III. 1776. CHAP. take an active part in this opposition, and declaimed in no measured terms against the director-general. But Necker's ideas of alteration went a great deal further; and, in truth, the state of the finances, on the eve of the breaking out of war with England, imperatively required an entire change of system. What he proposed rested on two bases,-1. The establishment of a general estimate of the expenses of every department, to be laid, by the minister at the head of it, at the beginning of each financial year, before the King for his consideration and approval; and, 2. The introduction of a greater degree of publicity into the accounts of the nation, in order to reassure the capitalists as to the real extent of the national resources, and prepare the way for negotiating those extensive loans, without which it was evident that the prosecution of hostilities would be impossible.1* 1 Soul. iv. 43, 45. Biog. Univ. xxxi. 9. 50. Character of Necker, Necker owed his appointment entirely to the embarrassments of the court, and the absolute necessity of negotiatand his plans ing loans on the eve of the American war. But being of finance. strongly attached, at once from early association, political principle, and religious impression, to free institutions, he endeavoured to make the difficulties of the government the means of emancipating the people. His system was boldly to face the public accounts, to make no secret to the world of the excess of the expenditure above the receipts, and to reduce them ultimately to a level by a rigid system * "It is a general survey of the financial state of the kingdom which can alone lead to wise and salutary determinations; and it is because such a survey has been constantly avoided during the preceding reign, that the finest kingdom in the world is now unable to enjoy its resources. Influential ministers, governing respectively the foreign relations, the army and the navy of the kingdom, expended at will immense sums: and feeble comptrollers-general, vain of their office, and desirous of continuing to enjoy it, sought to provide for these expenses, sometimes by a loan, sometimes by a tax, sometimes by a bankruptcy; and the national prosperity of France, from which such resources might have been drawn, served only to repair in a certain degree the effect of these disorders. The first step in reformation is to establish it as a fundamental principle, that at a certain time in the year-in the month of October, for example-the respective ministers of departments should each submit a scheme of their proposed expenses to the King, to be considered and approved of by him as a whole, and with reference to the general resources of the revenue."—NECKER, Mémoire à Louis XVI., 8th Aug. 1776; SOULAVIE, iv. 45. III. 1776. of general economy. He proposed to meet the public CHAP. exigencies in ordinary periods by taxation, in extraordinary by loans; to familiarise the people to the former, by obtaining the consent of the provincial parliaments, and gain them over to the latter, by giving perfect publicity to the public accounts. Thus both parts of his system were favourable to the progress of freedom-the taxes by leading to the States-general, and the loans by compelling a publication of the accounts; the former by establishing a legal organ for popular influence, the latter by opening a channel for public opinion. His private character was unexceptionable. Possessed of immense wealth, he made a noble use of it. When appointed minister of finance, he went a step beyond Turgot's rejection of the free gift of the farmers of the revenue-he refused the whole emoluments of office: an example of disinterestedness which excited the jealousy, as it was beyond the power of imitation, of the courtiers. His private charity was unbounded, his religious principles pure and sincere alike removed from the rancour of Protestant sectarianism and the arrogance of Romish domination. A faithful husband, an upright man, liberal, without either pride or prodigality, he would have been a perfect private citizen. But as a statesman he had qualities to the last degree dangerous. He had a vein of ostentatious and secret vanity, joined to a devout faith in human perfectibility, and an extrava- Soul. iv; gant belief in popular virtue and disinterestedness, which i. 16. Lac. afterwards, by making him sacrifice every thing to his Lab. ii. 33. love of popularity, brought unprecedented disasters on the monarchy. 1 1 40,45. Mig. v. 25, 32. Turgot and The first subject of moment on which Necker was 51. required to give an opinion, after he had been called to Views of the royal councils, was the question, whether France Necker on should interfere to support the insurgents of America in the Ameritheir contest with Great Britain. Turgot had strongly opposed the proposal of going to war; and in a very remarkable memoir, laid before Louis XVI., had given the can war. III. 1776. CHAP. clearest proof of the justice of his views and the solidity of his understanding. He resisted it on the ground, that the expense with which it would necessarily be attended would prove entirely destructive to all other plans of economy which had been formed, and on which the ultimate extrication of the finances from their present difficulties was dependent; that the opinion so generally entertained, that the emancipation of the colonies would prove fatal to the mother country, was erroneous, inasmuch as, in such an event, she would from previous habit and present interest retain their commerce, while she would escape from the burden of maintaining and defending these colonies; and that the strength of England would be much more effectually weakened by allowing the contest to be prolonged. In that case, if unsuccessful, she would be seriously tarnished in her reputation; if successful, burdened with a costly and discontented distant possession, which would give her the name of dominion and the reality of expense. Necker, when introduced into the cabinet, entirely concurred in this opinion, and in an especial manner insisted on the ruin which would inevitably ensue to the finances if a costly war were commenced, when the nation was unable to make head against its ordinary Sept. 1776. pacific expenditure. The other ministers concurred in these opinions, and it was unanimously determined in the cabinet to persevere in a system of neutrality, and to afford only secret and clandestine succour to the insurgents.1 1 Droz, i. 234, 235. Soul. iv. 40, 46. 