Eastman v. Litterer. and continue a business in any county of this State, without obtaining a license from the clerk of such county in accordance with the provisions of the act. Section 18 is: "That every merchant applying for license shall, before receiving the same, execute a bond to the State, with good security, to be approved by the clerk of the county court, conditioned that such merchant will render to the clerk issuing the license, at the end of twelve months from the date of the bond, a true statement, under the oath prescribed by this act, of the amount of capital invested in such business during said twelve months, and will pay to the clerk the tax thereon." The act of 1883, chapter 106, section 3, is: "That merchants shall pay an ad valorem tax upon the capital invested by them of forty cents on each one hundred dollars, and a privilege tax of thirty cents on each one hundred dollars of taxable property; provided, that such privilege tax shall in no case be less than five dollars; and they shall pay a privilege tax of ten cents on each one hundred dollars of their capital so invested for school purposes." Both of the foregoing acts were approved by the Governor, and went into effect on March 30, 1883. On the 9th of the same month another act, passed by the Legislature, had been approved by the Governor, and gone into effect, being chapter 29 of the printed acts, the first section of which reads as follows: "That it shall be lawful for clerks of the various county courts in the State to issue license by the quarter for the exercise of any privilege under the laws of the State." Eastman v. Litterer. If we look alone to the act of 1883, chapter 105, it is clear that while sections 16 and 17, which fix the merchant with a property and privilege tax and require him to take out a license, do not prescribe the time for which the license shall run, the following sections do give directions which contemplate a license for a year. They expressly provide, as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license, the execution of a bond by the merchant conditioned for the making by him, at the end of twelve months from the date of the bond, of a true statement of the amount of capital invested in the business during the twelve months. The statute goes further and provides that the "capital," upon which the merchant is to pay an ad valorem and a privilege tax, is the largest amount of stock on hand at any time in the year. Obviously, the clerk cannot issue a license for one-fourth or onehalf of the year, because the "capital" might be less in one-quarter than in another, whereas the statute requires that the tax for each quarter shall be based upon the largest amount of stock on hand at any one time in the year. These several acts, being all passed by the same Legislature and in pari materia, must, however, be construed together, and harmonized, if possible. Implied repeals are not favored, and the acts of March 30, 1883, do not in express terms repeal the act of March 9th. The latter act, in plain words, authorizes clerks to issue a license by the quarter for the exercise of any privilege under the laws of the State. If the tax can be ascertained in advance, the license . Eastman v. Litterer. may, under the statute, be issued for the shorter period. If it cannot be thus ascertained, and it is clear that it cannot be in the case of the merchant who goes into business for an indefinite length of time, the license must be for the year. The record does not show the fact, but that was probably what was doue in the case before us. And the real question is whether, if the merchant cease to do business within the year, the license and the tax may be cut down to the shorter period. Such a construction of the statute is in accord with the spirit of the whole legislation, and not actually violative of the letter of any part of it; for the provisions of chapter 105, fixing the tax and requiring the license, do not prescribe the time the license shall run, and the subsequent sections are directory, providing for the case where the business is carried on for a year. The license and the bond are merely modes of definitely ascertaining the amount of the tax, without necessarily determining the time of the exercise of the privilege. If, in fact, carried on for less than a year the license and the tax should, under chapter 29, be cut down to the period of actual business, counting by quarters. The judgment is therefore affirmed. 13L 728 15L 199 Grimstead v. Huggins. A. P. GRIMSTEAD, Adm'r, v. W. E. HUGGINS et. al. CHANCERY PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE. Administration. Insolvent estate. If, in the administration in chancery of an insolvent estate, the realty be subject to vendors' liens which are enforced in the suit, and the administrator collects the rents, and, in settlements made under orders of the court, is charged with such rents and allowed his disbursements thereof in the payment of debts and expenses of administration by decrees rendered from time to time in confirming reports by the master of such settlements, the reports not being excepted to, neither the court below nor this court upon appeal by the minor heirs of the deceased, can go behind those decrees, the heirs being all the time before the court by guardian ad litem. FROM DAVIDSON. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Nashville. A. G. MERRITT, Ch. J. P. HELMS for complainant. COVINGTON & ATCHISON for defendants. COOPER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. W. E. Huggins died in 1865, leaving a widow and four children. The widow qualified as administratrix of his estate, and acted as such, but without making any settlement of the administration, until her death in 1868. Before her death she seems to have suggested to the county court the insolvency of her husband's estate. After her death A. P. Grimstead was appointed and qualified as the administrator de bonis non of the estate of W. E. Huggins. On Grimstead v. Huggins. September 29, 1868, he filed the original bill in this cause against the children and creditors of his intestate, to remove the administration of the estate from the county to the chancery court, and to settle the same as an insolvent estate. Such proceedings were had in the cause that the insolvency of the estate was ascertained and declared, the debts ascertained, the realty sold, and the assets distributed. A. P. Grimstead died, and the cause was revived on July 20, 1883, against A. J. Roper, as his administrator, over his protest, and a reference made to the clerk and master to report to report the real the real estate of which W. E. Huggins died possessed, the amount received therefrom by A. P. Grimstead, and the taxes paid by him. The master made a report accordingly, from which it appeared that Grimstead had collected, between 1868 and 1873 inclusive, a certain amount of rents after deducting taxes paid. The children then moved for judgment against A. J. Roper, as administrator of Grimstead, for the net balance of rents thus found. But the chancellor was of opinion, and so decreed, that these rents had been reported to the court as collected and paid out on the debts of the estate in the administration suit, and that these reports had been confirmed by the court without exception, the rights of the parties being thereby concluded. The children appealed. W. E. Huggins had died seized and possessed of three tracts of land, each of which was encumbered with a lien for unpaid purchase money, in satisfaction of which they were sold. He had sold two other |