1

“fion (b).” He might have justly given this as an enumeration of all the fteps which the mind takes in the difcovery of new conclufions: But they are not all to be ascribed to reafon. The first of them, the finding out of ideas or experiments which may serve for proofs, is the province, not of reason, but of imagination. It is imagination likewise, that can be most properly faid to order and difpofe the proofs. It arranges them in a certain difpofition; then reafon furveys them, and examines, whether this difpofition is such as can enable it to perceive their connexion. If it does not, reafon rejects that difpofition; and imagination is again fet a working, arranges them in a different manner, and continues to vary the difpofition, till it either fuggefts one which reafon finds fufficient for its purpose, or till, after having wandered through all the arrangements of its materials that occur to it, it is wearied with the repetition of unsuccessful attempts, and gives over the work as defperate and impracticable. The difpofition, therefore, of the proofs must be afcribed to imagination, though reason always

(5) Efay concerning Human Underfanding. B. iv. c. 17. 32,30

follows

follows in its foot-fteps, keeps pace with it, and recalls it when it has made an useless excurfion. It follows, that the two laft operations which Locke affigns to reafon, are the only ones which properly and strictly belong to it. Its business is, to perceive the connexion or force of the proofs, after they are difcovered and arranged; and from the whole train of them to infer a juft conclufion. This is performed by every man who learns a fcience from the writings or inftructions of others. It must be performed before a perfon can comprchend a demonftration in Euclid, or the proof of any conclufion in philofophy. It implies, not genius, but mere capacity; and is daily accomplished by multitudes who are not able to make any original discovery in the fciences. Indeed, without this, no invention in fcience can be compleated; but without an imagination capable of finding out and ordering the proofs, no invention could be even begun. The chief difficulty in inventing new truths, regards that part which is the work of imagination, the difcovering of fit intermediate ideas, or appofite experiments, and the difpofing of them in fuch a manner that they may lead to juft and

D 2

and important conclufions. It is this that requires genius, and is regarded as its proper province. The reft demands, not invention, but the fame abilities which are neceffary for apprehending the discoveries of other men. A person may be able to perceive, with the greateft eafe and certainty, the connexion and force of proofs which are presented to him in due order, who could not have contrived or arranged these proofs. He may poffefs reason in perfection, and yet be totally ́destitute of invention, originality, and ge nius (1).

FROM these observations, it would appear, that genius of every kind derives its immediate origin from the imagination. Mere imagination, it is true, will not conftitute genius. If fancy were left entirely to itself, it would run into wild caprice and extravagance, unworthy to be called invention. A

(i) In this enumeration, we have not mentioned rafts, a faculty which confeffedly has great influence on genius. The reasons will readily occur. It influences only fome kinds of genius, not all the kinds; but we have here confined ourselves to the confideration of genius in general. Tafte is not a fim-ple, but a derived faculty. In respect of its principles, it is compound of judgment and internal fenfe; (Ejay on Tafte, part ll. fect. 2.) and its effects on genius refemble, fometimes thofe of the one of these powers, and sometimes thofe of the other.

man

man who throws out indigefted notions, contradictory pofitions, trite and vulgar fentiments, or foolish whimfies, is not faid to have invented them, but is rather blamed for not having avoided them. As fancy has an indirect dependence both on fenfe and memory, from which it receives the firft ele-· ments of all its conceptions, fo when it exerts itself in the way of genius, it has an immediate connexion with judgment, which muft constantly attend it, and correct and regulate' its fuggeftions. This connexion is fo intimate, that a man can fcarce be faid to have invented till he has exercifed his judgment (k).But ftill it is true that imagination invents, and judgment only fcrutinizes and determines concerning what it has invented. It is imagination that produces genius; the other intellectual faculties lend their affiftance to rear the offspring of imagination to maturity. It is also true, that in matters of fpeculation, imagination refigns its difcoveries into the hands of reafon, fooner than in the arts, and leaves it more to finish. Yet it always fup

(4) Ego porro ne inveniffe quidem credo eum, qui non judicavit: nec enim contraría, communia, ftulta inveniffe dicitur quifquam, fed non vitasse. Quint, Iuft. Orat, lib, iii. cap. 3.

plies the subject on which reafon is to work. Without judgment, imagination would be extravagant; but without imagination, judgment could do nothing. A bright and vigorous imagination joined with a very moderate judgment, will produce genius, incorrect, it may be, but fertile and extenfive: but the niceft judgment unattended with a good imagination, cannot beftow a single spark of genius. It will form good fenfe, it will enable a man to perceive every defect and error in the discoveries of others; but it cannot qualify him for fupplying thefe defects, or for being himself the author of any new invention. A man of mere judgment, is effentially different from a man of genius. The former can employ his reafon only on subjects that are provided by others; but the latter can provide fubjects for himself. This ability is owing folely to his poffeffing a comprehensive imagination, which the former

wants,

IT is the imagination, therefore, with its operations and laws, that we must especially examine, in order to explain the nature of Genius. The other faculties which affift it, particularly judgment, which is more intimately