Amiens. The two ministers assured me that the Prussian proclamations in favor of the Bourbons have found an echo. I suppose that we are on the eve of a battle. Whatever the result, the present state of things cannot last. The ministers declare to me, in the presence of the arch-chancellor, that the administration is everywhere falling to pieces, that money is wanting, and that the system of requisition ends by alienating all hearts, and leaving the government to stand alone. However hard these truths may be, as they cannot reach your majesty through your ministers, I fulfill without hesitation the painful duty of acquainting you with them."

In a second letter, of the same day, he wrote:

"I have seen the minister of the interior. The plan of sending deputations from the dif ferent towns to the Council-General of Paris seems to him to be open to some objections. I share in this opinion, and I am sure that if your majesty had time to think again on the subject, you would relinquish the idea. [This objection seems to have been, that communication with these country deputies would rather tend to frighten the Parisians into submission than to encourage them to resistance.] "The ministers and the Duke of Conegliano [Marshal Moncey, who commanded the na tional guard recently organized for the defense of Paris] are also of opinion that it would be impossible to double the national guard of Paris (one of Napoleon's projects], without changing its nature. Besides, there still remains the unconquerable difficulty of the want of arms.

"As to the national guard, as it now stands, it is a safeguard against anarchy; it is well disposed; it enters into the views of the government; it was electrified by the account of the prodigies which have been performed by your majesty in such a short time; it wishes for peace to restore you to your capital; its attachment for you is equal to its admiration. The capital shares in those opinions; but to say more, Sire, would be to deceive oneself as well as your majesty. The people of Paris, hostile to the government a month ago. touched by your majesty's confidence, in trusting your wife and your son to them, encouraged and astonished by your majesty's successes, are yet not in a state in which more than mere fidelity and obedience can be expected. They admire your genius, but they can be excited only by the hope of a speedy peace, and they are by no means inclined to oppose any effective resistance to a hostile army, or to send detachments of the national guard beyond the walls This, Sire, is the exact truth. Your majesty must not rely on an exertion greater than can fairly be expected from a population so disposed."

To these unpalatable communications, Napoleon replied from Chartres (Feb. 23, 2 P. M.), as follows:

"My Brother: I have received your letters of the 22d. I am sorry to see that you continue to conjure up phantoms. The greater number of facts contained in your letters are untrue. The enemy is not at Amiens; the Duke of Dalmatia has not commenced his retreat. It is an old story that the Comte d'Artois is at Basle; it is not certain, nor docs

it much signify whether there be, or be not three hundred rebels in the county Venaissin; at all events, courage, patience, and presence of mind can overcome everything. But you will do nothing, if you collect together all sorts of reports, and excite your imagination by working them up into striking pictures. You will be cowed and hopeless.

"I do not deny that the state of affairs is very serious. Do not fancy that I am illinformed; ministers generally want presence of mind. Placards of addresses. from the dif ferent villages which have been invaded by the enemy, will produce an excellent effect. There is no objection to the council of the municipality of Paris receiving deputations, and hearing what they have to say. Let their addresses be full of facts, and placard them immediately. The inhabitants of Paris will see that they are threatened with rape, pillage, and fire. As to the notion of doubling the national guard, if you disapprove of it, I give it up. If I had listened to the ministers, I should not have formed a national guard, and I should have distrusted Paris.

"I am badly served in the north. General Maison is a man of narrow understanding and little energy. Let the minister of war repeat the instructions to him to issue from the fortified places, and to attack the enemy by falling in detail upon his quarters.

"I have written to the Duke of Castiglione [Augereau]. I have written to the empress to speak to his wife. I think that you ought to speak to her also, and make the ladies of the court do the same. He must advance, take example by me, and do himself honor. [Augereau, reinforced by several regiments of veteran troops of the Spanish army, had been repeatedly urged to operate against the flank and the communications of the enemy. He showed little alacrity in doing so, but had recently moved on Geneva.]

