mind (d). It is thus precifely the reverfe of invention.

IMAGINATION is much lefs confined in its operations. Even when it exerts itself in the fimpleft manner, when it feems only to prefent ideas unattended with remembrance, it in fome degree displays its creative power. It does not, like memory, professedly copy its ideas from preceding perceptions of sense, nor refer them to any prior archetypes. It exhibits them as independent existences produced by itfelf. It may be queftioned, whether, in fome very peculiar cafes, its power extends not even to the formation of a fimple idea (c). But it is certain that, when it only exhibits fimple ideas which have been derived from the fenfes, it confers fomething original upon them, by the manner in which it exhibits them. Light and heat are ideas

(α) Ουτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον ἐνδέχεται μνημονίύειν, ἀλλ ̓ ἴσι δοξασὸν καὶ ἐλπισὸν ὄντι τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ ̓ ἄισθησις. Ταύτη γὰρ ὄντι τὸ μέλο λον, ἔντε τὸ γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. Ἡ δὲ μνήμη, τοῦ γινόμενου. Τὸ δὲ παρὶν ὅτι πάρεσιν, διον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτι ὁρᾶς οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη μνημονεύιν, ουδε τὸ θεωρούμενον, θεωρῶν καὶ νοῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αισθάνεσθαί φησι, τὸ δὲπίσασθαι μόνον. Ὅταν δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἱνεργειῶν σχῇ τὴν ἐπισήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται τὰς τοῦ τριγύ του, ότι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι τὸ μὲν, ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἡ εθεώρησε, τὸ δὲ, ὅτι ἤκουσεν, ἢ ὅτι ἶιδίν, ἤ, τι τοιοῦτον· δεῖ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημόσ νεύειν, ὄντως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ότι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν, ἡ ᾔσθετο, ε · ἐνόησιν. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤ. περί μνημο

(e) Treatife on Hum. Nat.

which

which memory retains exactly at all times, and whenever we please, we can recollect our having formerly perceived them by our fenfes. But imagination can present these ideas, not as copies, but as originals. We often form them in a cold day, or in a dark night, without reflecting on our having perceived them before; and confider them only as objects which would be agreeable at present, or which we may hereafter experience.

IMAGINATION is ftill more inventive in all its other operations. It can lead us from a perception that is prefent, to the view of many more, and carry us through extensive, diftant, and untrodden fields of thought. It can dart in an inftant, from earth to heaven, and from heaven to earth; it can run with the greatest case and celerity, through the whole compass of nature, and even beyond its utmoft limits. It can tranfpose, vary, and compound our perceptions into an endless variety of forms, fo as to produce numberless combinations that are wholly new (f). Even

Quæ eft enim forma tam inufitata, tam nulla, quam non fibi ipfe animus poffit effingere? ut, quæ numquam vidimus, ea tamen formata habeamus, oppidorum fitus, hominum figuras.-Nihil eft enim, de quo cogitare nequeamus. Cic. de divinat. lib. ii.

in

in fleep, when the fenfes are locked up, and when the exercise of memory is totally fufpended, imagination eminently displays its inventive force; which is then fo great, that "the flow of speech make unpremeditated harangues, or converfe readily in languages that they are but little acquainted with; the grave abound in pleasantries, the dull in repartees and points of wit. There is not a more painful action of the mind, than invention; yet in dreams it works with that cafe and activity that we are not fenfible when the faculty is employed, and we read without ftop or hesitation, letters, books, or papers, which are merely the inftantaneous fuggeftions of our own imaginations (g).”

To the imagination, invention is accordingly referred, even by the generality of mankind. If a poet or an orator only repeat the fentiments of others, or be unable to illustrate his subject with proper images, in

(g) See SPECTATOR, No. 487. Animorum eft ea vis, atque natura, ut vigeant vigilantes, nullo adventitio pulfu, fed fuo motu, incredibili quadam celeritate. Hi cum fuftinentur membris, et, corpore, et fenfibus, omnia certiora cernunt, cogitant, fentiunt. Cum autem hæc fubtra&a funt, defertufque animus languore corporis, tum agitatur ipfe per fefe. Itaque in eo et formæ verfantur, et actiones; et multa audiri, multa dici videntur. Cic. de divinat, lib. ii.

cidents,

cidents, characters, or obfervations, every perfon imputes this defect of invention, to the barrennefs of his fancy. All genuine productions in the arts, are marked with strong signatures of a bright and lively imagination and every original work in fcience, will be found, on examination, to proclaim a force and vigour of the fame power, though the traces of it may not be fo obvious at first view. Imagination is, therefore, a fource of invention. Whether it be the only fource, will appear immediately.

JUDGMENT, in which we comprehend reaJon, from the comparison of ideas and sensations, difcovers relations which are not the objects of sense. But many fubjects admit of the most copious invention, where the things invented are not relations. Whatever influence, therefore, judgment may have in fome kinds of invention, and however neceffary for perfecting the operations of Genius in every kind, its affistance may be, it cannot be reckoned properly the inventive power, as there are many objects of invention, to which it has not an immediate refpect. Besides, even in fcience, where relations are what we want to discover, judgment cannot fearch out or bring

bring into view, the perceptions that are to be compared. They must be fuggefted by fome other power, as we have occafion for them; and till they are fuggefted, judgment has nothing about which it may employ itself; it must remain inactive, and can make no comparison or deduction. Its fole bufinefs is, to obferve the relations of thofe perceptions with which it is fupplied by fense, memory, or imagination, and to produce conviction by its exertion.

Of all the kinds of judgment, reafon has most the appearance of an inventive power, as it not only perceives the connexion of the feveral parts of a proof, but also infers the conclufion from all the parts together. Mr. Locke analyses reason into two powers, Sagacity, and Illation; and afcribes to it four different exercises. "The first and highest "degree of reason, fays he, is the discover"ing and finding out of proofs; the fecond, "the regular and methodical difpofition of "them, and laying them in a clear and fit "order, to make their connexion and force "be plainly and eafily perceived; the third "is, the perceiving their connexion; and "the fourth, a making a right concluD "fion."