52. Growing But the period had now arrived when, on great questions in which the public took a warm interest in France, the French the substantial direction of affairs was taken out of the in favour of hands of government, and placed in those of the agitators interest of the insur gents. of the capital. Various causes had recently combined to render the feelings excited in favour of the American insurgents peculiarly warm, and the desire to assist them in the end irresistible. There is a natural sympathy in all generous minds with the weaker party engaged in a contest with a stronger, and on behalf of people contending III. 1777. for their liberties against their real or supposed oppressors. This general feeling was strongly increased in the present instance by the calm and dignified deportment and language of the leaders of the Americans, and the enthusiastic admiration with which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of freedom, every popular insurrection against an established government was regarded. It was urged, that it was in a peculiar manner incumbent on the French government to interfere on the present occasion, as the aid to be tendered would, in all probability, dissolve the British colonial empire, destroy its maritime superiority, efface the disgrace of 1763, and by one single effort extinguish the rivalry of four centuries. All classes concurred in clamouring for the war with England. The philosophers and democratic party had a natural sympathy for every people, from whatever cause, engaged in a contest with an established government; the young officers of the army sighed for promotion, and made the saloons of Versailles resound with declamations in favour of a gallant nation struggling for its liberties; the commercial towns, already enriched by the consequences of the rupture of 1 Droz, i. Great Britain with her colonies, anticipated still greater 235, 262. advantages from the participation of France in the contest, 347, 348. and loudly demanded the immediate commencement of hostilities. 1 Soul. iii. America, and the war with Eng Pressed by so many concurring passions and interests, 53. the King and the Queen, who long held out almost alone France joins in the court against the war, were obliged to give way. Maurepas, true to his uniform system of yielding to external pressure when it became violent, and thus avoiding the risk of all collision, got Vergennes, the minister of foreign affairs, to prepare a plan which he flattered himself would secure all the advantages of the proposed co-operation with the insurgents, without incurring any of its dangers. This was to conclude, in the first instance, only a treaty of commerce with the revolted colonies. England, it was urged, could not object to such a pacific relation VOL. I. U III. 1778. CHAP. with states which had, de facto, established their independence; and, accordingly, the French minister at London received instructions to represent that the cabinet of Versailles had no intention of injuring Great Britain by these measures.* As it was foreseen, however, that so flimsy a pretext would be speedily seen through by that great power, provision was, at the same time, made against its resentment, by the conclusion of a secret treaty, offensive and defensive, with the Americans, by which it was stipulated that neither of the contracting powers should conclude a separate peace, and that they should mutually assist each other, in the event of a rupture between France and England, with all their forces. Both treaties were Feb.6,1778. signed by the French minister on the same day, and they led immediately to the result which was anticipated—the recall of the British ambassador at Paris. But Louis, who had been literally concussed, against his better judgment, into this decisive, and, as it proved, ruinous Soul. iii. step, recorded his protest on the margin of the latest 348, Droz, memorial presented to him by his ministers, in these words: "What a situation! Is it necessary that reasons of state and a great warlike design should compel me to sign orders contrary alike to my heart and my opinions ?"1+ i. 262, 263. Camp. i, 234, 235. Martens. Unbounded was the enthusiasm which the long-wished for war with England excited throughout France. Such was the universal transport, that nobles of the highest rank *This is just what Great Britain did with the insurgent South American colonies in 1824. It is remarkable how exactly, in both cases, diplomatic astuteness, to disguise a disgraceful, but, as it was thought, profitable breach of national faith, resorted to the same flimsy and unworthy disguise. Both have since felt the full consequences of their injustice: France in the impulse thereby given to the causes which were inducing the Revolution of 1789; England in the wide-spread distress consequent on the destruction of the South American mines, which terminated in the Reform Revolution of 1832.-Vide infra, Chap. lxvii. § 86 et seq.; and Tables in Appendix there referred to, where this most curious and important subject is explained. + Joseph II., Emperor of Germany, as well as his sister, Marie Antoinette, clearly perceived the ultimate consequence of the King of France allying himself with the American insurgents. At the time the treaty was signed he was at Versailles, and on being asked his advice on the prospects of the Americans, replied, "I must beg to decline; my business is that of a royalist.”—WEBER, i. 121. |