III. 1789. CHAP. reign, they had often done this, under the beneficent rule of the patriotic Louis the case was very different. They then showed no disposition to concur in the reforms of the sovereign; suggested little or nothing for social amelioration; sturdily resisted all such when introduced by the government; threw out all attempts to subject themselves to the common burdens of the state; but contented themselves with a determined resistance to the imposition of any new taxes, even though rendered necessary by the American war, for which they had so loudly clamoured, and though plainly indispensable to save the nation from national bankruptcy. The pretext for this conduct—viz., that they were entitled to have the public accounts submitted to them before they consented to new taxes—was a manifest usurpation. What right had they, who were not the representatives of any portion of the people, but simple magistrates, invested with judicial functions in virtue of offices which they had bought for money, to erect themselves into a states-general or privy council, entitled to examine and control the whole administration of government? Even if they had possessed such a power, was it expedient to assert it, to the effect of involving the King in inextricable pecuniary embarrassments, and convulsing the nation by the convocation of the States-general, at the very time when the unparalleled excitement in the public mind rendered it evident that such a step was fraught with the utmost danger both to the stability of the monarchy and to the cause of freedom? 151. Necker's fatal error in the convocation of the Statesgeneral. Effect of his concessions. IV. Necker as clearly erred in the regulations which he laid down in the royal edict of 27th December, for the convocation of the States-general. The effect of these concessions has thus been described by the man in existence who gained most by the Revolution, Napoleon Buonaparte "The concessions of Necker were the work of a man ignorant of the first principles of the government of mankind. It was he who overturned the monarchy, and brought Louis XVI. to the scaffold. Marat, 109. III. Danton, Robespierre himself, did less mischief to France: CHAP. he brought on the Revolution, which they consummated. Such reformers as M. Necker do incredible mischief. The 1789. thoughtful read their works; the populace are carried away by them—the public happiness is in every mouth— and soon after, the people find themselves without bread: they revolt, and society is overturned. Necker was the author of all the evils which desolated France during the Revolution - all the blood that was shed rests on his head."1 Making every allowance for the despotic feelings 1 Bour. viii. which so strongly characterised the French Emperor, it is impossible to deny that there is much truth in these observations. Admitting that a struggle was inevitable, the question remains, Was it expedient to make so extraordinary an addition to the powers of the people at such a crisis to double the number of the popular representatives on the eve of a conflict? The result proved that it was not. It was intended to conciliate-it had the effect of alienating it was meant to attach the people to the throne it made them combine for its overthrow it was designed to produce oblivion of past injury it induced ambition of future elevation. -- 152. conciliation sion. Timely concession, it is frequently said, is the only way to prevent a revolution. The observation is just in one Limits of sense, but erroneous in another; and it is by attending to and concesthe distinction between the two great objects of popular ambition, that the means can alone be attained of allaying public discontent, without unhinging the frame of society. There is, in the first place, the love of freedom- that is, of immunity from personal restriction, oppression, or injury. This principle is perfectly innocent, and never exists without producing the happiest effects. Every concession which is calculated to increase this species of liberty is comparatively safe in all ages, and in all places. But there is another principle, strong at all times, but especially to be dreaded in moments of excitement. This is the principle of democratic ambition-the desire CHAP. III. 1789. 153. stituted the great error of Necker's measures. on the part of the people of exercising the powers of sovereignty, of usurping the government of the state. This is the dangerous principle - the desire, not of exercising industry without molestation, but of exerting power without control. The first principle will only produce disturbances when real evils are felt; and with the removal of actual grievance, tranquillity may be anticipated. The second frequently produces convulsions, independent of any real cause of complaint; or, if it has been excited by such, it continues after they have been removed. The first never spreads by mere contagion; the second is frequently most virulent when the disease has been contracted in this manner. It was not the mere duplication of the Tiers Etat What con- which was attended with these disastrous effects. That measure, if proper care had been taken to confine the right of voting for the delegates to persons possessed of an adequate property qualification, and the right of sitting in the States-general to men of respectability, and if the separation of the orders had been