"The enemy sets fire to everything, and ap pears to have given up all thoughts of Paris The Prince of Schwartzenberg's aid-de-camp, with whom I have just conversed for some time, let it drop that they were very much alarmed by this movement of the Duke of Castiglione. [His movement on Geneva.]

"Well, we have thrown back the enemy's armies nearly to Langres. As I foretold, Montargis and Orleans are relieved; the Cossacks are flying as fast as they can in every direction. I have written to Borghese to order him to send six thousand men from his division to Chambery [to reinforce Augereau]; let the minister of war reiterate this order. Desire the minister likewise to repeat to the Duke of Dalmatia [Soult] the order not to retreat without fighting."

The next day (Feb. 24, 7 A. M.) Napoleon wrote from Troyes:

"The enemy besieges me with flags of truce,

demanding a suspension of hostilities. We shall, perhaps, settle upon granting one this morning; but only if the negotiations at Chatillon proceed on the basis of the conditions of Frankfort [the natural limits].

"If I had had twenty boats, to cross the Seine where I wanted, the Austrian army would have ceased to exist: at any rate, terror reigns in the ranks of the enemy. A few days ago they thought that I had no army; now their imagination sticks at nothing: three or four

hundred thousand men are not enough for them. They fancied that I had none but recruits; they now say that I have collected all my veterans, and that my armies consist of picked men; that the French army is better than ever, etc. See what is the effect of terror. The Parisian newspapers must confirm their fears. Newspapers are not history, any more than bulletins are history; one should always persuade the enemy that one's forces are immense.

"I do not agree with the remarks which have been made on the communications between the country and Paris; I wish my orders on the subject to be executed. The minister of the interior is a coward; he has absurd ideas about men. Neither he nor the minister of police knows more of France than I do of China. When the deputies from the country show the letters which they have received, the prefect must assemble the notaries to hear them read. This is not a got up thing, nor an imposture; the enemy has committed such atrocities that the whole of France will be indignant. Here, on the spot, the most moderate people speak of them with rage. If the French were as contemptible as the minister of the interior believes them to be, I should blush to be a Frenchman."

Napoleon wrote the next day (Feb. 25), at 4 P. M., still from Troyes:

"It seems that the enemy [the grand army under Schwartzenberg] is retreating towards Langres. General Blucher, after crossing the Aube and advancing on Mery [at which place a severe skirmish took place on the 23d], recrossed it yesterday, and marched upon Anglure with between eight and ten thousand men, the remainder of the corps which he commanded. [This was a great miscalculation on the part of Napoleon, and subsequently proved very disastrous to him. Napoleon Alattered himself that he had destroyed the army of Silesia; but in fact, Blucher, reinforced from the army under Bernadotte, had under his command some fifty thousand men, while Napoleon's own army at Troyes was but sixty-two thousand. The grand army, which had fallen back on Langres, was about seventy thousand.] As soon as I see what Blucher intends to do, I shall try to fall upon his rear and cut him off. The commissioners discussing the armistice are still sitting at Lusigny. It is said that the Crown-Prince of Sweden [Bernadotte] is at Cologne. Could you not, on your own responsibility, send some one to make him sensible of his folly, and persuade him to alter his conduct? Try, but do not implicate me."

The next day (Feb. 26), Napoleon, still at Troyes, wrote the following letter in relation to Murat:

"It seems that the allies have not yet ratified the treaty with the king of Naples. Dispatch by a courier, with the utmost haste, a letter to the king, in which you will frankly point out to him the iniquity of his conduct, offering to mediate for him if he will return to his duties. Tell him that this is his only hope; that if he take any other course, he must be destroyed either by France or by the allies. I need not point out all that you may say. Even the English do not recognize him as king. There is still time to save Italy, and to replace

the viceroy on the Adige. Write also to the queen [their sister Caroline, Murat's wife], on her ingratitude, which revolts even the allies. Say that as no battle has yet taken place between the French and Neapolitan troops, all may be arranged; but there is not a moment to lose. As Senator Fouché is still in those parts, you may write to him to converse with your messenger on these subjects. [Fouché was then at Rome, whither he had retired in disgrace, after being dismissed from the ministry of police, and it is thought that he had given advice to Murat not very favorable to Napoleon.]"

