CHAP. III. 1789. enough to fix by a royal edict in what way the votes were to be taken in the States-general; and yet he had resolved in his own mind that the separation of the orders could not be maintained, and that the sooner and the more quietly the fusion took place the better. His great object was to get the privileged classes themselves to concede at once, and with a good grace, what could not ultimately be avoided; and in this way alone, he maintained, the dangers of the crisis could be averted. Thus, well knowing to what the general opinion was pointing, he left the matter, so far as authority went, unsettled-the most Réflexions perilous course which could at such a moment by possi- i. 175, 195. bility have been adopted; for it stimulated revolt at the De Stael, very time when it was most dangerous, and prepared from success the fatal belief, alike in its supporters and opponents, that popular power was irresistible.1 1 Necker's sur la Rév. i. 210, 213. Smyth's Fr. Rev. i. 151, 152. 145. which led these views It may appear strange how a monarch, possessing the good sense and penetration which distinguished Louis XVI., Reasons and who had had such ample experience, in the preced- Louis XVI. ing part of his reign, of the futility of all hopes of social to adopt regeneration founded on the expectation of disinterested of Necker. virtue in mankind, should have been led away by these illusions the more especially as he was so far from being blinded by the foolish Anglomania then generally prevalent, that he entertained a thorough, perhaps even an exaggerated, distrust of every thing adopted from an English model. But the secret reason which inclined him go into Necker's views of the fusion of the orders was to this and when once stated its force becomes very apparent. His whole life had been one continued contest with his subjects; but it was with the higher classes alone that he had been brought into collision, and their selfish, obstinate à l'estime de la nation; et cette voix du peuple, alors non encore altérée, avait pour lui quelque chose de divin. Le moindre nuage sur sa réputation était la plus grande souffrance que les choses de la vie pussent lui causer. Le but mondain de ses actions, le vent de terre qui le faisait naviguer, c'était l'amour de la considération. Pendant 1788, M. Necker étudia constamment l'esprit public comme la boussole à laquelle les décisions du roi devaient se conformer."DE STAEL, Rév. Franc. i. 94, 172. VOL. I. 2 D III. 1789. 1 Necker, i. 146. nicious results. CHAP. resistance to any social amelioration, or just measures of any kind, had profoundly afflicted his benevolent heart. The necessities of the exchequer absolutely required a consent on the part of the nation to increased burdens; but he had found, by experience, that all attempts to get the privileged classes either to submit to taxation themselves, or to register new taxes, so as to render them a legal burden on others, were ineffectual. Finally, he had been personally hurt at the determined resistance of the Notables to his just proposal for an equalisation of the public burdens, and not less so at the impassioned resistance of all 86, 97, 135. the parliaments of France, and the nobles of Brittany and Dauphiné, to his cour plénière and relative ameliorations. 1 He had thus, not unnaturally, come to entertain a belief, Their per- that still, as in feudal times, the real antagonist power which the crown had to contend with was that of the noblesse, who seemed now determined only on maintaining their own unjust privileges, to the entire stoppage of all measures likely to conduce to the public good; and that it was only by a union with the Tiers Etat that the King could either obtain the supplies requisite for carrying on the government, or be enabled to establish the ameliorations become essential in the public administration. To accomplish these objects, a union of the orders and voting by head appeared to be indispensable; for every project for the public good would be thrown out by the selfish resistance of the privileged classes in their separate houses. Referring to the past, these views appeared to be entirely supported by French history-for it was by elevating the boroughs, and relying on the support of the commons, that Louis XI., and after him Cardinal Richelieu, had reared up a counterpoise to the power of the feudal nobility. And yet this opinion overturned the monarchy, in consequence of the fatal mistake which it involved that of supposing that the principal thing to be done was the discovering means to overcome the resistance of the nobles, whereas the real point was to erect a barrier, III. 1789. by the combination of all the power and property in CHAP. the kingdom, against the encroachments of the people. Another instance, among the numerous ones which history affords, of the important truth, that while experience is the only secure guidance for the statesman, it is experience in parallel circumstances that is alone to be relied on ; and that, in the perpetual change of human affairs, the 176. De highest effort of political wisdom is to discern correctly 241, 247. when that similarity of circumstances has taken place.1 1 Necker, i. Stael, i. wrong at of the Re The French Revolution, the greatest and most impas- 147. sioned effort ever made by man for the attainment of Who did public freedom, has failed in its object; and failed not this period only at the time, but for ever. This is now generally volution? admitted, alike by its supporters and opponents; nor can it be denied by any with the