preserved, would have been attended with little peril. It was the combination of no property qualification in electors, delegates, or representatives, with that duplication, and the leaving the question of voting by orders or head at the same time unsettled, which was the fatal error. At the very moment when three millions of electors - a number above triple that of those who now hold the franchise among a larger number of inhabitants in the British empire * suddenly, and for the first time, admitted to a right of choosing representatives, for the avowed purpose of reconstructing and regenerating the monarchy, the number of these representatives in the States-general was doubled, and no restraint whatever was imposed by government were * At this time, under the combination of the Reform and original constitution of Great Britain and Ireland, there are 930,000 electors among a population of 27,000,000, or 1 in 30 nearly. In France, on occasion of the election of the States-general, 3,000,000 electors voted out of 25,000,000 persons, or somewhat above 1 in 8. III. 1789. on the prevailing and all-absorbing passion for a union of CHAP. the orders. What was to be expected from such a step but the total overthrow of society? How long would Great Britain, with its sober temperament, practical habits, and centuries of freedom, withstand a similar strain? Not three months. What then was to be expected from the ardent passions, excited feelings, and unbounded enthusiasm of the people of France, roused to the highest pitch by the visions of political regeneration, and then admitted for the first time to the exercise of the highest and most perilous political power? 154. Necker's In moments of political agitation, it should be the object of the statesman to remove all real causes of com- Effect of plaint, but firmly to resist all rapid encroachments of concessions. popular ambition. All restrictions upon personal liberty, industry, or property, all oppressive taxes, all odious personal distinctions should be abandoned; all prosecutions calculated to inflame the passions, and convert a demagogue into a martyr, should be avoided. If punishment is required, the mildest which the case will admit should be chosen; in selecting the species of prosecution, the least vindictive should be preferred. The inflicting of death should, above all things, be shunned, unless for crimes which public feeling has stigmatised as worthy of that penalty. But having conceded thus much to the principles of justice, and the growth of freedom, all attempts at a sudden increase of the power of the people should be steadily opposed, and nothing conceded which tends to awaken democratic passion. In so far as Necker laboured to relieve the real evils of France-in so far as he sought to re-establish the finances, curb the powers of the nobles, emancipate the industry of the peasants, purify the administration of justice, his labours were wise and beneficial; and he did all that man can do to terminate the oppression, and avert the disasters, of his country. In so far as he yielded to public clamour, or the fatal thirst for popular applause, and conceded unnecessarily to the III. CHAP. ambition of the people-in so far as he departed with undue rapidity from ancient institutions, to acquire temporary popularity, he deserves the censure of posterity, and is answerable for all the disasters which ensued. 1789. 155. ability to wield political power. The talent of using political power so as not to abuse Slow growth it is one of the last acquisitions of mankind, and can be of thy gained only by many ages of protected industry and experienced freedom. It can seldom with safety be extended to any considerable body of the people, and this least of all in a nation just emerging from the fetters of servitude. Unless the growth of political influence in the lower orders has been as gradual as the changes of time, or the insensible extension of day in spring, it will infallibly destroy the personal freedom which constitutes its principal object. A certain intermixture of the democratic spirit is often indispensable to the extrication of individual liberty, just as a certain degree of warmth is requisite to vivify and cherish animal life; but, unless the fire is restrained within narrow limits, it will consume those who are exposed to its fierceness, not less in political than in physical life. 156. between the dom and the power. The love of real freedom may always be distinguished Distinction from the passion for popular power. The first is directed. love of free- to objects of practical importance, and the redress of passion for experienced wrongs; the second aims at visionary improvement and the increase of democratic influence. The one complains of what has been felt, the other anticipates what may be gained. Disturbances arising from the first subside, when the evils from which they spring are removed; troubles originating in the second magnify with every victory which is achieved. The experience of evil is the cause of agitation from the first; the love of power the source of convulsions from the last. Reform and concessions are the remedies appropriate to the former; steadiness and resistance the means of extinguishing the flame arising from the latter. The passion of love is not more dependent on the smiles of beauty, than democratic passion on the hope of successive augmentations of |