The same day, at 6 P. M., Napoleon again writes:

"The Austrian commandant of Chatillonsur-Seine quitted the town yesterday. [This was the place where the peace congress was sitting.] The congress in our hands, which proves how completely the plans of the enemy have been frustrated. Lord Castlereagh asked if he were safe; considering that he is not actually an ambassador, of course there can be no question. All that appertains directly or indirectly to the congress is protected by the law of nations."

The suggestions of Napoleon as to Bernadotte were immediately acted upon by Joseph, who dispatched the next day an urgent letter to Murat, based on Napoleon's hints. Of the attempt to open a communication with Bernadotte, Joseph gives the following account, in a letter dated March 13th, 11 P. M.:

"Sire: The person whom I sent to the Crown Prince of Sweden returned to-day; he left the prince at Liege on the 10th. If your majesty would like to question him, your orders will find him at the quarters of the Prince of Neufchatel [Berthier], for whom I have given him a letter. This person is a Frenchman, formerly Bernadotte's physician, and his wife's secretary for the last eight years; he is somewhat slow, but very sensible. The Prince of Sweden talks openly and perpetually about the Bourbons; he says that he is temporising, to give you an opportunity to make peace; he is anxious for it, in order to return home."

Napoleon replied on the 17th;

"I have seen the person attached to Madame Bernadotte's service, whom you sent to me. He gave me some important intelligence, as well as some that was false. If you can trust him, I think it would be useful to send him back

again, and to depute others, if it were only for the purpose of acquiring information as to those provinces. The Duke of Bassano [Marat] has written to desire Count d'Hauterive to send to you a copy of the declaration of the allies at Chatillon, that they four intend to treat for all the other powers. You may forward this paper confidentially to the CrownPrince, and advise him confidentially to endeavor to have a minister at the congress; for it cannot possibly be for the interest of Sweden that this quadrumvirate should take possession of the whole of Europe. She must continue to do what she has always donewatch over her own affairs herself. Before you send the person in question, make sure

that he is not a traitor, and entreat him to be perfectly discreet."

Meanwhile, before the date of this last quoted letter, important changes had taken place in the position of affairs. The negotiations for an armistice having failed, involving also the rejection of Napoleon's offer of peace on the basis of the natural limits, he set out on the 27th of February in pursuit of Blucher. Oudinot, Macdonald, and General Gerard were still at Bar-sur-Aube, to resist Schwartzenberg, whom, in a letter written at 5 P. M. of that day, from Arcissur-Aube, Napoleon represents as still falling back on Langres. That letter closes with the following paragraph:

"I have received some engravings of the king of Rome. I wish you to change the inscription, May God watch over my father and France,' to this, I pray God for my father and France; it is simpler. I also wish some copies to be struck off, representing the king in the uniform of the national guard."

Napoleon's plan was, to inclose Blueher between his own force and a detachment under Mortier and Marmont manoeuvering on the north bank of the Marne, and guarding Paris from attack by way of Reims.

On the 2d of March he was at Jouarre, whence he wrote to Joseph, directing him to assemble all the high dignitaries, and to lay before them all the papers in relation to the recent negotiations. "The Duke of Cadore [Champagny]," so this letter concluded," will take down all that each of them says. I do not ask for formal advice, but I wish to know different people's impressions." The same day, in the afternoon, he wrote from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, on the Marne :

"We may possibly meet with great success. I am preparing to carry the war into Lorraine, where I shall collect all the troops which are in garrison on the Meuse and the Rhine."

Here was the first hint of the famous manœuvre executed three weeks after, but which so signally failed in the result expected of it.