slightest show of reason, when it is recollected that, half a century after the Revolution broke out, and after its progress has been marked by unutterable calamities, the electors of France are under two hundred thousand that they are confined to the class of proprietors, and the entire remainder of the nation is wholly unrepresented that no habeas corpus act, or restraint upon prolonged imprisonment, has yet been established that the odious fetters of the police system are unremoved that the taxes are twice as heavy, the standing army twice as large, the land-tax twice as burdensome, as they were before the Revolution: that Paris is permanently garrisoned by forty thousand regular soldiers, and restrained by a girdle of forts placed around its suburbs; and that the whole remainder of France is obliged to submit without a murmur to any government which the dominant capital chooses to impose. Rejecting, as contrary alike to reason and religion, and as decisively disproved by the examples of Rome in ancient, and Great Britain in modern times, the gloomy doctrine that such consequences are the unavoidable result of the struggles of a great nation for freedom, the question recurs-the allimportant question-What has occasioned this failure? III. 1789. CHAP. And it will be evident to every candid observer that the cause of it is to be found, not in any stern necessity, but in that common fountain of social and individual evil— the selfishness and guilt of the persons intrusted with its direction. And the important question here occursWho did wrong in this stage of the Revolution? 148. into the American war. I. The whole nation, and, in an especial manner, the The forcing popular and democratic leaders, were in fault in forcing the King, alike against his own judgment and that of his Queen and council, to engage in the American war. That aggression, alike unjust towards an allied and friendly power, and inexpedient as tending to render inextricable the already alarming embarrassments of the exchequer, contributed powerfully to bring on the Revolution. It at once doubled the strength of the democratic party, by combining national rivalry of England with a contest of an insurgent people against their government, and halved the power of resistance in the crown, by the vast addition which it made to the national debt, at a time when the selfish resistance of the parliaments to the registering of new taxes rendered it impossible to make any lasting provision for the payment even of its interest. National bankruptcy or a revolution were rendered unavoidable by forcing the King into such a contest, at a time when the state of the finances and the temper of the public mind made it impossible to provide for its expenses. 149. nobles and clergy in resisting equal taxation. II. The nobles and clergy did wrong in refusing to Fault of the equalise the public imposts, and relinquish their exclusive privileges in the matter of taxation. This was not merely a flagrant piece of injustice towards their fellow-citizens, then burdened exclusively with the heaviest part of the direct taxes, but a manifest dereliction of duty-it may almost be said an act of treachery-towards their sovereign, in the predicament into which they had brought him. They had cordially concurred with the Tiers Etat in forcing him into the American war, which had so immensely increased the embarrassments of the treasury; they had III. 1789. for long drawn the chief benefit from those numerous civil CHAP. and military offices which constituted so large a part of the public expenditure; and they had strenuously and successfully resisted the numerous efforts made by the King and his ministers to reduce this unnecessary part of the national charges. It was in an especial manner incumbent on them, therefore, to contribute their fair proportion to the national income, and relieve the King from the perplexity into which, by their efforts and for their benefit, he had been brought. Instead of this, they refused to depart from one iota of their exclusive privileges, and, without doing or suggesting any thing whatever to save their sovereign or their country, contented themselves with opposing an inert passive resistance to every project calculated either to increase the public income, or remove the grievances that were complained of. Whoever has had practical acquaintance with the almost invincible repugnance of mankind generally, and of none more than the highest landed proprietors of every country, to direct taxation, even for the most useful and necessary purposes, if not absolutely called for by dangers which strike the senses, will have no difficulty in appreciating both the magnitude of the embarrassment which this resistance imposed on the sovereign, and the guilt of those who, for their own selfish purposes, occasioned it. 150. ments did wrong in register the III. The parliament of Paris, and the other parliaments of France, did wrong in refusing, in the manner they did, The parliato register the loans and taxes which the King sent to them for their sanction. That this power with which refusing to they were constitutionally invested, of refusing their con- taxes. sent to new taxes, was a most important one, and constituted the only barrier remaining against despotic power, is indeed certain. If, therefore, they had made use of it to compel the sovereign to abrogate pernicious privileges, or consent to salutary improvements, they would have been real patriots, and have deserved the eternal gratitude of mankind. But though, under the corruptions of the preceding |