792, 38 L. R. A. 804; Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 463, 88 Atl. 711, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 415; Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 695, 92 Atl. 684.

We have no positive law which would be violated by a recognition of the California status of these children. The last-named ground for nonrecognition is but a subdivision of the larger matter of public policy. Minor on Conflict of Laws, § 9. The question of recognition in the present case thus becomes narrowed down to one as to whether any public policy of ours would be thereby contravened.

As bearing upon this question it is indeed true that we have no law upon the subject of legitimacy, written or unwritten, to the same effect as that of California in question, and quite likely also true that

public opinion in this state would not be favorable to the enactment of such a law, fixing and defining the status of the offspring of parents domiciled here. But that does not furnish the test to be applied in determining whether or not recognition should be given to the status acquired under the laws of another jurisdiction. If it were, the principle of comity between states and nations would become one of comparatively narrow application. The inquiry whose answer should determine whether recognition should be accorded by us to the status of persons elsewhere acquired is, whether or not there is any important matter of public policy here prevailing which would be contravened by such recognition.

Touching this inquiry, as applicable to the present situation, it is to be noted that recognition of the legitimacy of these children does not involve a recognition of the lawfulness of their parents' relations or condonation of their fault. California law does neither, and a recognition of the status of their offspring as their children neither does nor implies either; it concerns only the rights of the innocent offspring. It is further to be noted that the foreign law dealt with is not one legitimizing illegitimates, but one creating a legitimate status at birth. The claim for nonrecognition is one which contends that we should deny recognition of legitimacy to those who were born legitimate by the law of the place of the domicile of their parents at their birth, and, for that matter, although that may not be legally important, the place of their present domicile. It is to be noted again that legitimacy is by the California statute predicated upon a marriage in form. It is only where the parents have entered into a marriage in form that the issue are made legitimate.

Our public policy is one which insists upon the existence of the marriage relation between the parents as a condition precedent to the production of issue which society and the law will recognize as legitimate. We have long, in the interests of good morals and for the safeguarding of social purity and the sanctity of the home and family, insisted upon that condition. But we have not considered it either contrary to good morals or an invasion of the sanctity of the home and family, or as contrary to public policy, to restore children born out of wedlock to a legitimate status and the full enjoyment of the rights of legitimacy. By statute such children become legitimate upon the subsequent marriage of their parents. Gen. Statutes, § 396. From early times we have recognized that a child born out of wedlock was the child of its mother and capable of inheriting from her and through her. Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 279, 91 Atl. 191. In this our position has been unique among common-law jurisdictions in its liberality and considerate treatment of the illegitimate, and by it we have emphasized that it was not the policy of our law to visit the sins of the parents upon their innocent children nor our belief that