IV. 1789. CHAP. divisions which prevailed among them rendered it every hour more improbable that they would be able to maintain their ground. The Tiers Etat was unanimous, while a considerable part of the nobility, and the great majority of the clergy, were secretly inclined to their side. The able leaders of the commons thoroughly appreciated the advantages of their present position, and waited calmly for above a month for the arrival of the time when either the necessities of the crown might force government into measures of hostility, or the submission of the other orders, should give them the entire command of the state, or the decided tone of the public voice, daily gathering strength in their favour, might enable them to take the initiative themselves with the prospect of success.1* 1 Hist. Parl. i. 438-443. Mig. 37. Lac. vii. 30. Th. i. 52, 53. 15. of the nobles. This temporary lull in the parliamentary contest of parties affords a favourable opportunity, ere the decisive struggle commences, for surveying the feelings and interests by which they were severally actuated, and the leading characters who obtained their direction. The greater part of the nobles were naturally desirous Sentiments of maintaining the privileges they had inherited from and cahiers their forefathers, and which, in one form or another, they regarded with reason as essential to the existence of government in modern times. Their interests in this, as is generally the case with men, determined their opinions; and they were firmly resolved to resist to the uttermost those pretensions of the commons, which they clearly foresaw would end in prostrating the monarchy at their feet. They perceived that if the whole States-general were united in one chamber, they would, since the duplica * "Vous avez persévéré, avec un fermeté rare, dans une système d'inaction politique infiniment décrié par ceux qui avaient un grand intérêt à vous faire adopter de fausses mésures; c'était pour donner le temps aux esprits de se calmer, aux amis du bien public celui de seconder le vœu de la justice et de la raison; c'était pour vous assurer mieux que même dans la poursuite du bien vous n'excèderiez aucunes bornes; c'était, en un mot, manifester une modération qui convient surtout au courage, ou plutôt, sans laquelle il n'est pas de courage vraiment durable et invincible."-Discours de MIRABEAU, 13th June 1789; Histoire Parlementaire, i. 443. IV. 1789. tion of the Tiers Etat, the nearly equal division of the CHAP. clergy, and the strong body of the noblesse themselves who adhered to the same views, be left in a minority of at least one to two. Rather than incur certain destruction in this way, they were prepared to incur all the hazards of civil war. But, though resolute on this vital question, they had abated much of their original pretensions, and were disposed to concede many points upon which formerly they had been most tenacious. They were no longer the proud and haughty Notables of 1787, determined to relinquish none of their exclusive privileges: the imminence of the danger had made them willing to avert it by large concessions. Their cahiers, though not unanimous, tended in general to the same point. The instructions to the noblesse of Paris, the most important of any in the kingdom, from their rank, influence, and intelligence, recommended the surrender of all exclusive privileges in the matter of taxation: the regular convocation of the States-general, the imposition of all taxes by their consent, and their illegality without it; their legal extension only from one meeting of the States-general to another; the passing of all laws by their consent; the suppression of lettres-de-cachet; the liberty of the press; th closing of the Bastile; the abolition of all feudal rights, on a reasonable indemnity payable in ten years. The great majority of the instructions of the noblesse were in the same terms. The whole elements of real freedom were to be found in these concessions, on which the nobles were almost unanimous. But, in addition to this, a minority of forty-seven, with the Duke of Orleans and the Duke of Rochefoucauld at their head, which carried much weight la Noblesse from the high rank and acknowledged talents of some of de Paris, its members, was disposed to join at once with the com- i. 328, 330. mons, and go the whole length with them of revolutionary innovation.1 The higher classes of the clergy shared the sentiments of the noble families from which they sprang, and were 1 Hist. Parl. IV. 1789. 16. Views and of the clergy. CHAP. equally anxious to maintain the privileges from which they derived advantage; but the great body of the undignified ecclesiastics, who were indignant at their exclusion from all situations of consideration or emolument instructions in the church, participated in the feelings of the third estate, with whom they were more immediately in contact, and might be expected, on any serious struggle, to join its ranks. Taken as a body, the clergy had supported all the efforts of the people for the establishment of their liberties. The vast proportion of their numbers, who were humble curés, destitute of any property, afforded a sufficient security that this would be the case. They had urged the convocation of the States-general. The clergy of Rheims, with their archbishop at their head, demanded, in their instructions to their representatives, the establishment of a national code, embodying