Of the meeting of ministers, to consider the documents relating to the negotiations for peace, Joseph, in a letter of the 4th, 6 P. M., gave the following account:

"All the members of the council seemed to be of one mind: the enemy's proposals were considered most unjust, and perfect confidence was expressed in whatever commands your majesty may think fit to give to your plenipotentiary, in order to enable France to benefit

immediately by the enormous sacrifices which are exacted of her. They are all convinced that your majesty will never submit to such sacrifices, unless driven to them by absolute necessity, and that your majesty is a better judge of this necessity than any one else can be.

"But they almost unanimously agreed in thinking that it would be better to accept conditions, reducing France to her limits in 1792, than to expose the capital. The occupation of the capital is dreaded as the end of the present state of things, and the commencement of great misfortunes. The whole of Europe joins in wishing to reduce France to what she was in 1792. Let it, therefore, be the foundation of a treaty which is rendered imperative by circumstances, but let the country be evacuated immediately.

"To sum up: an immediate peace, whatever may be the terms, is indispensable. It will be a truce lasting for two or three years; but, whether it be favorable or not, we must have peace. The emperor will obtain the best terms that he can. At this juncture it is sure to do good, as it will enable the emperor to pay exclusive attention to the interior, and a wise system of administration may place him in a position to regain what has been unjustly demanded and wisely yielded. The natural limits would be a real boon both for France and the rest of Europe: we might then hope for a lasting peace; but impossibility relieves from every obligation. Peace now is indispensable; it may be broken on the day when France is able to reassert her rights. Make, then, what in your breast you will consider as a mere truce, since the enemy's injustice will not permit you to make an equitable peace, and the does not allow you to hope from France efforts state of public feeling and of public affairs proportionate to the end to be attained.

"Whether your majesty be victorious or This is the summary of all that is spoken here, not, you must turn your thoughts to peace. and thought here."

While Joseph was writing this letter, Napoleon was at Fismes, whence he wrote, the same day, as follows:

"The enemy has been driven back in every direction. The Duke of Ragusa [Marmont] must be at Soissons, and my skirmishers before Reims. The enemy seems to be moving towards Saon and Avesnes; he is in the greatest confusion. He has sustained an immense loss in men, horses, and carriages.

"Send one of your officers to Troyes, to tell the Dukes of Taranto and Reggio [Macdonald and Oudinot] that I may possibly manœuvre by Vitry, St. Dizier, and Joinville, on the enemy's rear, which will set them free, as the enemy will be forced to abandon the Seine to fly to the assistance of his rear. One advantage of this operation will be, the raising the blockade of my fortresses, whence I shall draw large garrisons and reinforcements."

Here is another allusion to the plan of action which Napoleon finally adopted. The letter concludes with reiterated complaints against General Maison, commanding in Belgium, for want of activity in harassing the enemy by sal

lies from the fortresses, and directing orders to be sent him to that effect, and also to Augereau, at Lyons, to press hard on the enemy's flank and rear. But that very day Augereau had given over his march on Geneva, which had greatly alarmed the allies, and, in a state of dissatisfaction, was falling back on Macon. On the points referred to at the beginning of the letter, Napoleon was also destined to be disappointed. Marmont was not at Soissons, and Macdonald and Oudinot had been already driven out of Troyes by Schwartzenberg. The two following letters show how much these events interfered with Napoleon's plans, and the vexation they

caused him:

"Fismes, March 5, 1814. I thought that the Duke of Ragusa (Marmont) would have been yesterday at Soissons; but the commandant basely evacuated the town without firing a shot. He retreated with all his troops, with the honors of war, and six pieces of cannon; he is at Villers-Cotterets. I have ordered the minister of war to have him arrested, brought before a court-martial, and shot. He must be executed in the Place de Grève, with the utmost publicity: the sentence must be printed, and its grounds well stated. Five generals must be appointed to try him. This business has done us incalculable harm. I should have reached Laon to-day, and I have no doubt that the enemy would have been routed and cut to pieces. I must now manœuvre, and lose time in constructing bridges. See that, at least, an example is made."

