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Of the Kinds of Genius.

ITHERTO we have endeavoured to investigate separately the fources from which the diverfities of geius fpring. Id this investigation, it was neceffary to fearch out the varieties incident to those powers which are any ways concerned in the operations of genius; for thefe varieties are the fimple principles, by the combination of feveral of which every distinct kind or form of genius is conftituted. We must now purfae a different method. Every kind of genius derives its denomination moft properly from the nature of the object about which it is employed, or of the end to which it is adapted. The diftinction, therefore, of the kinds of ge nius, may be moft commodiously deduced from the difference of their objects and ends: and diftinguishing them according to these, we must explain each, by combining the prin ciples already established, and pursuing them through their natural conféquences.

SECT

SECT. I.

Genius twofold; for Science, or for the Arts.

HE ends to which Genius may be

ΤΗ adapted, are reducible to two; the

discovery of truth, and the production of beauty. The former belongs to the Sciences, the latter to the arts. Genius is, then, the power of invention, either in fcience or in the arts, either of truth or of beauty.

THERE are great differences between one science and another, and between one art and another. On account of thefe differences, each science and each art requires fomething peculiar in the genius which is fuited to it. I intend not, at prefent, to defcend to the investi gation of these minuter peculiarities: it would be curious; but it would be likewife intricate: at any rate it is naturally pofterior to the illuftration of the more general diftinctions of genius.

THERE is likewise a general analogy among all the sciences, and among all the arts: and therefore we may expect to find some characters common to fcientific genius in all the forms which it affumes, and other characters, diffimilar to thefe, common to all the kinds of TO

genius

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genius which are exerted in the arts. These are the characters which I fhall endeavour to afcertain.

SOME difference between genius for science, and genius for the arts, arises necessarily from the very diversity of their ends. I begin with this. Scientific genius addreffes its difcoveries to the understanding; their end is information; genius for the arts addresses its productions to tafte, and aims at pleafing by them. It is a property of genius, that it keeps the end of the work continually in view, and by the view of it, modifies all the parts of the work, and selects the means which it employs fo as they may be fubfervient to that end. This contributes to diftinguish these two kinds of genius, and to render all their operations and efforts very diffimilar: they confider all their objects in perfectly different lights.

SCIENTIFIC genius leads a perfon to look out only for fuch objects and ideas as imply fome truth, or fuggeft fome new conclufion. Affifted by the conftant perception of this end, any relation is sufficient for introducing fuch objects and ideas; all the affociating principles are put upon the search for them; every object which these principles present, is steddily contemplated in that point of view in which

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which it contributes to this purpofe; all the circumftances of it which contribute to this parpofe, are ftudiously fought out and examined with care; objects and circumstances of objects, which contribute nothing to it, either are not at all fuggefted, or are inftantly . perceived to be ufclefs, and difmiffed without the fmalleft notice. Genius for the arts renders the perfon who poffeffeth it, equally in tent on pleafing tafte by his work. In confequence of its impulfe, objects and ideas fit to gratify tale, are very readily fuggefted to him; they are drawn into his view by their relation to the defign, as well as by the rela tions which they bear to one another; as foon As they ate fuggefted, they are moulded into that form, and placed in that attitude, in Which they promote this defign, and they are contemplated in that form and attitude alone: fuch objects and fuch circumftances of objects as are unfit to pleafe; either do not at all occur to the artift, or, being perceived at one glance to be unfit, are immediately rejected.

By this fixt affociation of fo diffimilar èrids; the two kinds of genius become very un!!kė in all their exertions. In every complex object that can engage our attention, there are two foffs of quatrick; there are fome which

give us pleasure or pain, and there are others' which convey perceptions of an indifferent nature. Genius for the arts directs`the attention chiefly to the former fort, and it leads to confider them only so far as they either immediately produce, or remotely contribute to pleasure or pain. Qualities which appear indifferent to sense, gratify tafte in some fituations: whenever they do, they attract the notice and employ the powers of genius for the arts. The mere perception of extension is indifferent; but the largenefs of its quantity produces grandeur, its terminations form figures either beautiful or fignificant; a just representation of it often displays skill: in all these cases it is a fource of pleasure, and engages the notice and employs the abilities of the poet and the painter. Both those qualities of things which give pleasure or pain, and those which give neither, enter into the sciences and affect the genius adapted to them. But the former are generally confidered abftractedly from the pleasure or pain which they give; and even when these are taken into the account, the philofopher proceeds as if he were infenfible to them, makes them the fubject of cool enquiry, examines what truth Y

they