Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid. they are commended to our approval as furnishing the only adequate remedy to the injured party for wrongs resulting from unauthorized or illegal acts like those complained of. The injury charged as the result of the acts complained of is a private injury in which the tax-payers of the county of Macon are the individual sufferers, rather than the public. The people out of the county bear no part of the burden; nor do the people within the county, except the tax-payers, bear any part of it. It is therefore an injury peculiar to one class of persons, namely, the tax-payers of the county of Macon. I am of opinion that the action is well brought in the name of the plaintiffs as tax-payers, on behalf of themselves and all others who are similarly interested, and that the state is not a necessary party to the suit. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded. All concur. Judgment reversed. THE WILMINGTON & WELDON RAILROAD COMPANY v. REID. 13 Wallace, 264. Supreme Court of the United States; December Term, 1871. Taxes. Exemption by provisions of charter. Where the charter of a railroad company exempts from taxation the property of the company and the shares therein, a subsequent act imposing a tax upon the franchise, rolling stock, and real property of the com Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. 0. Reid. pany, is void, as it impairs the obligation of the contract in the charter. In the application of such an exemption, the corporate franchise can not be distinguished from other property of the company, and is equally within the protection of the contract. Error from the supreme court of the United States to the supreme court of North Carolina. This was a suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant, as sheriff, from a threatened seizure of the plaintiff's property for non-payment of a tax. The plaintiff was incorporated by the legislature of North Carolina, the act of incorporation providing that "the property of said company and the shares therein shall be exempt from any public charge or tax whatsoever.' Under a subsequent act, a tax was assessed upon the franchise and rolling stock of the company, and certain real estate owned by it, necessary to its business. The company refused to pay the tax, and made this application for an injunction against the collection of it, alleging that the act was void as impairing the obligation of a contract. The court held the act valid, and denied the injunction. To review this judgment the company prosecuted a writ of error from the supreme court of the United States. Carlisle, McPherson, and B. F. Moore, for the plaintiff in error. W. H. Battle, for the defendant in error. DAVIS, J.-It has been so often decided by this court that a charter of incorporation granted by a state creates a contract between the state and the corporators, which the state can not violate, that it would be a work of supererogation to repeat the reasons on which the argument is founded. It is true Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid. that when a corporation claims an exemption from taxation, it must show that the power to tax has been clearly relinquished by the state, and if there be a reasonable doubt about this having been done, that doubt must be solved in favor of the state. If, however, the contract is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning of the parties to it can be clearly ascertained, it is the duty of the court to give effect to it, the same as if it were a contract between private persons, without regard to its supposed injurious effects upon the public interests. It may be conceded that it were better for the interest of the state that the taxing power, which is one of the highest and most important attributes of sovereignty, should on no occasion be surrendered. In the nature of things the necessities of the government can not always be foreseen, and in the changes of time the ability to raise revenue from every species of property may be of vital importance to the state; but the courts of the country are not the proper tribunals to apply the corrective to improvident legislation of this character. If there be no constitutional restraint on the action of the legislature on this subject, there is no remedy, except through the influence. of a wise public sentiment, reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making power. There is no difficulty whatever in this case. The general assembly of North Carolina told the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, in language which no one can misunderstand, that if they would complete the work of internal improvement for which they were incorporated, their property and the shares of their stockholders should be forever exempt from taxation. This is not denied, but it is contended that the subsequent legislation does not impair the obligation of the contract, and this presents the only question in the case. The taxes imposed are upon the franchise and rolling Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid. stock of the company, and upon lots of land appurtenant to and forming part of the property of the company, and necessary to be used in the successful operation of its business. It certainly requires no argument to show that a railroad corporation can not perform the functious for which it was created without owning rolling stock, and a limited quantity of real estate, and that these are embraced in the general term property. Property is a word of large import, and in its application to this company included all the real and personal estate required by it for the successful prosecution of its business. If it had appeared that the company had acquired either real or personal estate beyond its legitimate wants, it is very clear that such acquisitions would not be within the protection of the contract. But no such case has arisen, and we are only called upon to decide upon the case made by the record, which shows plainly enough that the company has not undertaken to abuse the favor of the legislature. It is insisted, however, that the tax on the franchise is something entirely distinct from the property of the corporation, and that the legislature, therefore, was not inhibited from taxing it. This position is equally unsound with the others taken in this case. Nothing is better settled than that the franchise of a private corporation, which in its application to a railroad is the privilege of running it and taking fare and freight,—is property, and of the most valuable kind, as it can not be taken for public use even without compensation. Redfield on Railways, 129, § 70. It is true it is not the same kind of property as the rolling stock, road bed, and depot grounds, but it is equally with them. covered by the general term "the property of the company," and, therefore, equally within the protection. of the charter. It is needless to argue the point further. It is clear Raleigh, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid. that the legislation in controversy did impair the obligation of the contract which the general assembly of North Carolina made with the plaintiff in error, and it follows that the judgment of the supreme court must be reversed. Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. THE RALEIGH & GASTON RAILROAD 13 Wallace, 269. Supreme Court of the United States; December Term, 1871. Taxes. Exemption by provisions of charter. Where the charter of a railroad company exempts from taxation all the property of the company for a certain term of years, and afterwards until the annual profits exceed a certain percentage, subsequent legislation imposing a tax, although the annual profits have not reached the percentage specified, is void, as impairing the obligation of a contract. Error from the supreme court of the United States to the supreme court of North Carolina. This was a suit of the same nature as the preceding case, brought upon a similar state of facts, except that in this case the exemption from taxation of the property of the railroad company was limited by its charter to a term of fifteen years, and until the annual profits should exceed eight per cent., when a tax upon the individual shares of stockholders, not exceeding twenty |