66

Béry-au-Bac [on the Aisne], March 6, 1814, noon. If the Duke of Taranto [Macdonald] is ill, he must give up the command to the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot], and place General Sebastiani at the head of the 11th corps. I am assured that Troyes has just been evacuated. [Oudinot and Gérard had been driven out of Bar-sur-Aube, after a sharp action on the 27th of February, by the readvance of the grand army under Schwartzenberg; but Napoleon, in a letter of the 4th of March, had expressed himself well enough satisfied with their retreat, as Bar-sur-Aube was not a position that could be held.] I cannot believe in such incapacity. There can be no finer position than Troyes, where the enemy is forced to manœuvre on both banks. I am going to drive the enemy to-day towards Laon, I shall then march upon Chalons and Arcis. It is indispensable to hold the Seine for five or six days at Nogent, Bray, and Montereau. I could not be worse seconded than I am. I left a splendid army and excellent cavalry at Troyes; but the soul is wanting. I am sure that this army is stronger in the field than any which Prince Schwartzenberg can oppose to it. Consult the minister of war: a sick general is worse than anything."

The difficulty, however, was not in the sickness of Macdonald--Joseph wrote the next day that he was perfectly well-but in the overwhelming force of the enemy, and the necessity of falling back in order to cover Paris.

Having failed in an attack [March 6] on Soissons, Napoleon crossed the Aisne at Béry-au-Bac, and on the 7th attacked Marshal Blucher at Craonne, but with no other result than to drive him back a few miles to the strong position of Laon. That formidable position Napoleon attacked on the 8th, 9th, and 10th, but was repulsed, and retreated to Chavignon.

In the mean time, affairs at Paris grew more alarming. Joseph wrote on the 8th:

"The news from the Duke of Dalmatia's

We

[Soult's] army increases our alarm. already see the English at Bordeaux; nor do we see how their progress is to be arrested, unless it be opposed by the Duke of Dalmatia in the centre of France. The Austrian army [Schwartzenberg's] is on the Seine, and we are uneasy that your majesty should be at such a distance from us. The Dukes of Taranto and Reggio [Macdonald and Oudinot] do not agree: no good can come of the combined services of these two marshals.

"It is most important that your majesty should proceed instantly to the Seine, and the neighborhood of your capital; considering what is passing on the Garonne, the consequences of the occupation of Paris are to be feared."

The next day, at 11 A. M., Joseph acknowledged the receipt of Napoleon's letter, giving an account of the battle of Craonne, and proceeded as follows:

"I presume that Soissons is ours, and that you are drawing nearer to Paris in that direction. This is indispensable. The Duke of Taranto's [Macdonald's] army seems to have been outflanked on the left; detachments of the enemy have entered Sézanne, and even advanced as far as Coulommiers. The funds fell yesterday to 51. The Duke of Dalmatia's movements cause the greatest anxiety with respect to Bordeaux, which might easily become a hot-bed of civil war. After your recent victory, you may honorably sign a peace on the ancient limits. Such a peace would restore the prosperity of France after the long strug. gle that began in 1792; and there would be nothing dishonorable to her in it, as she would lose no portion of her territory, and has arranged her affairs at home as she saw fit."

This letter closed with an appeal to Napoleon to return to his "natural kindness," and, renouncing his "assumed character and perpetual efforts," to "consent to relinquish the part of the wonderful man for that of the great sovereign."

In reply to Joseph's appeals to draw near Paris, Napoleon wrote from Chavignon, March 10:

"Paris is in greater danger from this army [Blucher's] than from that of Schwartzenberg. Nevertheless, I will draw near to Soissons, in order to be more within reach of Paris; but

until I have been able to obtain another victory over this army, I can hardly proceed elsewhere. The detachments which Schwartzenberg's army has sent to its rear have considerably diminished its strength. and it seems to fear to venture to cross the Seine."

