published the letter set out in the information, and whether the inuendoes imputed a particular meaning to particular words, as that "the kmeant His Majesty King George III.; that it was not for them to decide whether the publication, as alleged by the counsel for the Crown, was false and libellous; for whether it was libellous or innocent was a mere question of law, upon which the opinion of the Court might be taken "by a demurrer, or a motion in arrest of judgment."

After a prolonged deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of "Guilty of the printing and publishing only." Thereafter, two applications were made to the Court of King's Bench; the first, by the defendant, to stay judgment; the second, by the Crown, to enter the verdict according to the legal finding of the jury. After listening to elaborate arguments, Lord Mansfield delivered the opinion of the Court in favour of a new trial—

"Had the verdict," he said, "been simply 'guilty of printing and publishing,' we should have thought that it ought to be entered generally for the Crown; but we cannot exclude the word 'only,' and this appears to negative something charged in the information which the jury thought was submitted to them. Where there are more charges than one, ‘guilty of some only' is an acquittal as to the rest; but in this information there is no charge except for printing and publishing; clearly there can be no judgment of acquittal, because the fact found against the defendant by the jury is the very crime they had to try. That the law is as I stated to the jury has been so often unanimously agreed by the whole Court, upon every report I have made of a trial for a libel, that it would be improper to make it a question now in this place. Among those who have concurred, the bar will recollect the dead and the living not now here. And we all again declare our opinion that the direction was right and according to law. Can any meaning be affixed to the word 'only'

which may affect the verdict? If they meant to say 'they did not find it a libel,' or 'did not find the epithets false and malicious,' it would not affect the verdict, because none of these things were to be proved or found either way. It is impossible to say with certainty what the jury really did mean. Probably they had different meanings. It is possible some of them might mean not to find the whole sense put upon part of the words by the inuendoes in the information. If there be a meaning favourable to the defendant which by possibility the words will bear, he ought not to be convicted. Therefore we order the verdict to be set aside, and that there shall be a new trial.”

No new trial took place, the Crown lawyers being perfectly well aware that no jury would find the publisher of Junius guilty—at least, no jury in the city of London.

In the case of Miller, Mansfield's direction to the jury was couched in the same spirit; laying down the erroneous and pernicious doctrine-long since eliminated from English law—that the juries could decide only the fact of publication and the inuendoes. In laying down this doctrine he did nothing morally wrong; he followed the example of his predecessors, and was supported by the unanimous opinion of his fellow-judges; but it is surprising that his enlightened and powerful mind did not see the issues which could not fail to flow from it. As his ruling was favourable to the action of the Government, it was not unnaturally supposed to have been influenced by political motives, and provoked very general censure. In the public press he was bitterly assailed by Junius.

"Our language," said the anonymous vituperator, "has no term of reproach, the mind has no idea of detestation, which has not already been happily applied to you, and exhausted. Ample

justice has been done by abler pens than mine to the separate merits of your life and character. Let it be my humble office to collect the sweets till their united virtue tortures the sense.

"Permit me to begin with paying a just tribute to Scotch. sincerity wherever I find it. I own I am not apt to confide in the professions of gentlemen of that country; and when they smile, I feel an involuntary erection to guard myself against mischief. With this general opinion of an ancient nation, I always thought it much to your lordship's honour that in your earlier days you were but little infected with the prudence of your country. You had some original attachments which you took every proper opportunity to acknowledge. The liberal spirit of youth prevailed over your native discretion. Your zeal in the cause of an unhappy prince was expressed with the sincerity of wine and some of the solemnities of religion. This, I conceive, is the most amiable point of view in which your character has appeared. Like an honest man you took that part in politics which might have been expected from your birth, education, country, and connections. There was something generous in your attachment to the House of Stuart. We lament the mistake of a good man, and do not begin to detest him until he affects to renounce his principles. Why did you not adhere to that loyalty you once professed? Why did you not follow the example of your worthy brother? With him you might have shared in the honour of the Pretender's confidence ; with him you might have preserved the integrity of your character; and England, I think, might have spared you without regret. Your friends will say, perhaps, that although you deserted the fortunes of your liege lord, you have adhered firmly to the principles which drove his father from the throne; that without openly supporting the person, you have done essential service to the cause, and consoled yourself for the loss of a favourite family by reviving and re-establishing the maxims of their Government. This is the way in which a Scotchman's understanding converts the errors of his heart. My lord, J

acknowledge the truth of the defence, and can trace it throughout all your conduct. I see through your whole life one uniform plan to enlarge the power of the Crown at the expense of the liberty of the subject."

It must be confessed that this is brilliant writing, and that there is a deadly ingenuity in the way in which the writer compliments Mansfield on that part of his conduct which he would willingly have had forgotten.

Mansfield suffered much in public estimation from his alliance with Lord Bute, and the influence he exercised, or was supposed to exercise, over the politics of the Cabinet. He laid himself open to attack, moreover, by presiding on the woolsack as Speaker of the House of Lords, and virtually exercising almost all the functions of the Lord Chancellor, while keeping the great seal in commission. To our modern ideas the position of Chief Justice seems incompatible with that of an active member of the Government, and the combination of political partisanship with judicial administration cannot but be productive of unfortunate consequences. Mansfield himself was probably not unconscious of this fact, and refrained from replying to the invectives of Junius, because he felt that they were not without justification. The Attorney-General advised a prosecution; but the Chief Justice prudently refused to allow Junius another opportunity for inquiring into all the circumstances of his political career.

At this time his hands were fully occupied in defending himself against parliamentary assaults. In the House of Commons, Mr. Sergeant Glyn moved for a committee to inquire into the proceedings of the judges in Westminster Hall, particularly in cases relating to the liberty of the

press; and in the course of the debate, Mansfield's conduct was severely censured by Dunning and Edmund Burke.

In the House of Lords the attack was still more formidable. It was led by the Earl of Chatham, and supported by Lord Camden. The defence was not without dignity:

"Judges," said Mansfield, "cannot go astray from the express and known law of the land. They are bound by oath punctually to follow the law. I have ever made it the rule of my conduct to do what was just, and, conscious of my own integrity, am able to look with contempt upon libels and libellers. Before the noble lord, therefore, arraigns my judicial character, he should make himself acquainted with facts. The scurrility of a newspaper may be good information for a coffee-house politician, but a peer of Parliament should always speak from higher authority; though, if my noble accuser is no more acquainted with the principles of law in the present point than in what he advanced to support the motion, when he told us an action would lie against the House of Commons for expelling Mr. Wilkes, I am fearful the highest authorities will not extend his ideas of jurisprudence, nor entitle him to a patient hearing upon a legal question in this assembly."

Lord Chatham rejoined :

"If I conceive the noble lord on the woolsack right, or have been rightly informed by the public prints-from which, I candidly confess, I originally derived my information on the subject -the doctrine of the King's Bench is, that a libel or not a libel is a question of law to be decided only by the court, and the sole power of the jury is to determine upon the fact of printing and publishing. This I understand to be the noble lord's opinion, but this I never understood to be the law of England; on the contrary, I always understood that the jury were competent judges of the law as well as of the fact, and, indeed, if they are not, I