take place in us by means of different organs. The voluntary motions, for instance, are executed by means of the nervous systems of the vertebral column: the functions of sense are each attached to a different internal and external apparatus. It is true, that men are not willing to admit the compari. son of the voluntary movements and the functions of the senses with the moral qualities and intellectual faculties, because these first functions are regarded as material. But, as these functions are performed with consciousness, and in part voluntarily, this would imply that organs, purely material, have consciousness and will. This doctrine would approach much nearer to materialism than mine. We should even find ourselves obliged, after the example of a great number of philosophers, to include among the properties of matter, memory, intelligence, imagination, the affections, passions, propensities and inclinations. What could prevent these materialists from going one step further, and allowing to matter other faculties, as the reason and the will, which are called, by preference, faculties of the soul and mind. The case is very different in my manner of viewing the subject, and iny doctrine is not open to any of these objections. There exists, according to my view, only one single principle, which sees, feels, tastes, hears, and touches, which thinks and wills. But, in order that this principle may gain a consciousness of light and sound, that it may feel, taste and touch, that it may manifest its different kinds of thoughts and propensities, it has need of different material instruments, without which the exercise of all these faculties would be impossible. It results, then, from this discussion, that those who charge me with materialism, because I regard material conditions as indispensable to the exercise of the faculties of the soul, confound these faculties with the instruments, by means of which they act. It also results, that the brain being double, anatomists are forced to admit the plurality of these material conditions: it finally re VOL. I. 18 sults, that the profoundest writers of all ages have subjected the exercise of the faculties of the soul and mind to material organs; and that, consequently, if this truth establishes materialism, we must make this charge against all the physicians and philosophers that ever flourished, and even against the fathers of the church, and the apostles. Of Fatalism. We have seen that, under the name of materialism, very different things have been included; it is the same with fatalism. If it be affirmed that every thing in the world, and even the world itself, is necessary; that whatever is and happens, is the effect of chance or of a blind necessity, and that no Supreme Intelligence ever has, or at present does concern itself with existing objects, this doctrine is a species of fatalism, which differs very little from atheism. But this fatalism has nothing in common with the doctrine, which asserts the innateness of the faculties of the soul and mind, and their dependence on organization. I cannot, therefore, in this sense be accused of fatalism. Another species of fatalism is, that by which it is taught that, in truth, there exists a Supreme Being, the Creator of the Universe, as well as of all the laws and all the properties which exist in it; but that he has fixed these laws in an immutable manner, so that what happens, cannot happen otherwise. In this system, man is necessarily drawn along by the causes which lead him to act, without his will having any influence. His actions are always a necessary result, without voluntary choice, and without moral liberty; they are neither punishable nor meritorious, and the hope of future recompense vanishes, as well as the fear of future punishment. This is the fatalism of which superstitious ignorance accuses the physiology of the brain; that is to say, the doctrine of the functions of the noblest organ on earth.? I have incontestably proved, that all our moral and intellectual dispositions are innate; that none of our propensities, none of our talents, not even understanding and will, can manifest themselves, independently of this or ganization. Add to this, that man has no part in endowing himself with the faculties proper to his species, nor, consequently, with such and such propensities and faculties. Now, must we infer that man is not master of his actions? that there exists no free choice, and, consequently, can be no merit or demerit in any action ? Before refuting this conclusion, let us examine, with all the frankness worthy of true philosophy, to what degree man is subjected to the immutable laws of creation; to what extent we must acknowledge a necessity, an inevitable destiny, or fatalism? To disentangle these confused notions, is the best means of placing the truth in a clear light. Man is obliged to acknowledge the most powerful and most determinate influence of a multitude of things on his happiness or misery, and even on his whole conduct, without being able, of his own will, to add to or diminish this influence. No one can call himself into life: no one can choose the period, the climate, the nation, where he shall see the light of day: no one can fix the manners, the customs, the laws, the form of the government, the religion, the prejudices, the superstitions, with which he shall be surrounded from the moment of his birth: no one can say, I will be servant or master, elder or younger; I will have robust or feeble health, Í will be a man or woman; I will have such a temperament, such inclinations or talents; I will be foolish, idiotic, simple, intelligent, a man of genius, violent or calm; of a sweet or peevish temper, modest or proud, heedless or circumspect, cowardly or inclined to debauchery, submissive or independent: no one can determine the prudence, or the folly of his instructors; the hurtful or useful examples he shall meet, the results of his connections, fortuitous events, the influence which external things shall have on him, the condition of himself or his parents; or the sources of the irritation which his passions and his desires shall experience. So far as the relations of the five senses to external objects, so far as the number and the functions of the viscera and the limbs have been fixed in an immutable manner; so far is nature the source of our inclinations, our sentiments, our faculties. Their reciprocal influence, their relations with external objects, have been irrevocably determined by the laws of our organization. As it does not depend on us to hear and see, when objects strike our eyes and our ears, so are our judgments the necessary results of the laws of thought. "Judgment," says M. de Tracy with reason, "is independent of the will, in this sense, that when we perceive a real relation between two of our perceptions, it is not free for us to feel it otherwise than as it is; that is, as it must appear to us by virtue of our organization, and such as it would appear to all beings organized like ourselves, if placed precisely in the same position. It is this necessity, which is essential to the certainty and reality of all our knowledge. For, if it depended on our fancy to be affected by a large thing as if it were small; by a good thing as if it were bad; by a true thing as if it were false, there would no longer exist any reality in the world, at least for us. There would be neither largeness nor smallness, good nor evil, falsehood nor truth; our fancy alone would be every thing. Such an order of things cannot be conceived, and it implies inconsistency." Since the primitive organization, the sex, age, temperament, education, climate, form of government, religion, prejudices, superstitions, &c., exercise the most decided influence on our sensations, ideas, and judgments, and the determinations of our will; on the nature and force of our propensities and talents, and consequent ly on the primary motives of our actions, we must confess that man, in many of the most important moments of his life, is subjected to the power of destiny, which sometimes fixes him to a rock, like the inert shell-fish, and sometimes raises him in the whirlwind, like the dust. It is not then surprising, that the sages of Greece, the Indies, China, and Japan, that the Christians of the east and west, and the Mahometans, should have mingled with their several doctrines this species of fatalism. From periods the most remote, men have derived from the Deity our moral and intellectual faculties; in all ages it has been taught that all the gifts of men come from heaven; that God from all eternity has chosen the elect; that man, of himself, is incapable of any good thought; that all the difference which exists between men, with respect to their qualities, comes from God; that it is only those, to whom it has been given by superior power, who are capable of certain actions; that each one acts according to his innate character, just as the figtree does not bear grapes, nor the vine figs, and as sweet water cannot flow from a bitter fountain; in fine, that all cannot find out the mysteries of nature, nor the secrets of God. It is this same fatalism, this same inevitable influence of superior powers, which has been taught us by the fathers of the church. St. Augustine,* would have this same doctrine preached, in order to exhibit clearly the belief of the infallibility of Providence, and our entire dependence on God. แ As," says he,† "no one can give himself life, so no one can give himself understanding." If some persons do not understand the truth, it is, according to him, because they have not received the necessary capacity to comprehend it. He refutes the objections, which would be hence drawn, against the justice of God, and remarks, that the grace of God has no more distributed temporal goods equally to all, such * Lib. de bono perserverantiæ, ch. 20-2. + Lib. de fide, c. 1. |