of enforcing all the rights for which he stipulated in the agreement, which is all that he can reasonably ask. * * *

The specifications of error are sustained, and the decree of the court below is reversed, and the bill is reinstated.

* *

SECTION 9.-ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES BY ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT

O'BRIEN V. PEOPLE ex rel. KELLOGG SWITCHBOARD & SUPPLY CO. (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1905. 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108, 108 Am. St. Rep. 219, 3 Ann. Cas. 966.)

Proceedings for contempt by the People, on the relation of the Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company, against John O'Brien, Thomas Queenan, Lee S. Fisher, Jacob Christensen, and Albert Mashek. From judgments sentencing defendants to various penalties, affirmed by the Appellate Court, they bring error.

On May 25, 1903, the Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, and engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling telephones, switchboards, and electrical supplies, with its principal office in Chicago, filed its bill for an injunction in the superior court of Cook county against certain parties named therein as defendants, and prayed for an injunction restraining said defendants from doing certain things mentioned in said bill. A preliminary injunction was issued, which restrained the defendants and their confederates from in any manner interfering with the business of the said Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Company.

On June 3, 1903, the complainant filed a petition in the superior court, which petition stated that persons named therein, since the issuing of said injunction, had been picketing and patrolling complainant's place of business, stopping persons on their way to take employment with complainant, and had been endeavoring, by threats, intimidation, and persuasion, to compel complainant's employés to leave its service, and to prevent persons from seeking employment with complainant, and that the persons named therein had congregated on the streets and approaches to the complainant's factory in order to accomplish these purposes. At a hearing on the petition and affidavits, on June 15, 1903, the court found that Jacob Christensen, S. E. Doty, Charles Heinig, Andrew Emerson, Fred Waggoner, Albert Marshek, and others were guilty of violating the injunction order, and they were each fined the sum of $10.

On July 14, 1903, the complainant filed still another petition. The court found that George Christensen, Albert Mashek, Lee S. Fisher, John Brent, Charles Evans, and John O'Brien had violated said writ of injunction, and ordered that Lee S. Fisher be fined $100, that George Christensen be committed to the county jail for 30 days, that John O'Brien be committed to the county jail for 10 days, that Albert Mashek be committed to the county jail for 60 days, that Charles Evans be fined $25, that John Brent be fined $25, and that R. S. Schoenbacker be discharged.

WILKIN, J. * * It is a well-known rule of law that, in proceedings for contempt in failing to obey an order of court, the respondent may question the order which he is charged with refusing. to obey only in so far as he can show it to be absolutely void, and cannot be heard to say that it is merely erroneous, however flagrant it may appear to be. The judgments of courts cannot be attacked collaterally for mere irregularities. Therefore plaintiffs in error cannot question in this proceeding the sufficiency of the bill upon which the writ of injunction was granted. Courts of chancery have within themselves full power and authority to enforce their official mandates in a summary and effective manner. To say otherwise, would render them powerless and inefficient.

It is again insisted with much earnestness that this proceeding is criminal in its nature, and therefore the defendants below were entitled to be discharged upon their sworn answer, and, if their answer was not sufficient, they could only be punished after they had been tried and convicted by jury. Proceedings for contempt of court are of two classes: those which are criminal in their nature, and those which are designated as purely civil remedies. When the contempt consists of something done or omitted in the presence of the court tending to impede or interrupt its proceedings or lessen its dignity, or out of its presence in disregard or abuse of its process, the proceeding is punitive or criminal, and the penalty is inflicted by way of punishment for the wrongful act, and to vindicate the authority and dignity of the people as represented by their judicial tribunals. In such cases the application for attachment may be made in the original cause, yet the contempt proceeding will be a distinct case, criminal in its nature. Cases of this kind are clearly distinguished from cases where the parties to a civil suit, having the right to demand that the other party do some act for their benefit, obtain an order from a proper court commanding the act to be done, and, upon refusal, the court, by way of executing its orders, proceeds as for contempt, for the purpose of advancing the civil remedy of the other party to the suit. In this class of cases, while the authority of the court will be incidentally vindicated, its power has been called into exercise for the benefit of a private litigant, and not in the public interest, merely. If imprisonment is ordered, it is not as a punishment, but to the end that the other party to the suit may obtain a remedy for the advancement of his own private interest and rights which he could not otherwise maintain.

