Mayor, etc., of Knoxville v. Sanford, Chamberlain & Albers. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF KNOXVILLE v. SANFORD, CHAMBERLAIN & ALBERS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Taxation by. Under an ordinance declaring certain occupations and business transactions privileges, and taxing them as such, among others enumerating “hacks, carriages, drays and wheeled vehicles run for a profit," a firm of merchants are liable who kept a dray used for the hauling of goods to the depot for their non-resident customers and for which service drayage was charged. FROM KNOX. Appeal in error from the Circuit Court at Knox- ville. S. G. HEISKEL for Knoxville. ANDREWS & THORNBURG for Sanford, Chamberlain & Albers. DEADERICK, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an agreed case, showing that defendants are wholesale merchants in Knoxville, and keep a dray and pair of horses, with which they haul from their place of business to the depot, goods sold to their customers to be transported by railroad. For this service they charge drayage, but they charge nothing for delivering their goods to customers in the city, and used their dray for no other purpose. A warrant was issued for failing to take out a license and the recorder fined each of the defendants 35-VOL. 13. Mayor, etc., of Knoxville v. Sanford, Chamberlain & Albers. $3.333, and they appealed to the circuit court. His Honor, the circuit judge, reversed the judgment of the recorder and discharged defendants, and plaintiffs have appealed to this court. The question presented is, are the defendants bound to take out license to run their dray or wagon upon the facts disclosed in the agreement? By an ordinance certain occupations and business transactions were declared privileges and taxed as such, and were not to be pursued without license. Amongst other things enumerated were "hacks, carriages, drays and wheeled vehicles run for profit." It The power to pass the ordinance is not questioned, but defendants insist they are not liable to the tax because the running of the wagon is not their occupation or business, but is only an incident and convenience in the conduct of their business as merchants, and they do not fall within the provisions of said ordinance. They charge only such of their customers drayage as receive their goods by railroad, and do not haul for and receive pay therefor from the public. is also ingeniously argued that running their dray is neither their occupation nor their business. The ordinance taxes the occupations and business transactions specified. The running of the dray to the depot for pay may not be the chief occupation or sole business of defendants, yet it is a business transaction, and although it may not yield sufficient profit to defray the expense of it, it is nevertheless run for pay or profit, as their customers are required to pay for the service rendered. The law and the ordinance treat the bus Lane v. Railroad Company. iness of merchandising as distinct from the running of a dray, and the fact of the latter being useful in the conduct of the former cannot excuse the necessity of obtaining license for both. Although the defendants do not exact pay from all their customers for the service of their wagon, they do charge and receive pay from a large class of persons-their non-resident customers, and fall within the description of the ordinance as being engaged in business transactions for profit or pay. We are of opinion the judgment of the circuit. judge was erroneous and it will be reversed, and judgment will be rendered here aflirming the judgment of the recorder. W. T. LANE, Trustee, v. EAST TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA & GEORGIA RAILROAD COMPANY. BONDS. Coupons. Interest. The endorser of a negotiable State bond, whose liability has been fixed by demand of payment of the bond at maturity, protest for non-payment and notice, is thereby rendered liable for the unpaid coupons then attached to the bond, with interest thereon, without a separate presentment for payment of the several coupons as they fell due, protest for non-payment and notice. FROM M'MINN. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Athens. W. B. STALEY, Ch. Lane v. Railroad Company. BURKETT & LANE for complainant. W. M. BAXTER, A. BLIZZARD and P. B. MAYFIELD for defendants. COOPER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant was held liable, on a former day of the term, as the endorser of certain State bonds, which were duly protested at maturity for non-payment, and notice thereof given to the defendant. The only question raised by the petition for rehearing is whether the defendant is liable for the amount of the unpaid coupons attached to the bonds sued on, with interest thereon since their maturity. The argument in support of the petition for rehearing is that, in order to hold the endorser of the bond liable, it being otherwise as to the maker, it is necessary to present the coupon for payment at maturity, protest the same for non-payment, and give the endorser notice. All of the authorities cited in support of this contention relate to coupons detached from the bonds. If the coupons are in a negotiable form and cut from the bonds, all the authorities agree that they may be treated as negotiable securities, and accordingly presentment, protest and notice to hold an endorser may be required. But the rule is altogether different in regard to coupons allowed to remain attached to the bond. Municipal bonds stipulate on their face for the payment of interest, and therefore the maker will be liable on the coupons although they show no promise on his part: Mayor, etc., v. Potomac Insurance Com Lane v. Railroad Company. pany, 2 Baxt., 296. The bonds sued on in this case expressly call for "interest at the rate of five per cent per annum payable semi-annually." Such a call would be good and make any party liable for the bond equally liable for the interest payments, with interest on each payment, without any coupons: House V. Tennessee Female College, 7 Heis., 128. But the interest stipulated is a mere incident of the debt, even if it be put in the form of detachable coupons, as long as those coupons remain attached to the bond. The holder of the bond, as said by the Supreme Court of the United States, has his option to insist upon payment of the coupon and treat it as a separate negotiable security, or to allow it to run until the maturity of the bond, that is until the principal is payable: Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S., 51, 58. The coupons are mere incidents of the debt as long as they remain attached to the bond, and the same act which fixes the liability of the endorser for the debt equally fixes his liability for the interest, the payment of which is expressly stipulated for in the bond. The coupons cease to be incidents of the debt, and become independent claims only when detached: Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall., 583; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S., 683, 696. Rehearing disallowed. |