The letter closes with a project for raising thirty thousand men from among the masses who had taken refuge in Paris, and the workmen without employment.

Joseph wrote the next day, that the ministers of the interior and of the police were of opinion that it was utterly impossible to find a thousand men who would leave Paris to join the army. He had written at midnight, on the 9th, that there were no longer any disposable men in Paris, as they had all been sent to join the army in the field. As early as the 25th of February he had noticed the almost entire stoppage in the arrival of conscripts. In the letter of the 11th he enclosed a return, furnished by the minister of war, showing that, so far from having thirty thousand muskets, there were not six thousand fit for service.

This letter concluded as follows: "Unpleasant reports, tending to diminish the popularity of your majesty, are beginning to circulate in the capital. For instance, it is said that the Duke of Conegliano [Moncey, who commanded the national guard], who is liked, is about to be recalled; that he is to be replaced by General Sebastiani, who has been here for the last five days; that the Duke of Padua will shortly arrive; that he is to be em

the blame of the repulse at Laon on Marmont, whose behavior he described as "that of an ensign." His young guard, he stated, was melting away

like a snow-ball," his horse-guard was also disappearing rapidly. The old guard was still in good order. He urged all possible attention to the remounting of his cavalry, and suggested some redoubts at Montmartre, not only as of use for defense, "especially with regard to their moral effect," but as a means of charity to the unemployed. In reference to these fortifications, he wrote, on the 13th, from Soissons :

"Before commencing the fortifications of Paris, I must see the plan; the one which was sent to me seems to me to be very complicated; I want something simple. The people complain everywhere of the mayors and authorities, who prevent them from defending themselves. I see that in Paris it is just the same. The people possess energy and good faith. I fear greatly that the difficulty consists in the unwillingness to fight of certain principal personages, who will be confounded, after the event has taken place, by finding what will be their own fate."

fended. The month of March is slipping away, yet the fields are not sown. It is, however, superfluous to enter into further details. Your majesty must feel that there is no longer any remedy but peace, an immediate peace. Every day that is lost is mischievous to our personal popularity. Individual distress is extreme; and on the day when it is believed that your majesty has preferred prolonging the war to making even a disadvantageous peace, there is no doubt that disgust will incline the public mind in another direction. If Toulouse or Bordeaux should set up a Bourbon, you will have civil war, and the immense population of Paris will support the side which promises to give them peace soonest.

Such is the state of opinion; no one can change it. This being the case, the only way is, to submit. If the peace be unfavorable, it will be no fault of yours, as all classes here insist upon it. I cannot be mistaken, as my view is that of all the world. We are on the eve of total destruction; our only hope is in peace."

In a letter written the same day, from Chavignon, Napoleon stated that finding the position of the enemy at Laon too strong to be attacked without severe loss, he had determined on returning to Soissons. He sought to lay VOL. VIII.-5

gestions:

"If it suited me to remove the Duke of Conegliano, all the idle talk of Paris would have no effect. The national guard of Paris is a part of the people of France, and as long as I live I will be master everywhere in France. Your character is opposed to mine; you like to flatter people, and to yield to their wishes; I like them to try to please me, and to obey my wishes. I am as much a sovereign now as I was at Austerlitz. Do not permit any person to flatter the national guard, nor Regnaud nor any one else to set himself up as their tribune. I suppose, however, that they see that there is some difference between the time of La Fayette, when the people ruled, and the present time, when I rule.

"I have issued a decree for raising twelve battalions in Paris, out of the levée en masse. On no pretext must the execution of this measure be delayed. I have written my wishes on this subject to the ministers of the interior and of the police. If the people find that, instead of doing what is for their good, one is trying to please them, it is quite natural that they should think that they have the upper hand, and that they should entertain but a mean opinion of those in authority over them."

The same day, in contemplation of the movement into the rear of the ene