* * *

Upon this bill being filed, a writ of injunction was ordered for the purpose of protecting the company against the unlawful acts of certain persons; and when the injunction was issued, and the plaintiffs in error were attached for contempt of court, it was primarily because they were injuring the business of the Kellogg Company, and the punishment was inflicted to prevent such injury. While it is true that the dignity of the law and the order of the judicial tribunal have been violated, this was merely incidental to the rights of private individuals. The proceeding for the attachment was civil, and in no sense criminal. The rule is that, when the defendant is attached for contempt of court for a crimiral offense and files a sworn answer, that answer, if sufficient to purge im of the alleged contempt, may be taken as true and the defendant discharged. But this rule applies only where the proceeding is brought to vindicate the law or the dignity of

the court, and does not apply to acts treated as contempts, for the enforcement of orders and decrees as a part of the remedy sought to be enforced. * * *

It is, however, contended that, even though they were not entitled to be discharged upon their sworn answers, they still had the constitutional right to a trial by jury, and could not be legally deprived of their liberty or property without such a trial. Upon the filing of the petitions for contempt and the appearance of the defendants thereto, the court proceeded in the summary to hear the case upon the petitions, answers, and affidavits filed by the respective parties. In 1893 the Legislature of this state passed an act providing for a trial by jury in all cases where a judgment was to be satisfied by imprisonment. Laws 1893, p. 96. In the case of Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 821, we decided that this act did not apply to the case of proceedings for contempt of court, where it was sought to coerce defendant into the performance of the duty which the court had ordered him to perform. * * * These authorities are decisive of the question here raised, and hold that the defendants in such a proceeding as this are not entitled to a trial by jury. * *

We have endeavored to give the material questions raised and discussed in the argument due consideration, and have reached the conclusion that the judgments of the superior court were properly affirmed by the Appellate Court. The judgment of the latter court will accordingly be affirmed.

SECTION 10.-BANKRUPTCY

Section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. Under this grant of power Congress enacted the first National Bankruptcy Act in 1800, but this act was repealed in 1803. The second National Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1841, but, like its predecessor, it was repealed two years later. Again, in 1867, a National Bankruptcy Act was passed, which act remained in force until its repeal in 1878. The present National Bankruptcy Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 9585-9656) was passed in 1898. Several amendments thereto have been adopted since its original enactment.

The primary purpose of a bankruptcy act is to provide the machinery, administrative as well as judicial, for the expeditious and economical collection of the assets of an insolvent person and for the equitable distribution thereof among his creditors. The act is passed largely in the interests of the creditors, although, under the present act the bankrupt usually obtains the benefit of a discharge from most of his legal obligations. In the absence of such a system as that provided for by the Bankruptcy Act, creditors must prosecute independent suits against their common debtor. The prosecution of such actions results in needless expense. Moreover, the property of the judgment debtor will not be distributed proportionately among the creditors, because the extent of their several rights generally will be fixed as of the date of the entry of

their respective judgments. Some creditors are, therefore, likely to be paid in full, while other creditors will receive nothing. Under a system of bankruptcy legislation, all of the property of the bankrupt is placed beyond the reach of all courts except the bankruptcy tribunal, the title thereto vested in a trustee, upon whom is imposed the general duty of distributing it, or the proceeds arising from its sale, among the creditors in proportion to the amount of their respective claims. After the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the custody of the property of the bankrupt vests in the federal court having jurisdiction of the cause.