the fundamental laws of the monarchy; the regular assembly of the Statesgeneral, the right of taxing themselves, the establishment of personal freedom, security to property, the responsibility of ministers, open eligibility to all the citizens to every employment, a new civil and military code, uniformity of weights and measures, and the abolition of the slave-trade. All the other instructions of the clergy to their representatives contained more or less the same sentiments. It was at a later period in the Revolution, 99. Hist. and in consequence of the treachery and injustice with which they were assailed, that this great body became the lasting and inveterate enemy of the Revolution.1 1 Riv. 8. Lac. vii. 9, teaubriand, xix. 344. Burke, v. Parl. i. 323, 327. Etat. 17. Liberty and equality were the ideas predominant in Of the Tiers the minds of the whole third estate, and of that large party of the clergy which, having risen from its ranks, was identified with its interests. EQUALITY was the great object of their ambition, because the distinctions of rank were the evil which occasioned their discontents. It was not so much absolute freedom which they coveted, as equality of restraint, and the repeal of all those laws which threw their fetters with undue severity upon the CHAP. IV. 1789. lower classes. They would rather have had servitude in common with the privileged ranks, than freedom accompanied with those privileges which drew an impassable line between them. The passion for distinction, as Napoleon afterwards observed, is the ruling principle in France. Equality was demanded because it promised to remove the load which depressed the buoyant ambition of the middle and lower orders of society. Proceeding on these principles, the cahiers of the Tiers Etat were unanimous in demanding the union of the orders and the voting by head; and the instructions in these respects were so precise, that in truth the deputies of that order had no discretionary power on the subject. In addition to this, and all the points conceded by the noblesse, the commons were led, both from the tenor of their instructions and their own wishes, to demand the abolition of incorporations and statutes of apprenticeship of every kind; universal freedom of commerce and labour; uniformity of weights and measures; a relaxation of the penal code ; reformation in the administration of justice; the establishment of a general code of laws, and the restriction of the powers enjoyed by the police. Generally speaking, the instruction of the Tiers Etat pointed to the abolition of practical abuses, to an extent and with a minuteness never carried into effect by the National Assembly; and excepting in the one particular, the union of the orders, gave no countenance whatever to the overthrow of the D'Abr. vii. monarchical authority, or the nourishing of that aspiring Lac. i. 32. ambition which so speedily caused the States-general to overturn the throne.1 1 Parl. Hist. i. 330, 345. Riv. 37, 48 269, 270. 18. the King. The King, who had never tasted one moment of repose since his accession to the throne, had been induced, by Views of financial embarrassments, to convoke the States-general, and looked forward to their assembling as the termination of his difficulties. He in truth loved his people, and expected to meet their representatives with the tenderness of a parent who rejoins his long-lost children. He CHAP. believed himself beloved, because he deserved to be so. IV. Unhappily, it was the fashion to laugh at the idea of a revolution. Reposing under the shadow of the monarchy, men shut their eyes to the possibility of its overthrow, and deemed present institutions stable, because they had never seen them shaken. He had yet to learn that no reliance is to be placed on the affections of mankind when their interests are at stake; that democratic ambition may carry away in a few weeks the most rational; that the force of ancient recollections, strong in periods of tranquillity, is frequently lost in moments of danger ; and that attachment to old institutions is powerful only in those who have shared in their protection. He had adopted from M. Necker two principles very generally received at that period, but of which subsequent experience has amply demonstrated the fallacy-viz. that public opinion is always on the side of wisdom and virtue, and that he could at pleasure sway its impulses. The principle, vox populi vox Dei, doubtful at all times, is totally false in periods of agitation, when the passions are let loose, and the ambition of the reckless is awakened by the possibility of elevation. It would often be nearer the truth to say then-vox populi vox diaboli. Public opinion, in the end, will always incline to the right side; but amid the violence of its previous oscillations, the whole fabric of society may be overthrown. The mariner who descries a coming storm, may with certainty predict that its fury will ultimately be stilled; but he cannot be sure that his own vessel will not previously be sunk in the waves.1 The people of Paris, whose opinions came to have so Vast an influence on the march of the Revolution, looked forward to the States-general as a means of diminishing the imposts; the nobility hoped it would prove the means of re-establishing the finances, and putting an end to the vexatious parsimony of later years; the citizens trusted it would remove the galling fetters to which they were |