In the following very brief résumé of some of the more prominent features of the operation of the Bankruptcy Act, we are concerned with three general questions: (1) What persons may be adjudicated bankrupts? (2) Under what circumstances may these persons be adjudicated bankrupts? (3) What is the nature and extent of the rights of the trustee, who is charged with the duties of administering the bankrupt estate, in the property of the bankrupt, and what are his duties with respect to its distributon among creditors?

(1) WHO MAY BE BANKRUPTS?

With respect to the persons who may become bankrupts, the act draws some distinctions between voluntary bankrupts, that is, those persons who, upon their own petition, ask to be adjudicated bankrupts, and involuntary bankrupts, namely, those persons who have been proceeded against by creditors. Section 4 provides, with four exceptions, that any person may be adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt. Section 1, clause 19, defines the word "person" to include corporations and partnerships. The four exceptions to the rule that any person may be adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt are municipal, railroad, insurance, and banking corporations. Notice that the exception concerns corporations engaged in these enterprises, and does not include partnerships engaged in the private enterprises named. There is no provision with reference to the amount of debts which one must owe before one may file a petition in voluntary bankruptcy, and, indeed, there is no requirement that such person be insolvent, although as a practical matter a person would rarely seek an adjudication in voluntary bankruptcy unless he were insolvent.

Not every person who is privileged to obtain an adjudication in bankruptcy upon his own voluntary petition may be proceeded against by his creditors upon their petition in involuntary bankruptcy. With reference to the persons who may be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts the act contains provision with respect to three classes of persons: (1) Natural persons; (2) unincorporated companies; and (3) corporations. Section 4 provides that "any natural person * * * may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt." To this rule, then, are two exceptions; the same section providing that wage-earners and persons engaged chiefly in

farming or the tillage of the soil cannot be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts. Who are wage-earners? Who are farmers? When will a person be engaged chiefly in farming or in the tillage of the soil? Section 1, clause 27, defines a wage-earner as "an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year." This definition is but a partial definition of the term "wage-earner," for there are many persons who earn less than $1,500 per year who could not properly be regarded as wage-earners. Would a schoolteacher earning less than $1,500 per year be a wage-earner, within the meaning of this section? Is a lawyer, physician, broker, or a preacher a wage-earner, within the meaning of this section? What should the test be? 3

With respect to the second exception, may one be a tiller of the soil without being a farmer? Is a stock raiser a farmer? Would one be a farmer who was engaged in raising fruit? Where land has been rented to a tenant, who cultivates it, is the owner a farmer by reason of his receiving an income from the land? A. owns a tract of land and keeps a large herd of dairy cows. He raises very little of his feed. Is he a farmer? A. owns a tract of land, and employs B. to cultivate the land, to raise and care for the crops. A. does no work on the land. B. is paid by the month. Is A. a farmer? Is B. a farmer? Occasionally questions of this nature are presented to the courts. The questions may be further complicated by the requirement that, in order to be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy, one must be chiefly, but not entirely, engaged in farming or tillage of the soil.4

With respect to unincorporated associations, section 4 provides that "any unincorporated company" may be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt. Section 5 further provides that "a partnership, during the continuance of the partnership business, or after its dissolution and before the final settlement thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt." The expression, "any unincorporated company," while broad enough to include all partnerships, was inserted probably for the purpose of including within the scope of involuntary bankruptcy associations other than partnerships. Apparently, therefore, the expression would include associations although not established and conducted for profit.

Not all corporations may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts. In the first place, section 4 provides that only those corporations which are "moneyed, business, or commercial corporations" are subject to involuntary bankruptcy. These three words, "moneyed," "business," and "commercial," indicate rather clearly that Congress

3 See First National Bank of Wilkes-Barre v. Barnum (D. C.) 160 Fed. 245 (1908).

4 See Bank of Dearborn v. Matney (D. C.) 132 Fed. 75 (1904).

5 A leading case on the subject of partnership bankruptcy is Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 33 Sup. Ct. 701, 57 L. Ed. 1029, L. R. A. 1915E, 706 (1913).